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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines three periods in Euro-American history that appear disparate
but reflect the West’s changing relationship with the Muslim majority countries and with
Muslims, in particular with Muslim women, in Muslim-majority countries, the United
States, and the United Kingdom. Specifically, this dissertation examines how Muslim
women’s agency in the United States evolved from the erotic, provocative performance
of the hootchy-kootchy at the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition to the political and
economic activism after post-September 11th, the Trump Era, and finally a different kind
of agency through radicalization through the Islamic State (IS). The structure of this
dissertation uses the voice of the narrator Scheherazade, from the 1001 Arabian Nights,
co-opted by the Western literary canon, secularized, and made into a fairy tale princess
through popular culture into a secular entity. It also uses the post-9/11 site of “Ground
Zero” as both the actual and metaphorical site where Muslim women’s agency and
visibility, dictated until this point by popular culture, media, and fairy tale, began to
evolve into a more assertive presence both within the Muslim communities in the West
but also as citizens of Western nations. The research for this dissertation draws upon a
cross-section of the material culture from the Maghreb, the newly industrialized United
States, political protest, entrepreneurship, and social media woven together to illustrate
a century of navigating a religious, social, and political identity and citizenship borne of
conflict with, and assimilation within, Western nations.
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any, Muslims.
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Hajj/Hadj – The annual pilgrimage to Mecca. Hajj/Hadj is one of the
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Hijab – For the purposes of this dissertation, hijab is defined as a scarf or
fabric covering of a woman’s head that does not obscure her face and
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Hijrah – Refers to the early Muslim community’s flight from the pagan
stronghold of Mecca to Medina. The Medinans offered sanctuary to
Muhammad and his early followers. In the context of contemporary issues,
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Jihad – There are three separate forms of jihad. In this dissertation, I use the
popular usage of jihad, which is a shortened form of “jihad by the sword.”
This type of jihad became more prevalent in the 20th century with the rise
of Islamist thought and postcolonialism.
Muhajirah – The feminine version of muhajid (m.), one who is engaged in
jihad. In the context of contemporary extremist movements, including the
Islamic State, the title of muhajirah is widely used by women who
participate in jihad as non-combatants but supporters of male fighters.
Purdah – An antiquated word for seclusion, sometimes used
interchangeably with harem. It may also extend to dress in which a
woman is completely covered and does not interact with men who
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are not her relations. Purdah also exists in some Hindu
communities.
Salafism – School of thought within Sunni Islam that looks back to the first
three generations of Islam for guidance on practice and belief. The
movement is the product of Western colonialism. In the 21st century, it is
the predominant iteration of Sunni Islam followed by extremist groups like
the Islamic State (IS).
Umma(h) – Originally referred to the early community of Muslims but
expanded in contemporary understanding to encompass the entire
Muslim world regardless of national identity or citizenship in nonMuslim countries.
Wahhabism – Ideologically related to Salafism, Wahhabism is another
interpretation of Islam rooted in Sunni Islam. Its origins are attributed to
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now Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism is considered by some to be distinct from
Salafism, as Wahhabism’s center of political and social power is
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appeal. Despite these differences, both interpretations of Sunni Islam
have significant ideological overlap.
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“She derived, however, great consolation, (during the tightening of the bowstring)
from the reflection that much of the history remained still untold, and that the petulance of her
brute of a husband had reaped for him a most righteous reward,
in depriving him of many inconceivable adventures.”
- “The One-Thousand-and-Second Tale of Scheherazade.”
(Edgar Allan Poe, 1845)1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is set among three periods in Euro-American history that appear
disparate but reflect the West’s changing relationship with the Muslim majority countries and
with Muslims in Muslim-majority countries, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The
organization of this dissertation from the Columbian Exposition in 1893 to the emergence of the
Islamic State (IS), traces the emergency of an umma (the global community of Muslims)
negotiating boundaries of nation states and identity in the context of postcolonialism.2 The fact is
that there was engagement with the Middle East and Muslim-majority countries during the earlymid 20th century, but it was mediated by colonial governments, not indigenous rulers. European
governments stymied the efforts of independence movements until the mid-20th century when the
influence of the Muslim Brotherhood (1928) expanded thanks to the work of Egyptian scholaractivist Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) and the success of other independence movements galvanized
other anti-colonial groups. In this timeline, this work highlights important moments in the postcolonial decades of the Muslim-majority countries: Algerian Independence (1962); the Iranian
Revolution (1979); and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and the social changes among
Muslim communities in the West that were precipitated by these events. These events were
precipitated by resistance to Western interference in a desire for national autonomy. A major

1

2

Edgar Allen Poe, “The Thousand-and-Second-Tale of Scheherazade,” Godey’s Lady’s Book, February 1845.
Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Penguin Books, 1979).

1

element of these three historical moments was the weaponizing and propagandizing of women’s
bodies and intense scrutiny of Muslim women living outside of the borders of Muslim-majority
countries, regardless of whether or not they claimed citizenship in any of these countries.3 Much
has been written about Muslim women claiming identities and modes of agency within Muslimmajority countries and about how Muslim women are perceived in the West, but material on how
Muslim women negotiate identity and agency in the West remains limited.4 This dissertation
connects the earliest iterations of Muslim women in this periodization through the 1001 Arabian
Nights (1704).
This work uses Scheherazade and the 1001 Nights and Ground Zero to structure its
argument, but unlike the 1001 Nights, there is no conclusion, no happy ending where violence
abruptly ends and Scheherazade can finally rest as a Sultana and mother. Unlike Ground Zero,
there is no monument to the evolving struggle for citizenship or historical markers
acknowledging Muslims or their contribution to the history of the United States. Over a century
since the Columbian Exposition in 1893 and twenty years since the September 11th attacks,
Muslims, especially Muslim women, continue to navigate communities where their presence is
tolerated and problematic. They remain the subject of media stories with recycled tropes of
oppression and gendered violence. In recent months, as countries begin to re-open in anticipation
of the end of the Covid-19 Pandemic, banning veiling as a form of counter-terrorism has

Jessica Davis, Women in Modern Terrorism: From Liberation Wars to Global Jihad and the Islamic State (New
York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017): 13.
Juliane Hamer, American Muslim Women, Religious Authority, and Activism: More than a Prayer (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 2012). Hamer’s study of Muslim American women’s activism is the most recent
comprehensive study of Muslim American women. Other texts focus on “normalizing” Islam through conversion
narratives or immigrant experiences writing about a non-threatening, what I refer to as a “neighborhood Islam.” See:
G. Willow Wilson, The Butterfly Mosque: A Young American Woman’s Journey to Love and Islam (New York:
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2010); Ayser Salman, The Wrong End of the Table: A Mostly Comic Memoir of a Muslim
Arab American Woman Just Trying to Fit In (New York: Skyhorse, 2019); and Sabeeha Rehman, Threading My
Prayer Rug: One Woman’s Journey from Pakistani Muslim to American Muslim (New York: Arcade Books, 2017).
3

4
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traction.5 The pandemic brought a lull in anti-Muslim violence (shifted to Asians and AsianAmericans) but in correlation with the return to normal life is a resurgence of Islamophobia and
counterterrorism measures that focus on aesthetics rather than social services of education.6
Despite these challenges, Muslim women continue to force a paradigm shift in the way their
image is articulated through commerce, worship, politics, and political violence.
In 1979, Edward Said’s Orientalism named the phenomenon that informed and framed
every interaction between “West” and “East.”7 Said acknowledged that Europe’s collective
anxiety about Muslims and the Muslim majority countries was justified by the trauma of both
conquest (Spain, 711 C.E.) and the threat of conquest (Vienna, 1529 C.E.).8 A centuries-long
project of routing Muslims and their influence culminated with the decline of Muslim power and
Europeans (and later Americans) recasting the Islamic “East” to the Christian “West” as a
contrast between licentiousness and complacency to modesty and industry.9 In the 19th century,
the power of Orientalism reached its zenith as the “East” became something that the “West”
could control politically and culturally.10 Women occupying this Orientalist landscape are
“usually creatures of a male power-fantasy. They express unlimited sensuality, they are more or

Voice of America News, “Muslim Group, UN Rights Office Object to Swiss Veil Vote,” Voice of America, March
9, 2021. https://www.voanews.com/europe/muslim-group-un-rights-office-object-swiss-veil-vote. Accessed March
14, 2021. Sri Lanka also announced the week of March 8, 2021 that they would seek to ban the full-face veil as the
country anticipates a return to in-person services for Easter Week. Other sources claim it is a move to appease the
country’s Buddhist majority. See: Shereena Qazi and Easwaran Rutnam, “‘Racist agenda’: Fear, worries over Sri
Lanka’s burqa ban,” Al-Jazeera, March 14, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/14/all-about-control.
Accessed: March 14, 2021.
Voice of America, “Swiss Veil Vote.”
Said, Orientalism, 50.
Said, Orientalism, 59. Said refers to the European interaction with Muslims as the “Trauma of Islam.” The
conquest of the Iberian Peninsula (711) and the incursion of Muslims as far into European lands as the Gates of
Vienna (1529). Anxiety about Islam was present from the first century of revelation as the new religion made its
way from Mecca to Seville. See also: Maxime Rodinson, Europe and the Mystique of Islam (London: I.B. Tauris,
2002) and W. Montgomery Watt, The Influence of Islam on Medieval Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1994).
Said, Orientalism, 59.
Said, Orientalism, 244.
5
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less stupid, and above all they are willing.”11 The template that emerged from Orientalist
scholarship, art, and literature was of a Muslim woman with autonomy created by and bestowed
upon her by a man.12 She was confined by the walls of a harem, guarded by eunuchs, or, as
discussed later, clever salesmen.13 Her presence at the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition in
Chicago made the Muslim woman a tangible commodity capable of being mass produced.
Various performers took on the persona of the belly dancer, “Little Egypt,” and joined traveling
carnivals bringing the exoticism of the “East” and a literally and figuratively stripped-down
version of Muslim womanhood to towns and cities across the United States.14 The diaphanous
belly dancer became the template for Muslim womanhood until this artificial form was contested
and challenged by Muslim women in America, Europe, and in Muslim-majority countries.
Postcolonialism, beginning with the French retreat from Lebanon (1946) and the end of British
Mandate rule in Palestine (1948), ushered in an era of Muslim women negotiating identities that
challenged or dovetailed with Western influences, much of it predicated on the degree of
Western hegemony and violence their communities experienced.15 This is where the figure of

Said, Orientalism, 207
Mary Roberts, Intimate Outsiders: The Harem in Ottoman and Orientalist Art and Travel Literature (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2007). See also: Sarah Graham Brown, Images of Women: The Portrayal of Women in
Photography of the Middle East, 1860-1950 (London: Quartet Books, 1988) and Julie F. Codell and Dianne Sachko
MacLeod (Eds.), Orientalism Transposed: The Impact of the Colonies on British Culture (London: Scholar Press,
1999).
Sol Bloom, The Autobiography of Sol Bloom (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1948). Bloom’s legacy will be
discussed later in this dissertation. He was the salesman who organized and imported the dancers and other
inhabitants of the “Street in Cairo” for the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition. Despite his commercial identity, he
remains an important agent in the story of Muslim women’s agency and identity in the United States due to his role
in the Columbian Exposition.
Donna Carlton, Looking for Little Egypt (International Dance Discovery, 1995). Carlton’s text is the only
substantive examination of the elusive character from the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition. “Little Egypt”
represented multiple iterations of belly dance and Arab and Muslim performers across the United States. The
original “Little Egypt” is never identified.
Mounira Charrad, States and Women’s Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco (Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), 51.
11

12

13

14

15
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“Little Egypt” gave way to a more dynamic, culturally, and religiously aligned fictional iteration
of Muslim women: Scheherazade.
SCHEHERAZADE: SITUATING THE STORYELLER
The character of Scheherazade is the most recognizable character from Arabic literature
and also the most malleable. Over the three centuries since the 1001 Arabian Nights was
introduced in Europe – first in French, and then later translated into English – the heroine of the
tales, whose appearance bookends each of the stories, has appeared across many mediums. In
every iteration of her tales, save for one written by the American novelist, Edgar Allan Poe, she
emerges as virtuous, faithful, and wise, preserving her life, along with the lives of her sister,
Dunyazad, and the young women of her kingdom, by reforming the aggrieved Sultan Shahryar
through her tales.16 She takes the place of a wife whose voracious, adulterous sexual appetites
ruined her husband’s faith in women, and restores them not only through her endless tales, but
also through her virtue. At the end of the 1001 Nights, Scheherazade is the mother of three
princes and her husband’s faith in women is restored through the honor of his storyteller wife.
However, Scheherazade as a character is more complex than her storytelling and represents a
more nuanced encounter between East and West; Islam and Christianity. To fully understand the
utility of Scheherazade as a storyteller beyond the 1001 Arabian Nights, it is necessary to draw
upon archival fragments of the literature, the early Muslim majority countries, and the United
States’ intermittent engagements with the Muslim Middle East. The 1001 Arabian Nights is

The American novelist, Edgar Allan Poe, drawing-upon the series’ astonishing popularity in translation, published
an addendum to the storyteller’s fate in his short story, “The Thousand-and-Second-Tale of Scheherazade” in
Godey’s Lady’s Book in February 1845. At the conclusion of Poe’s tale, the storyteller, having bored her royal
husband, is sentenced to death: “These words, as I learn from the "Isitsoornot," both grieved and astonished
Scheherazade; but, as she knew the king to be a man of scrupulous integrity, and quite unlikely to forfeit his word,
she submitted to her fate with a good grace. She derived, however, great consolation, (during the tightening of the
bowstring,) from the reflection that much of the history remained still untold, and that the petulance of her brute of a
husband had reaped for him a most righteous reward, in depriving him of many inconceivable adventures.”
16

16

5

situated in the history of Islam as much as the Qur’an is, first as an oral tradition and then as a
written one, a means of transmitting and interweaving religion and culture.17 The 1001 Nights
offers a snapshot that is less discomfiting than that of the Qur’an, which as Said illustrated in
Orientalism is too proximate to Christianity for comfort.18 Stripped of its historical context, its
original preface that included the shahada, and replete with fantastic illustrations, it represents a
firm boundary between Christianity and Islam, but one which the storyteller, Scheherazade,
transgresses.19
The earliest fragment of the 1001 Nights was dated in 1945 by the Islamic historian,
Nabia Abbott to the year 879 C.E.20 Abbott’s analysis of the fragment is significant and often
overlooked in discussions of the 1001 Nights. First, the fragment of the 1001 Nights is written on
paper, a commodity that was introduced to Iran via Chinese captives in Samarkand, dates to
approximately the 9th century C.E (266 A.H.).21 Neither Persians nor Arabs had access to paper
prior to the 7th century, relying instead on papyrus, skins, and oral storytelling to preserve
religious, literary, and social histories.22 Second, Abbott draws our attention to the style of
calligraphy used to copy the text, “It is a light but well-schooled hand used at the time primarily
for the smaller Qur’ans and occasionally for other valued works of a religious and linguistic
character” and it is limited to the first three centuries of Islam, making the origin of the 1001

Mustafa Shah and M.A.S. Abdel Haleem (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Qur’anic Studies (London: Oxford
University Press, 2020).
Said, Orientalism, 59.
David Ghanim, The Sexual World of the Arabian Nights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 7. See
also: Marilyn Jurich, Scheherazade’s Sisters: Trickster Heroines and their Stories in World Literature (New York:
Praeger, 1998).
Nabia Abbott, "A Ninth-Century Fragment of the "Thousand Nights" New Light on the Early History of the
Arabian Nights." Journal of Near Eastern Studies 8, no. 3 (1949): 129-64.
A.H. is the abbreviation for “After the Hijra.” The Hijra was the early Muslim community’s flight from Mecca to
Medina in 622 C.E. It is from this historical moment that the Islamic calendar originates. For the purposes of this
dissertation, I will use A.H. in the introduction and when referencing important historical moments related to the
Islamic calendar, but will not translate every date in the Gregorian calendar to the Hijra.
Paul McMichael Nurse, Eastern Dreams: How the Arabian Nights Came to the World (London: Viking Press,
2010), 75.
17

18

19

20
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22
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Nights tantalizing proximate to the revelation of Islam.23 Finally, Abbott notes from the
fragments that the introduction to the text is written as, “A Book of Tales from a Thousand
Nights. In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate ()ﺑﺴﻢ ﷲ اﻟﺮﺣﻤﻦ اﻟﺮﺣﯿﻢ.”24 The story is
introduced as if it were a chapter of the Qur’an, commencing with an invocation to Allah, adding
a dimension of reverence to the text that is missing from modern translations that excise the
tales’ relationship to the Muslim majority countries. What remains unknown is how many of the
tales predate Islam or if they came to be anthologized as a single work in the 9th century. Abbott
argues that the tales originated in Iran as, Hazar Afsana (“A Thousand Fanciful Tales”) and that
the 1001st night was added much later.25 Abbott situates this fragment of text in Syria, rather than
the Tales’ traditional point of origin in Baghdad, Iraq.26 In the version that has come down to
Western audiences, the tales are centered around the rule of the Caliph of Baghdad, Harun AlRashid (766-809 C.E.) during the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258). This period of Harun AlRashid’s rule is considered to be the peak of the “Golden Age of Islam,” with an empire that
stretched to the Mediterranean and down the Silk Road.27 The fragment in Abbott’s study from
following Harun Al-Rashid’s rule is so limited that we do not know if the tales originally

Abbott, “A Ninth-Century Fragment,” 131.
Abbott, “A Ningth-Century Fragment,” 132. The Bismillah is considered to encompass the entire essence of the
Qur’an and is stated by Muslims as a preface to any significant undertaking. Its inclusion in this early iteration of the
1001 Nights is important because it elevates the tales above simply the act of storytelling and indicates that the
contents are important for reasons beyond entertainment. The early iterations of the tales likely communicated
Islamic belief, custom, and culture in an accessible and entertaining manner. Later iterations became more like fairy
tales, but echoes of Muslim identity are still reflected in the prose.
Abbott, “A Ninth-Century Fragment,” 133.
Nurse, Eastern Dreams, 123.
The “Golden Age of Islam” was a period of rule during the ‘Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258 C.E.). Baghdad was the
center of learning (medical, theological, linguistic) and a crossroads between East and West. The caliphate, but
especially Baghdad, was the site of cultural exchange. See Amira K. Bennison, The Great Caliphs: The Golden Age
of the ‘Abbasid Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) for an overview of the ‘Abbasid Empire. The
term was first applied in the 19 century by Josias Leslie Porter in his book A Handbook for Travelers in Syria and
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contained in the folio included allusions to the caliph or the cosmopolitan capital of Baghdad.
However, although Harun Al-Rashid is often referenced in the tales and in analyses of them, they
were not written as a hagiographic portrait of the Caliph.
Significantly, analysts of the Arabian Nights and Scheherazade often overlook the text’s
elevation of a female character in a book that originated in the Muslim majority countries. The
Moroccan sociologist, Fatima Mernissi, who spent her childhood in a harem in Morocco
(Dreams of Trespass, 1994) waited until the end of her career in Quranic exegesis to tackle the
phenomenon of Scheherazade.28 In her last book, Scheherazade Goes West: Different Cultures,
Different Harems (2001), Mernissi uses Scheherazade of the tales she was told as a child, and not
the contemporary Western iteration, as a traveling lens through which to study the differences
between the genders in the West versus the East.29 Mernissi’s analysis continues her memoirs’
process of reconciliation of her past inside her father’s harem with her career as a sociologist,
theologian, and feminist. Framed as both a travelogue and an analysis of the 1001 Nights, she
makes her way through various European cities on her book tour, framing those experiences in
the context of the 1001 Nights. Ultimately, through her use of Scheherazade, she concludes that
the difference between East and West is the forms of spatial limitations put on women: in the
West, women aspire to beauty, and youth, while making oneself physically small so as to not
take-up space. In the Muslim World, women are not cloistered in aesthetics but in segregated
spaces (not related to veiling) meant to control and limit their agency.

Fatima Mernissi, Dreams of Trespass: Tales of a Harem Girlhood (London: Perseus Books, 1995). See also: Hoda
Shaarawi, Harem Years: The Memoirs of an Egyptian Feminist (New York: The Feminist Press, 1987) and Leila
Ahmed, A Border Passage: From Cairo to America—A Woman’s Journey (New York: Penguin Books, 1999).
Contemporary scholars of women and gender in Islam like Mernissi and Ahmed published memoirs in the late
1990s about childhoods inside traditional households with harem-like arrangements. Hoda Shaarawi’s memoirs are
considered the first of the “harem memoir” genre and the formulaic harem childhood to liberated adulthood.
Fatima Mernissi, Scheherazade Goes West: Different Cultures, Different Harems (New York: Washington Square
Books, 2001).
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The fluidity of borders is evident in Abbott’s fragment of the 1001 Nights and Mernissi’s
travels, but also in the work of Muslim-American writers. In her essay, “My Arabian
Superheroine (2013)”, Alia Yunis describes Scheherazade as “a feminist before the word became
part of Western society. While she was hanging out in the Middle East, Cinderella, Sleeping
Beauty, and Rapunzel were self-absorbedly waiting to be rescued.”30 Yunis uses Scheherazade as
a tool for asserting her identity as a first-generation Arab Muslim in white American suburbia
emphasizing her Lebanese and Palestinian identities, Scheherazade is a vehicle through which
she can perform her “Arabness” and control the narrative of being brown, Arab, and a woman.
Like Mernissi, Yunis negotiates space between competing identities and worlds and the
dichotomy between East and West. Scheherazade is an ideal vehicle to navigate and express
these tensions, adding dimensionality by simply speaking as a woman from a Muslim-majority
country. The 1001 Nights are “often seen as the Muslim counterpart to European fairy
tales…unlike most Western fairy stories, good does not inevitably triumph over evil,” argues
Paul McMichael Nurse in Eastern Dreams: How the Arabian Nights Came to the World (2010).
Nurse emphasizes this important element of the 1001 Nights and, by extension, Scheherazade’s
role in them: it is not a fairy tale world of black-and-white dichotomies, but a series of complex
social interactions and exchanges that are fantastical, but also deeply human. The character of
Scheherazade is the privileged daughter of the Sultan Shahryar’s Vizier, which grants her
immense privilege, but she is also a very vulnerable pawn in a world dominated by men, honor,
and physical as well as emotional boundaries. Scheherazade appears in the 1001 Nights neither
as a captive princess nor as a woman with complete autonomy, making her an ideal
representative for Muslim women negotiating agency and identity. However, Scheherazade’s

Alia Yunis, “My Arabian Superheroine,” in Scheherazade’s Children: Global Encounters with the Arabian Nights,
Eds. Philip F. Kennedy and Marina Warner (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 398.
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complex character did not originate in an historic vacuum but likely developed in the earliest
days of Islam and within the text of the Qur’an itself.
In Arabic literature, the qasida (“intention”) is best described as an epic poem originating
with pre-Islamic tribes and continuing through the Abbasid dynasty (including that of Harun alRashid).31 The qasida is divided into three parts: the nasib, in which the storyteller reflects on an
incident or pursuit of his beloved (from whom he is still separated); the rahil, the middle element
of the poem, where the protagonist journeys to reunite with his tribe and describes the various
impediments and challenges that lie between his nostalgia and reunification; and finally, the
madih, which is message of the poem that may praise a ruler, satirize another tribe, or offer some
moral observation.32 Rodney Koeneke, relating his first experience with the qasida, writes, “And
if the qasida’s essentially a study in motion—oscillating between experience and memory, trace
and presence, campsite and camel ride, desire and resignation, abasement and boast—its
progress depends, paradoxically, upon its boundedness.”33 The tales themselves subscribe to
these finite limits, hemmed in by both the duration of time (the night) and social boundaries.
While the 1001 Nights may have drawn upon this format, the narrator of all qasidas is a man.
Deviation from this would represent a radical departure from the art form and one that I do not
think storytellers would have challenged, as women in qasidas served a structural purpose inside
of the poem as a goal, a boast, or a paradigm for femininity. In pre-Islamic qasidas, men boasted
of multiple lovers and women had social and sexual agency not confined to the boundaries of
marriage.34 Replacing a male storyteller with that of a female in the early centuries of Islam
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required, to borrow from Quranic exegesis, an isnad (chain of transmission) used to validate
hadith (sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad) to repurpose the qasida from the preIslamic jahiliyya (period of ignorance prior to the revelation of Islam) to an Islamic art form. The
isnad for justifying Scheherazade as the central storyteller, and the precedent for her form living
within the prescribed religious, social, and ethical codes of the period.
The first translation of the 1001 Arabian Nights from Arabic was in 1704 by Antoine
Galland, who translated the Arabic into French.35 Several more editions, including the most
popular English translation by Sir Richard Burton published between 1885-1888, would follow
as the book and its provocative and exotic tales were translated through the 18th and 19th
centuries. Each subsequent publication of the text seemed to be more embellished than the last,
dovetailing with yet another moment in the zeitgeist of a rapidly industrializing West and
subsequent dramatic social and economic changes. The texts included elaborate illustrations of
the exotic and forbidden worlds of that formed the backdrop and cultural milieu of the tales.36
For Europeans and eventually, Americans, “the Arabian Nights…is the prime example of a
polyphonic, traveling text, which leaped over borders of creed, nation, allegiance, its stories
spreading irrepressibly, immediately after they were translated.”37 The tales themselves continue
to evolve and still exist in some iteration in every kind of commodity from books to ballet to
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cosmetics to Disney films to pornography.38 The East, in its exoticism, escapism, and sensuality
remains a marketable commodity translated through the Arabian Nights.39
If Scheherazade was originally a character strongly linked to the Muslim majority
countries in both origin and faith, her introduction to the West gradually secularized and
sexualized her so that her relationship Islam was erased. By 1888, her image had become more
magical than historical, which Nurse attributes to, “the Arabian Nights’…seemingly spontaneous
appearance as a book.”40 In this way, again, the stories appear as revelations, witnessed by
Scheherazade and, at some point compiled and arranged into a single text. The text itself was
introduced to Europeans in twelve volumes translated from Arabic to French and then to English
by an anonymous London press.41 The 1839 translation by Edward Lane excised the eroticism of
the original text and replaces it with footnotes that situate the stories in Egypt, where Lane
believed the tales originated and whose culture was reflected in the tales.42 In 1882, John Payne
translated the 1001 Nights and included all of their explicit scenes. Payne circulated just 500
copies of his translation before ceding it to Sir Richard Burton whose 1885 edition is perhaps
over eroticized.43 A children’s version of the tales was adopted from Lane’s work in 1898 and
became the standard version of the 1001 Nights albeit stripped of both its ethnographic content
so it became, like Payne and Burton’s editions, a fairy tale onto which the West could project its
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desires about the Muslim majority countries.44 Lane “created an English-language adaptation for
a broad middle-class and upper-class readership that was more literally translated to capture and
celebrate, he hoped, the creative agency of Middle Eastern artists. It came with ample footnotes
that described the stories as the performance of actual Egyptian storytellers and sought to
engender the reader’s sympathy toward a part of the world routinely criticized by Europeans.”45
The serialization and bound publication of the Lane’s translation of the 1001 Nights prompted a
sympathetic response that was imperially paternalistic thus the intent of the American edition of
the Nights.
Responding to the popularity of the 1001 Nights, Edgar Allan Poe published the short
story, “The One-Thousand-and-Second Night of Scheherazade” in the February 1845 Godey’s
Lady Book. Poe’s work is traditionally excluded from any discussion of Scheherazade and the
1001 Nights, but this short piece is an important cultural moment and frames future discourse
around Scheherazade and Eastern femininity. Although it was meant to parody the popularity of
the serialized 1001 Nights, Poe’s short story ends with Scheherazade’s execution after the 1002nd
night when her husband Shahryar is finally so bored with her that he has her killed. Poe writes of
Scheherazade’s execution, “She derived, however, great consolation, (during the tightening of
the bowstring,) from the reflection that much of the history remained still untold, and that the
petulance of her brute of a husband had reaped for him a most righteous reward, in depriving him
of many inconceivable adventures.”46 Poe’s writing is as much a parody as it is a commentary on
Western perceptions of the East: Muhammad is situated as the antichrist leading a spiritual
community driven by violence and misogyny. This common approach to writing about Muslims
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is the prescribed formula for a millennium of writing about Islam.47 Poe’s execution of
Scheherazade removes her from the historical record and strips her the authority she inherited
from her cultural and religious ancestors like A’isha. Poe panders to Orientalist tropes and also
removes Scheherazade from her own narrative: she tinkers with power and authority only to have
it revoked by her Shahryar. Poe makes sure that Scheherazade is not savvy enough to realize that
her husband is bored with her and exhausted by both her power and novelty, his only concession
to her is to give her the fleeting satisfaction that her execution will somehow deprive her already
morally vacant husband of some fulfillment. Poe’s writing is somewhat prophetic because in the
continuous publication of the 1001 Nights, Scheherazade’s authority, identity, and agency
gradually disappeared until she became an empty vessel into which Americans and Europeans
Medieval portraits and descriptions of Islam centered around the Prophet Muhammad juxtaposed against the image
of Christ. Muslims were regularly referred to as “Mahommedans” as Christian writers equated Muhammad’s role in
Islam with that of Jesus Christ in Christianity, making no distinction between the similar, but different theologies.
This continued through the early twentieth-century and is reflected in texts authored by missionaries to the Middle
East. This deliberate theological contrast originated in the 9 century in Islamic Spain/Andalusia. Religious figures
and writers from among the Mozarabs (Spanish Christians living under Islamic rule), like the most famous written
by Álvaro of Córdoba (800-861 C.E.), who wrote of Muslims: “Muslims are puffed up with pride, languid in the
enjoyments of the fleshly acts, extravagant in eating, greedy usurpers in the acquisition of possessions... without
honor, without truth, unfamiliar with kindness or compassion... fickle, crafty, cunning and indeed not halfway but
completely befouled in the dregs of every impurity, deriding humility as insanity, rejecting chastity as though it were
filthy, disparaging virginity as though it were the uncleanness of harlotry, putting the vices of the body before the
virtues of the soul.” (Indiculus luminosus.) Álvaro of Córdoba also wrote that Muhammad was the antichrist, a
theme that carried on through Dante’s Divine Comedy where Muhammad is portrayed as a heresiarch, split in two
with his entrails spilling out in Hell (c. 1308). Late medieval depictions of the Prophet continue the theme of
Muhammad being a false prophet, a demon, and the antichrist, a leader of a larger group (Muslims) sent to destroy
or assimilate Christians. For portrayals of the Prophet Muhammad see: Brian A. Catlos, Kingdoms of Faith: A New
History of Islamic Spain (New York: Basic Books, 2018); Richard Hitchcock, Muslim Spain Reconsidered: From
711 to 1502 (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2014); Jerry Broton, This Orient Isle: Elizabethan England
and the Muslim majority countries (London: Penguin, 2016); Kenneth M. Setton, Western Hostility to Islam and
Turkish Prophecies of Doom (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1992); Minou Reeves, Muhammad in
Europe: A Thousand Years of Western Myth-Making (New York: New York University Press, 2003); and Ahlam
Sbaihat, “Stereotypes Associated with Prototypes of the Prophet of Islam's Name till the 19th Century,” Jordan
Journal of Modern Languages and Literature Vol. 7, No. 1 (2015): 21-38. For early-20 century Christian writing on
Muslims see: Samuel Zwemer, The Moslem Christ (New York: 1911); Annie Van Zommer and Samuel M. Zwemer,
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poured their sentiments about the Muslim majority countries. But Scheherazade re-emerged with
a potential for autonomy in the late 19th century, with the rise of middle-class consumerism and
American imperialism that stretched into the 21st century.

GROUND ZERO
This dissertation examines the trajectory of the perception and agency of Muslim women
through the U.S.-based consciousness from the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago
through the post-9/11 and Trump era. It examines the points of tension between the desperate
American and European desire to control the political narrative of Middle Eastern relations with
the West and Muslim women’s challenges to the narrative. In the following chapters, U.S.
Muslim women reclaim identities, social spaces, and real battlefields through their entanglement
in Islam, the Middle East and the Islamic State. This work builds upon recent work that examines
the ways in which the Muslim World, Europe, and America continue to negotiate layers of
interconnectedness, in much the same way that Scheherazade’s 1001 Nights were told and
compiled, never static, always somehow imbibing at least part of popular sentiment about the
Middle East. This work also connects two landscapes local to the United States: The Midway
Plaisance, part of the 1893 Columbian Exposition, now a stretch of green land serving as a line
of demarcation between the University of Chicago campus and one of Chicago’s impoverished
urban neighborhoods. The only remnant of the area that was once the origin of a living,
performing, storytelling community of Muslims, including women, is a street sign that
acknowledges the segment of the exposition but does not name or acknowledge its significance.
The second site is “Ground Zero,” the site of the World Trade Center destroyed in the terror
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attacks of September 11, 2001. From that site this dissertation takes its title: “Scheherazade at
Ground Zero.”
“Ground Zero” is a place and an historical moment. As Marc Redfield writes, “as a
proper name, uncontextualized and capitalized, it refers to the site formerly occupied by the
World Trade Center towers; as an idiom in more general use, it refers to the impact point of a
bomb or the exact locus of an explosion.”48 The 9/11 Museum, situated alongside the memorial
(officially called “Reflecting Absence”) is “an institution dedicated to understanding how
strength was expressed in a time of sorrow, how unimaginable problems were solved, how
resilience and hope grew out of tragedy, the 9/11 Memorial & Museum is uniquely placed to
offer insight, empathy, and expertise towards our past and present challenges.”49 As a museum
and public landmark, “Ground Zero” is a site of mourning, education, and nationalism. The
museum offers public programming, most of it focused on counterterrorism, the historic
aftermath of September 11th, al-Qaeda, and other security-related topics.50 It presents a history
highlighting the manifestation of all that was claimed to be wrong or deficient in the Muslim
majority countries. The museum relates a story where angry, violent, male co-religionists attack
a “Christian” nation. The museum presents the site carefully, delicately laid out in something less
than the “locus of an explosion.” The narrative deliberately omits the complex history and series
of events that led to the attack on the World Trade Center.51 The strategic omission of context is
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a response to the original plan to make a memorial that was multi-faceted: that memorialized but
was also reflective of the intent and outcome of terror.52 Families of victims allied themselves
under the banner of “Take Back the Memorial.” In a letter to then-Mayor Michael Bloomberg,
they wrote: “We, the undersigned, believe that the World Trade Center Memorial should stand as
a solemn remembrance of those who died on September 11, 2001 and not as a journey of
history’s ‘failures’ or as a debate about domestic and foreign policy in the post-9/11 world.”53
The families of those killed along with the survivors of September 11th demanded that the
memorial be about them. They guided mourning and remembrance of a catastrophic event too
recent to memorialize permanently. The rush to create a memorial overshadowed the process of
national grief and reckoning that should have preceded and informed a permanent installation.
The rush to add permanence to collective grief and trauma also expedited the process of
securitization of the State. Adrian Parr argues, “the homogenizing force of striated space was
already at work when September 11th occurred; the traumatic memory of September 11th simply
became the excuse to increase and legitimize the interpretation of space solely in terms of
security.”54 Securing the nation entailed the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in
November 2002 to preserve American exceptionalism. Instead of naming the new department the
“Department of National Security,” the Bush Administration instead chose, “homeland” to create
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the illusion that this new office was exclusively focused on protecting the virtues of a Christian,
American home life from another Muslim incursion. The department polices geographical and
cultural borderlands which ensures that American Muslims, in particular, are kept captive and
surveilled outside of America’s national and cultural borders. At the national level, Homeland
Security Committee Chair Representative Peter T. King claimed, in an interview with Fox News’
Sean Hannity in 2004, that “no American Muslim leaders are cooperating in the War on
Terror.”55 King continued to adhere to and repeat claims that up to 80% of American mosques
were controlled and/or funded by fundamentalists, holding four hearings between 2011-2012 to
address what he claimed was a massive radicalization of American Muslims and claims that
terror groups were operating widely throughout the United States.56 Those claims were contested
by Muslim groups, including Alejandro J. Beutel of the Muslim Public Affairs Council: “Our
heads aren’t in the sand…The threat clearly exists, but I also want to put it in perspective. The
threat exists, but it is not a pandemic.”57 King also advocated for a national surveillance system
of Muslims, a practice that the New York Police Department (NYPD) had already implemented
as of 2002 and used with impunity until 2011.58 During the decade following 9/11, only 172
Muslim-Americans were identified as having some role in terrorist activities and those not
necessarily in designing attacks on the United States.59 Attacks since September 11th, 2001 on
U.S. soil have largely been committed by individual or “lone wolf” attackers not part of a larger
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network, usually motivated by domestic or workplace conflict such as the 2015 attack at the
Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California and the massacre at Pulse nightclub in
Orlando Florida in 2016.60 These numbers remain fairly steady despite the rise of the Islamic
State in 2014. Current and would-be members of these organizations are present mostly online
where they are also monitored by security agencies.61
A brief discussion of the NYPD policing of Muslims is important here as the center of the
attacks and casualties: New York emerged as the focal point of memorialization. In 2002, “the
NYPD Intelligence Division took advantage of the climate of “public tolerance” for aggressive
police practices and began systematically spying on American Muslim enclaves throughout New
York City and its surrounding metropolitan area.”62 The unit systematically mapped
neighborhoods in New York City and the surrounding area with populations representing 28
“Ethnicities of Interest.”63 All these ethnic groups originated in countries with a Muslim majority
and also included Black Muslims who were largely American born.64 The NYPD paid so-called
“mosque crawlers” to attend services and events at a variety of mosques and even meetings of
the Muslim Students Association (MSA) and report back to the unit with keywords such as
“jihad” and “revolution.”65 The program, and others like it, such as the FBI surveillance of
Southern California mosques in 2019, has not publicly netted any terrorists or intelligence.
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Surveillance and securitization strategies only succeeded in alienating non-Muslim Americans
from Muslim Americans and endorsing Islamophobia.
The aftermath of 9/11 saw violent, xenophobic attacks on American Muslims (and those
perceived to be Muslim); justified a now twenty-year war in Afghanistan under the pretense of
“liberating” Afghanistan and Afghan women; and catalyzed extremist groups abroad such as the
Islamic State (ISIS) to respond to the incursion of Western, non-Muslim aggression. 66 “Ground
Zero” was also used to contest and prevent the expansion of Islam in New York City proper as
opponents to Daisy Khan’s Cordoba Center labeled her project, “The Ground Zero Mosque” due
to its proximity to “Ground Zero.”67 Any infringement upon the sanctity, real or perceived, of
Ground Zero is a blasphemy against American nationalism and a threat to national security. The
September 11th attacks obliterated (or sought to destroy) not only significant national landmarks,
but also the fragile peace that existed between American Muslims and non-Muslims. By 2001,
the First Gulf War (1990-1991) was a distant memory, with a decisive victory by Americans
against Saddam Hussein (1991): suicide bombings and the potency of the PLO were diminished
by the start of the second intifada, the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza (2000);
and, stretching further back into America’s engagement with the Muslim Middle East, the 1979
Hostage Crisis in Iran remained in diminished form as a vague memories of anti-Iranian bumper
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stickers.68 There were, of course, in popular culture mediated images of veiled women. As
Faegheh Shirazi and Reina Lewis both illuminate, America’s hostile engagement with the
Muslim majority countries inevitably generated a flood of images and literature centered on the
violence of Muslim men, the subjugation of Muslim women, and a new catalogue of images of
veiled women for Americans to consume.69 The months and years after September 11th followed
this same pattern of Islamophobic, deeply reductive images and narratives about Muslim women
who were controlled by American men, and in a cultural shift, also by women.70 In response to
this tired recycling of anti-Muslim tropes, Muslim women, especially those coming of age and of
the second and third generations of Muslims in America, seized this historical moment to fashion
and promote their own narratives and claim their own agency in public.

CHAPTER OUTLINES
CHAPTER 1: Scheherazade in the White City:
Gender, Performance, and Muslim Womanhood
at the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition
The first chapter of this dissertation, “Scheherazade in the White City,” presented a template for
how Muslim women were introduced to the American public. Their presentation at the 1893
World’s Columbian Exposition was the latest iteration of their identities as Muslim women. The
women’s identities, Arab, Jewish, Oud Naïl, and Ghawazi, were filtered through the European
tourist trade along the Nile before being transported to Paris for the Exposition Universelle. In
Paris, some of the dancers were transformed into cabaret stars and minor celebrities, assuming
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elements of French culture while shedding the aspects of their Arab, Muslim, Jewish, and tribal
identities that did not enhance their art. Finally, some of the dancers were brought to the United
States and established themselves on the “Street in Cairo” within the Egyptian theatre where
their daily performances were scrutinized and editorialized. Americans, in contrast to the French,
did not make celebrities of the dancers. With the exception of “Little Egypt,” celebrity and
respectability was eluded the women of the Midway. The women who danced on the Midway in
1893 are still anonymous and tracing them after 1893 is futile. There is no way of tracing “La
Belle Fatma” or “Colona, the Sudanese Baby Dancer.”71 They left no written record, no
newspaper interview, or passenger manifest. Their work was entirely transactional. The only
historical record of the dancers was left by white, middle class Americans who recorded their
observations in newspaper editorials.72
The chapter on the Midway Plaisance and its dancers deliberately excluded the adoption
of belly dancing by white American women in the mid-twentieth century as a secularized form
of entertainment and exercise.73 Professional belly dancers, particularly white women, adopted
personas based-on Orientalist writing and art as a form of sexual liberation.74 In this way, they
continue the secularization of the dance and its use as a way of expressing desire and sexuality in
the same way that men and women who encountered the dance at the fair did in 1893.75 Seventy
years later “two major factors fueled the appeal of belly dancing in the age of flower power and
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political protest and continue to be important today. First, the 1960s and 1970s were a period of
second- wave feminist activism marked by a focus on the ‘body as a site of pleasure and
discovery,’ especially for white liberal feminists.”76 Many contemporary belly dancers have
blogs where they attempt to parse the history of belly dancing and link themselves to a secular,
pre-Islamic form of female power. Some blogs, like The Honest Courtesan, The Gilded Serpent,
and Eva Sampedro’s blog on tribal fusion, manage to uncover elements of the dance and its link
to North African tribes like the Ouled Naïl.77 As an art form, “belly dancing has become a site
for staging a New Age feminism and liberal Orientalist perspective on Arab and Muslim
women.”78 Sunaina Maira labeled belly dancing among white American women “Arab Face.”79
Similar to World Hijab Day, belly dancing is a byproduct of imperial feminism where non-Arab,
non-Muslim, white women can play at exoticism without relinquishing either their privilege or
power as white women. The Egyptian Theatre of the Midway Plaisance is now a constellation of
dance studios and Middle Eastern restaurants where the narrative of Middle
Eastern/Arab/Muslim is constructed to appeal to white, middle class Americans, just as it was in
Chicago in 1893.
In this chapter, I rely on the histories of the Columbian Exposition like Robert Rydell’s
All the World’s a Fair: Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876-1916
(1987); Stanley Appelbaum’s Spectacle in the White City (2009); and even Erik Larsen’s Devil
in the White City (2002) to introduce the premise of the Columbian Exposition to promote
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American innovation, masculinities, and empire.80 Rydell and Larsen are also useful, in distinct
ways, to examine the burgeoning social tensions within the United States including the
increasing economic and political agency of women within specific social and architectural
parameters established by men.81 The valorizing of white masculinity, as Gail Bederman argued
in Manliness and Civilization (1996), was deeply integrated in the design and participation of the
exposition, which lifted whiteness and its associated moral and industrial achievements above
other races.82 I examine the role of masculinities (and in some instances, white femininities)
through the placement and production of ethnographic exhibits on the Midway Plaisance,
specifically through the mapping of exhibits and bodies of Muslim women at the fair.
Inside the Columbian Exposition, the Midway Plaisance housed the amusement area
apart from the White City. Rydell describes the Midway as a “Sliding Scale of Humanity
(1987),” a reflection upon the popular work of eugenicist Francis Galton.83 The Midway
Plaisance contained living ethnographic exhibits set apart from the industrial achievements and
innovation of the White City; among others it contained Muslim bodies and heavily promoted
those of Muslim women.84 Ethnographic displays did not originate at the Columbian Exposition,
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but occurred at earlier French Exposition Universelles in 1878 and 1889. The architecture and
mapping of the Columbian Exposition presenting a vision of Western supremacy deliberately
joined race and empire. Historians like Zeynep Çelik primarily focus on the architecture and
placement of all Muslim bodies on the Midway. This chapter brings deep scrutiny to how
Muslim women inhabited the exhibits and deliberately performed a Muslim identity that was
simultaneously contrived and authentic.
I trace the trajectory of Muslim women’s involvement with the Columbian Exposition
through the origins of their engagement with the West in North Africa in an effort to not just
offer another reductive reading of images of Muslim women. I rely on the work of Lawrence
Morgan, author of the only ethnography of the Ouled-Naïl tribe (1956), Karin van Nieuwkerk’s
history of dance and female religious performance in Egypt (1995), and Donna Carlton’s history
of the belly dancer, “Little Egypt,” (1995) to unravel the history of Muslim women’s
performance and economic agency as it traveled from the Maghreb to Chicago.85 Malek
Alloula’s The Colonial Harem (1986) and his reading of a selection of French colonial postcards
of Ouled-Naïl women facilitates a discussion of how members of the Muslim Ouled-Naïl tribe
engaged with the colonizer at home and also abroad through photography of costumes and
“harem scenes.”86 The three-dimensional exoticization of Muslim women originates with these
postcards. Alloula’s guides theoretical reading of the postcards guides later readings of images
like those of Sarah Graham Brown (1988), Mohja Kahf (1999), and Amira Jarmakani (2008).87
Graham Brown’s analysis places the images contextually within social developments and the
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continuum of colonial tension in the Middle East, especially North Africa. Graham Brown’s
work, coupled with Alloula’s analysis guide my reading of images taken from Buel (1893) and
Putnam’s (1893) albums where images of Muslim women are featured. I disagree with scholars
like Kahf and Jarmakani who argue that women’s power over these images was entirely
subsumed by men. A cultural and economic exchange was ongoing and continuously negotiated,
even if the exchange did not benefit Muslim women. Women’s agency was limited by men, but
not subsumed, and Muslim women participated in the cultural forgery still manufactured today.
The performances by and featuring Muslim women on the Midway Plaisance is the
precursor to the post-9/11 art, activism, and engagement with and by Muslim women in the
United States. The Midway Plaisance and Ground Zero are distinct spectacles of empire, built,
dismantled, and destroyed. Their cultural legacies widely overlap in their purposes as testaments
to the intentions of empire, but a part of each also more narrowly relates to how Americans
engage with the Middle East, the Muslim majority countries, and the tensions that persist in
those encounters. Finally, the Columbian Exposition’s conclusion marked the end of even a
vaguely “authentic” engagement with Muslim women in the U.S. This narrative ended abruptly
in 1893. For a few “hootchy-kootchy”-inspired acts that traversed the country for the next
decade, the women performers left no historical record and even sixty years later, Lawrence
Morgan’s ethnography of the Ouled-Naïl omitted the transnational experiences of the tribe’s
women.88 A gap was left to be filled with the whims of American consumers and an expanding
U.S. empire while the Middle East navigated profound social changes and independence
movements lasting decades into the late 20th century.
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CHAPTER 2: Scherazade’s Closet:
Hijab, Activism, and “Generation M”
In the West, another boundary, an aesthetic one that transcends race and class, is still a
point of contention in communities and politics. The hijab is in the midst of a process of
Americanization in multiple forms: as an aesthetic device worn by Muslim women as part of
their religious identity; as a form of dawah; an act of protest against the Trump administration; a
commodity and in the form of the Women’s Mosque of America. Hijab is one of the most fluid
of concepts within Islamic material culture. Muslim women used the removal of the veil as a
symbol of women’s liberation in Egypt (1922); the veil was a tool of revolutionary struggle in
Algeria, allowing women to move weapons undetected (1954-1962); and in Iran, chador was a
simultaneously a statement against the aggressive secularization and despotism of the Shah’s rule
and support of Ayatollah Khomeini (1979).89 In the United States, after 9/11, the hijab was
symbolic of Islam and a way to identify Muslims, but it was also a used for dawah and solidarity
with non-Muslim women. Various iterations of World Hijab Day occurred in the years following
9/11 with try-on events eventually codified into one international event held annually every
February. The American flag was converted into a hijab on at least three occasions in post-9/11
art. The American flag hijab increased Muslim women’s visibility and emphasized their claim to
citizenship.90 The most recent iteration designed by artist Shepherd Fairey from the 2017
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Women’s March was complicated by its use by white women to protest the Trump presidency
but the exploitation of hijab in this context still supported the presence of Muslims and Muslim
women as citizens. The leadership of Linda Sarsour at the march helped to mitigate concerns that
the image was purely exploitative.91
Western fascination coupled with commercial and political exploitation of Muslim
women’s dress continued long past the Orientalism of the 19th century is an ongoing
phenomenon.92 This chapter concerns the emergence of Muslim women’s negotiation of identity
and religion in the U.S. This reimagining took place in the wake of direct U.S. war with Islamic
nations. Knowledge of veiling expanded following 9/11, but the various iterations of the veil:
burqa, hijab, niqaab assumed specific meanings assigned mostly by non-Muslims rather than by
Muslim women themselves.93 For the purposes of this dissertation, I focus on hijab, the most
recognizable and popular form of veiling (Ahmed 2012) and how hijab enabled a generation to
forge and negotiate a social, consumer, and even political identity in the wake of September 11th.
This generation, also referred to as “Generation M” is learning how to leverage their power as
participants in the political and consumer processes in the United States and Europe.94
In the months following 9/11, a dramatic upsurge in hate crimes that centered on women
wearing hijab prompted both feminist organizations and university campuses to host “Hijab
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Day” events for non-Muslim women to wear hijab and learn about Islam.95 The events were
meant to help mitigate further attacks and also served as a form of dawah for Muslim students.96
The Feminist Majority’s pivot from using scraps of burqa to advocate for the liberation of
Afghan women from the Taliban in 2000 to hosting “Hijab Day” in 2001 is an example of the
shallow understanding of veiling in the West. Commodifying hijab by Muslims in a way that
was recognizable and palatable to American communities began in 2004 with “Pink Hijab Day”
to coincide with Breast Cancer Awareness Month.97 Commodification of “Hijab Day” came in
February 2013 as part of a clever marketing scheme developed by Nazma Khan to promote her
own hijab business in New York.98 The day is still celebrated and non-Muslim women regularly
partake in the event.
The 2016 Presidential Elections and the anti-Muslim rhetoric of the Trump campaign
made Muslims, especially Muslim women, perhaps even more visible than in the immediate
months and years following 9/11. Muslim activists like Linda Sarsour took Trump’s election to
highlight the violence that plagued Muslim communities in the United States and abroad, but
soon realized that the trauma of the 2016 election did not include an opportunity for Muslims to
speak about gross abuses of their autonomy. Instead, Sarsour took up one of three leadership
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positions in the Women’s March and images of Muslim women created by non-Muslim artists
like Shepherd Fairey and homemade signs dominated the discourse of the post-election period.99
The now famous image of a woman (model Mounira Ahmed) wearing an American flag hijab
did very little other than to offer non-Muslim women the opportunity (to borrow from Lila AbuLughod’s essay), to play at “saving Muslim women.”100
Political engagement was one path way to stronger advocacy for Muslim women, as the
election of Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib in 2018 demonstrated. So was entrepreneurship in the
expanding consumer market driven by young Muslims. Traditionally, conservative clothing for
Muslims had to be made locally or purchased overseas or from conservative Christian clothing
sites, but the 2010s saw an increasing demand for “Pious Fashion” in a religious market that was
as diverse in its demands and taste for women’s fashion in the secular one.101 To illustrate these
consumer demands, the chapter looks at the success of HauteHijab, American Eagle’s attempt to
merge the iconic American blue jean into hijab, aspirational brands and the rise of Muslim
influencers, known as “#hijabaes.”102 Adopting secular consumer trends accelerated and
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sustained the assimilation of Muslims and Islam into American culture in a way that activism
failed to accomplish.
Finally, American Muslims, especially women, used their visibility for women within the
community seeking change. Ongoing debates about what it means to be Muslim and American
were used as a platform for American Muslim women to challenge accepted norms that were
cultural rather than Islamic (Hamer, 2012; Elkhaoudi, 2014; ISNA, 2015).103 I look at the
practice of segregated prayer (Mernissi, 1987; Fewkes, 2019) as precedents for women’s
leadership and the founding of the Women’s Mosque of America.104 The Women’s Mosque of
America reflects issues surrounding hijab, since feminist scholarship around hijab included
discussion and controversy about women’s role in worship and the mosque (Wadud, 2006;
Nomani, 2006). The establishment of a mosque for women in Los Angeles, represents a
sustained presence of Muslim women into a new public space.
Chapter 3: SCHEHERAZADE’S CIRCLE OF KNOWLEDGE:
Young Women, ISIS, and the Stories they Tell
The final chapter of this dissertation focuses on the displacement and radicalization of
young, American and European-born women in the two decades following 9/11 and the 7/7
London Bombings.105 Whereas the previous chapter highlighted Muslim women’s identities
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within the U.S. and Euro-American contexts, this chapter analyzes how Muslim women make
meaning for Islam in the twenty years since the attacks. Like others who examined this issue
recently including Deeyah Khan, Meredith Loken and Anna Zelenz ,and most recently, Azadeh
Moaveni (2019), I grapple with the motivation for young women’s engagement with the Islamic
State (ISIS).106 Khan argues that joining IS was a means of escape from racism and
Islamophobia, while Loken and Zelenz claim that the escapism that Khan describes is an escape
from post-9/11, state-mediated identities. Loken and Zelenz argue that, “extremism is not built
on factors inherent in fundamentalism, but that individual disaffection with the West-spurred by
colonialism and exclusion-finds comfort in extremism.”107 IS and their iteration of Salafism
makes an appealing, uncomplicated option for disenfranchised adolescents.108 I expand upon the
observations made by these scholars to argue that the global upheaval of September 11th
continues to shape the ways young Muslim women, negotiate their religious and cultural
identities within a secular state fixated on security and targeting their faith.
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of the Muslim community. Its influence spread to Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, India, Indonesia, and Egypt in
particular. The most influential movements inspired by Salafi were the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Jamaat-i
Islami of Pakistan. In the late twentieth century, the term came to refer to traditionalist reformers.” “Salafi,” Oxford
Islamic Studies Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2072, Accessed February 21, 2021.
See also: Jacob Olidort, “What is Salafism? How a Nonpolitical Ideology Became a Political Force,” Foreign
Affairs, November 24, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-11-24/what-salafism. Accessed
February 21, 2021.
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A preliminary discussion in the chapter focuses on Salafism and women’s involvement
with Salafi groups. Annabel Inge’s 2016 study of Salafi women in London, including motivation
for conversion and social exchanges is the only current ethnography of Salafi women. I draw
upon Inge’s experience with Salafi women to contend that Salafism’s appeal lies in its articulated
and enforced gender norms that allow some measure of autonomy and community for
disenfranchised groups. Inge claims that Salafism (and Wahhabism) are not inherently linked to
IS and that they actively challenge IS and its ideology. But I concur with the arguments made by
Maher (2014) and Lauzière (2015): although Salafism is not inherently violent, this iteration of
Islamic teaching does form the theoretical and theological framework for Islamic terror
groups.109 Inge cites some prominent Salafi leaders in the UK as speaking-out against IS but the
fact remains that Salafism is without question intertwined with and supporting the ideology of
terror groups.110 Despite these efforts, Salafism retains its appeal to young Muslims, including
women.
In disentangling the motivations for women’s engagement in what became terror to some
(the West) and jihad to others (sympathetic Muslims and affiliated terror groups), I trace
women’s engagement in state warfare back to the early Muslim community and also examine the
engagement of women in guerrilla warfare in mid-century independence movements like the
Algerian War of Independence. Since the early centuries of Islam, women have played a part in
defending the umma through military engagement with other tribes, political foes, or, in the
contemporary period, colonizing powers. After September 11th, 2001, women’s engagement
against terror changed through the use of women suicide bombers by Hamas in the Occupied

Shiraz Maher, Salafi-Jihadism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Henri Lauzière, The Making of Salafism:
Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).
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Territories, carefully documented by Barbara Victor in 2003.111 Suicide bombings, an anomaly
through the early 2000s became commonplace as independent, militant Islamic organizations
began to appreciate and rationalize the utility of women for combat and state building (IS). Lara
Sjoberg and Caron Gentry seek to downplay its extent arguing that women suicide bombers are
“a strategy specific to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and not indicative of an entire organization.”112
However, that assertion is false, as women performed suicide bombing before the formation of
al-Zarqawi’s organization, Al-Qaeda in Iraq.113 The use of women in terror operations emerged
during the beginning of the Palestinian Second Intifada in 2002 as a tactic against Israeli
occupation, later to be adopted by al-Qaeda and their affiliate groups.
In this chapter, I argue that the motivations of young women recruited into IS were
vulnerable due to being untethered to any stable identity or community. I profile a selection of
women who were indoctrinated into the ideology of ISIS (IS) and some who made hijra to the
Islamic State.114 Martha Crenshaw (2000); Joel Day and Scott Kleinmann (2012); and Katharine
Kneip (2015) theorize that radicalization is the culmination of experiences over a period of time
rather than a single event.115 For young women who join IS, I argue that September 11th and the
subsequent normalizing of Islamophobia, securitization, and war were the “culmination of

Barbara Victor, An Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers (London: Constable
and Robinson, Ltd., 2004).
Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry, Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics (London:
Zed Books, 2007), 124.
Sjoberg and Gentry, Mothers, Monsters, Whores, 124. See also: Christopher Dickey, “The Women of Jihad,”
Newsweek, December 12, 2005, 26; Kevin Peraino and Evan Thomas, “Odyssey of an American Wife,” Newsweek,
January 14, 2002, 40; and Christopher Dickey and Gretel C. Kovatch, “In bin Laden’s World, an Ambivalent Role
for Women,” Newsweek, January 14, 2002, 48.
Hijra refers to the emigration of the early Muslim community to Medina where they took sanctuary from the
Pagan tribes persecuting the early community in Mecca. It is used frequently by recruiters to the Islamic State to
encourage (young) Muslims to flee Western countries for sanctuary in the “Islamic State” in Syria (Raqqa).
Martha Crenshaw, “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21 Century,” Political Psychology Vol. 21,
No. 2 (2000): 170; Joel Day and Scott Kleinmann, “Combating the Cult of ISIS: A Social Approach to Countering
Violent Extremism,” The Review of Faith and International Affairs Vol. 15, Issue 3 (2017): 143; Katharine Kneip,
“Female Jihad: Women in the ISIS,” Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal, Vol. 29 (2015): 94.
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experiences.”116 Some of the women were born after September 11th or were infants in 2001, and
not immediately conscious of the long-term political and social implications or directly affected
by the event.117 Sjoberg (2018) writes that, “women who have joined IS are framed as
manipulated by recruiters and susceptible to that manipulation,” an assertion that I agree with,
although, like Sjoberg, I acknowledge the process is more complex.118 Mia Bloom (2010)
asserts that the “men in these women’s lives do play a crucial role in mobilizing them and
facilitating their entrance into the organization.”119 The recruiters are often pictured as men
(“Brothers”), but they are often joined by women (“Sisters”) in recruitment.120 The process of
recruitment is more complex, and increasingly sophisticated, using social media, WhatsApp,
YouTube, etc. carefully crafted to appeal to specific vulnerable, isolated audiences.
The final segment of this chapter is comprised of profiles of some of the women who
joined the IS. The group comprises both American and British women who came of age in the
decade following September 11th. The public does not yet have access to a complete roster of
successful recruits to the Islamic State, so trying to assemble a profile of a “typical” recruit
results in several shallow, distorted, and fragmented images. The most recent attempt to
configure a robust profile including motivations was published by Moaveni (2019) and although
it does give us a more nuanced picture of the women, it is still not a complete narrative.121
Instead of relying on Moaveni, I compiled profiles of women through news sources (CNN, The
Guardian, The New York Times, Buzzfeed) to attempt to add some three-dimensionality to my

Kneip, “Female Jihad,” 94.
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subjects which was, inevitably, a deeply frustrating exercise. However, even with these limited
details about the women, I felt a surprising level of empathy and sadness, despite (as in the case
of Aqsa Mahmood), their embrace of a grossly violent and misogynistic organization. After
spending so much time with these women, the realization that they were still children when they
were radicalized makes understanding the process of recruitment and radicalization paramount,
as well as advocating for their repatriation, essential to state security. Understanding recruitment
into IS can be leveraged for anti-Islamophobia campaigns and creating a more secure, integrated
society.
CONCLUSION
Unlike the fictional heroine, Scheherazade, Muslim women negotiating space and
identity in Euro-America have not achieved their happy ending, having won over the Sultan and
assumed the role of Sultana. The women in this dissertation are still weaving their tales: stories
of seeking personal and religious autonomy while crafting an identity that either dovetails with
Western culture or rejects it entirely. Muslim women now work on challenging two forms of
Orientalism: the classic tropes of belly dancing, sex, and aggression from Islamic lands that Said
theorized, and the newer form, “neo-Orientalism,” which informs state security and emboldens
the Islamophobic.122 The decisions Muslim women make about how to navigate the challenges to
community in the U.S. and Europe are to either adapt to or reject the circumstances of living
outside of a Muslim-majority country. Some Muslim women adapt Islamic precepts (prayer) and
aesthetics (hijab) to be workable in a Western context and strive to normalize (and neutralize)

Neo-Orientalism evolved following September 11 as a new iteration of Orientalism. Neo-Orientalism is informed
by the rise in terror attacks and a new military and cultural engagement with the Middle East and the Muslim
majority countries. It is no longer an Orientalism comprised of harem scenes and passive observations by
Westerners looking into the Muslim majority countries. It is a more active and complex form of Orientalism because
of transnationalism, globalization, and securitization of Western states with significant Muslim populations. See:
Tugrul Keskin, Middle East Studies after September 11: Neo-Orientalism, American Hegemony, and Academia
(New York: Haymarket Books, 2019).
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Islam an “Islamic Threat” while maintaining their identity and values.123 Other women reject
Euro-American culture altogether in favor of a “purified” version of Islamic society in the form
of the Islamic State (IS/ISIS). From the Columbian Exposition to the hijabaes and the women of
IS, Muslim women are collectively negotiating, navigating, and resisting an identity co-opted
and created by the West. The outcome of this identity will be shaped by U.S. and European
governments and citizens reckoning with the long-term impact of colonialism, imperialism, and
globalization on Muslim-majority countries for the benefit of the West.

John Esposito, The Islamic Threat (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). The “Islamic Threat” is a term coined
by Esposito in 1999. The book is on its third edition as it evolves through two decades following September 11 and
the definition of an “Islamic Threat” changes with each new manifestation of political Islam and the influence of
Salafism.
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CHAPTER I: SCHEHERAZADE IN THE WHITE CITY:
GENDER, PERFORMANCE, AND MUSLIM WOMANHOOD
AT THE 1893 WORLD’S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION
“Now that we are not afraid of Turks, Arabs, and Saracens, the Orient has become for us a sort
of hippodrome where grand performances are given… We take the Orient for a theater.”
Le Figaro, 26 June 1867
Introduction
The 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition imported Muslim women, invented Muslim
womanhood in the United States and everywhere, and established a national mythology around
Muslim women. The Street in Cairo, an area of the Midway Plaisance meant to replicate an
average street in Cairo featured women belly dancing, lounging in a harem, and women in
“Muslim” dress wandering through the streets interacting with guests. I argue in this chapter that
Muslim women had significant agency as actors by leveraging some indigenous, folk practices
tangentially related to Islam (zar) and various costumes to their advantage to create agency that
did not exist or was curtailed in their home countries and under Ottoman rule. The Columbian
Exposition forever cemented the expectation of Muslim womanhood as hyper-sexual, ephemeral,
and subservient and thus fodder for the American imagination. This imagined Muslim woman
became ingrained in popular imagery, fantasy, and ethnic stereotyping well into the 20th and 21st
centuries. Indeed, much of the agency constructed during the 1893 World’s Fair was undone
over the next century by the commercialization and politicization of Muslim womanhood from
through advertising, television, and US conflicts abroad with Iran and Afghanistan. However,
contemporary Muslim women have adopted the same techniques that early women did:
subverting the colonial gaze, appropriating dress, and challenging what has become normative
practice in Islamic communities to create and perform a new, perhaps even “Americanized”
version of Islamic practice and belief. The new, multicultural, multiracial, multiethnic Islam that
38

now inhabits America is a conglomeration of different iterations of Islamic practice and belief.
The strategies that Muslim women are adopting to build agency and visibility in the American
umma (global community of Muslims) and the American social and political landscape,
originated in the dancers and of late 19th century both in Cairo and on Chicago’s Midway
Plaisance.124
The 1893 World's Columbian Exposition hosted a myriad of national displays and
cultural curiosities. Along its famous Midway Plaisance outside the formal fairgrounds, exhibits
portraying Muslim-majority countries were perhaps amongst the most heavily attended. As John
Mackenzie writes:
The ‘native villages’ were in fact among the most enduring features
of all the exhibitions… They repay closer attention because here was the prime
way in which people in the metropolis were brought into contact with the
conquered peoples of the Empire. Here were the racial stereotypes illustrated,
Social Darwinism established in the popular mind, and control of the world
expressed in its most obvious human form. Moreover, the numbers of programs
and postcards of these exhibits that can still be found seem to indicate that
they caught the public imagination. Yesterday’s enemies, the perpetrators of
yesterday’s ‘barbarism’ became today’s exhibits, showing of quaint music,
dancing, sports, living crafts and food, but now set on the path
to civilization.125
At the Algerian Village, the Egyptian Theatre, and the Persian Palace, dancers from the Muslim
majority countries together with American-born dancers performed Muslim womanhood through
belly dancing. Through their dancing and the photographic record of their costume and
performance provided in souvenir guides by cultural anthropologists like F.W. Putnam and
intrepid entrepreneurs like Sol Bloom, Muslim women subverted the imperial gaze. They
actively engaged, in a medium they could control, with the colonizer, in this instance the
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designers of the exhibit (Bloom) and the fairgoers, a diverse cross-section was not simply limited
to wealthy Americans and European travelers abroad, in a medium that they could control.
Dancers wore a modified Islamic dress, a hodgepodge of ornaments and textiles from various
regional communities of North African Muslims. These costumes included the now ubiquitous
“harem pants,” bare torsos, and nomadic ornamentation, together with other signifiers like hijab
and ritual movements associated with mysticism and the Egyptian Zar. The dancers also
contributed to Americans’ changing attitudes about sex and bodies through their simultaneous
visibility (public performance) and invisibility (veiling). Dancers utilized Islamic mysticism and
female power in Islam to their advantage, controlling their colonizers in ways that extended into
the public sphere and altering the ways in which Americans thought about sex and the body.
Americans at the Columbian Exposition could experience desire through Islam. Muslim dancers
undermined the celebration of imperialism and the accomplishments of the Anglo-Saxon and
Teutonic races through their performance of desire vis-à-vis Islam. Dancers, through their
gyrations, also thrust sex into a shared public space through the non-Protestant narrative of
Islam, thereby doubly undermining both the imperial gaze and the Christian narrative of the
neighboring White City.
In the medieval tales of The Thousand and One Arabian Nights the character of
Scheherazade uses her intellectual and political savvy, as well as her gender to preserve her life
and her livelihood. After she takes the bold initiative of arranging her own marriage with Sultan
Shahrayar, Scheherazade begins the first of one-thousand-and-one nights of storytelling, in
which she, together with the help of her sister, Dinarzad, harnesses both her intellect and her
sexuality. In so doing, she retained some of her own female power while subduing the impulses
of a murderous sultan. In the tales, Scheherazade’s storytelling is the commodity upon which she
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trades for her survival. In 1893, nearly one-thousand years later, inside of the White City and like
their fictional predecessor, female dancers from Muslim North Africa also plied their wares in
the form of their bodies, sexuality, and cultural knowledge inside another marble palace. These
modern Scheherazade’s also sought to tell tales, but their stories were exiled to the carnivalesque
atmosphere of the Midway by white American women manifested as the Board of Lady
Managers, the group of women responsible for the execution of exhibits that celebrated women’s
achievements.126 Together with the men who designed and hosted the Columbian Exposition,
white Protestant bodies conspired against brown Muslim bodies to craft a new narrative, separate
from the intimate, feminine ritual of the dance, that exploited the gyrations of Muslim women’s
torsos and reinterpreted their fables. However, like Scheherazade, these women simultaneously
contested their portrayal as sexual and served as willing participants in the spectacle because
their very survival depended upon the men who bought, rented, and imported them to the United
States.127 With no choice but to perform, the Muslim dancers fought back against a narrative that
framed their dancing as savage and sexual.
The White City served as an architectural metaphor to showcase the accomplishments of
white men. It did not feature brown men or women, nor did it elevate white women. The city was
erected for the purpose of exhibiting the industrial and commercial achievements of these white
men, particularly those of Americans. The failure of peoples to meet the requisite criteria of
whiteness with corresponding intellectual or cultural achievement was marked by their relegation
to the Midway Plaisance, a carnivalesque ghetto on the outskirts of the White City. Here on the

“On Midway Plaisance Street of All Nations at the World's Fair. The Oriental Dancing Girls,” Idaho Statesman,
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Midway the world’s nations congregated in a variety of exhibits that simultaneously exploited
and celebrated their unique cultural commodities: commodities neatly packaged within bodies.128
It is within this setting, mostly upon the bodies of the “other,” that organizers of the fair,
entrepreneurs, and fairgoers themselves translated Islam: they stripped Middle Eastern culture of
its Muslim signifiers and appropriated Islamic cultural artifacts, gender, and especially
mysticism, exploiting a dizzying array of religious and cultural products for entertainment.
However, despite these limitations, Muslim women found ways to circumvent the restrictions
placed upon them; like the famous storyteller, they ensured their survival by manipulating a
public masculinity that faced challenges from changes brought by modernization to sex and
gender. Through their dancing, Muslim women subverted both the imperial and colonial gaze
and challenged public attitudes about the performance of sex and sexuality.
The removal of these women from their traditional venues of performance on the streets
and villages also removed them from their local economies and transferred them into the
economies of entrepreneurs and anthropologists alike. More than anyone else, Businessman Sol
Bloom, who imported the Algerian Village. G.B. Putnam, the Harvard-trained anthropologist
who took a particular interest in Muslims129 and other investors in the Exposition created the
economy of the Midway.130 Women in Muslim-majority countries were never guaranteed
income, but relied on goodwill, sometimes manipulating one of the central tenets of Islamic
belief, zakat, a tax that takes the form of a charitable donation or philanthropy. In countries with
regular tourist trade like Algeria and Egypt, women relied upon peddling exoticism and desire,
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not a connection to holiness through poverty, to sell sex and desire. They thereby developing a
micro economy built-around a conscious bastardization of religious ritual, all to ensure their
economic survival.131 The Algerians possessed enough economic savvy and knowledge of
Western culture through colonization by the French and the subsequent tourist trade, to
understand that even a short-stay in the United States had the potential to be quite lucrative, even
if it required self-exploitation, especially for women.132 The New York Herald Tribune reported
that the dancers were paid a sum of $30 for their services for the duration of their stay in the
United States, not an insignificant amount of cash for women of that time.133 The promise of a
larger income and opportunities associated with Western civilization may have galvanized
performers, as well as other poor urban and rural women to emigrate first to Paris where they
performed at the 1889 Exposition and then to Chicago in 1893.134

The Hootchy-Kootchy in the Jahiliyya135
The dancers imported the danse du ventre to the Midway Plaisance with the assistance of
white male entrepreneurs who sought to exploit the thriving and well-established tourist trade in

Karin van Nieuwker, A Trade Like Any Other: Female Singers and Dancers in Egypt (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1995), 26.
Algeria remained under French colonial rule until 1962, while Egypt remained under British colonial rule until
1922, with the exception of the Suez Canal Zone.
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Aileen Vincent-Barwood, "The Arab Immigrants," Saudi ARAMCO World Magazine, September/October, 1986,
15. Early Arab emigrants to the United States did not intend to settle in the United States. The majority of Arabs
emigrating from the Ottoman Empire (which included Egypt) intended to remain in the United States for up to two
years, generating income through peddling. Income earned was to then provide for the establishment of businesses
in their home countries.
“Pre-Islamic period, or “ignorance” of monotheism and divine law. In current use, refers to secular modernity, for
example in the work of Abu al-Ala Mawdudi, who viewed modernity as the “new Jahiliya.” Sayyid Qutb interpreted
Jahiliya as the domination of humans over humans, rather than submission of humans to God. The term denotes any
government system, ideology, or institution based on values other than those referring to God. To correct this
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North Africa and the Levant in the late 19th century.136 The dancers’ agency, their willing
participation in first the vibrant and often lucrative tourist trade and the Columbian Exposition,
demonstrate that women had a more sophisticated understanding of the colonial (male) gaze,
allowing them to capitalize upon and exert their power over the colonizer through belly dancing.
As colonial citizens, Egyptian and Algerian dancers had survived under the authority of the
metropole, but in matters pertaining to cultural authority, the dancers negotiated a space between
the Islamic and the colonial, creating a sophisticated yet subtle new source of power that gave
them a particular agency.
By 1876, the end of the Tanzimat Reforms, the Ottoman state, corrupt and gradually
ceding power to European powers, was unable to support its population.137 Traditionally in
Muslim-majority countries, waqf (religious endowments) were established with the intention of
donating one’s earthly goods, a parcel of land, or cash “in charity of poors or other good
objects.”138 But that safety net was inadequate. As a result, female dancers understood that their
survival both as performers and as women, depended on manipulating and negotiating the area
between colonizers and colonized, Muslim and non-Muslim, first in Egypt and Algeria, and then
in the United States.

Elvan Cobb, “Learning Vicariously: Tourism, Orientalism and the Making of an Architectural Photography
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Belly dancing originated in Egyptian culture, having evolved from an existing tradition
within Egyptian practice of Islam performed by the Awâlim, a group of female religious scholars
who used dance for the purposes of religious devotion.139 Other innovators included the
Ghawâzî, a second group of dancers who “performed unveiled in the streets and in front of
coffeehouses.”140 In Islam, dance is permitted if it is a means of becoming closer to the divine
and is an intrinsic element of Islamic mysticism. The rise of the tourist industry (in tandem with
colonization) in the early-mid-19th century in North Africa forced the dance away from its
religious origins.141 The medieval Islamic jurist al-Ghazali wrote, “A performance is not
acceptable if too much time is devoted to it, so that it interferes with higher Islamic goals and
distracts believers’ attention from their devotion to God.”142 While the public performances of
the Awâlim coincided with Saints Days or religious holidays, the Ghawâzî performed in public
for the purposes of entertainment rather than religious vocation.143 These two groups of dancers
would eventually merge as a result of government attempts at religious and moral reform,
obscuring some of the original signifiers of Islamic mysticism and female performance.144
In the mid-nineteenth century, under the rule of Muhammad ‘Ali, the Ottoman governor
of Egypt, the government instituted a heavy tax on female performers. In 1834, the governor,
under the advisement of the Ottoman-Egyptian ‘ulama, who disapproved of public performances
given by women, issued an edict that officially banned female dancers and public performers in

Exact dates for the origin of the Awâlim are unknown as the Muslim conquest of Christian and Pagan societies
inevitably Islamicized dance as part of ritual in some communities, especially in the Levant (Egypt, Syria, Jordan,
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Cairo, regardless of the intention of the performance. The ban also included the Awâlim despite
their conforming to the recommendations of Muslim jurists. The Ottoman governor’s edict also
banned prostitutes from the capital, eliminating yet another source of income for poor women.145
The ‘ulama hoped that the ban would safely restore moral order to the city and the province. The
ban also served as a response to the growing incursion of European travelers and colonial
influence or simply a method through which ‘Ali could gain traction with Al-Azhar University,
the center of Sunni learning, to establish the legitimacy of his leadership. Both motivations for
establishing some kind of control mechanism, most effectively addressed the regulation of
morality and desire. The taxes and subsequent ban of the dancers inadvertently created a black
market and a lascivious tourist culture in Upper Egypt where dancers and prostitutes migrated to
ply their trades among European and American travelers. In Southern Egypt, where much of the
tourist culture was centered around the Valley of the Kings and other Egyptological delights
along the Nile. Provincial governors and the police looked away in the interest of the economic
benefits that the dancers brought through European and American tourism. Interestingly, it
seems that both Egypt and the United States shared a common interest in legislating morality and
desire, however as Egypt discovered through its tourist trade and Anthony Comstock, United
States Postal Inspector, learned through his visit to the Columbian Exposition, selling and
policing desire was a lucrative commodity.146 Comstock’s visit to the fair in 1893 resulted in
fines for several of the Midway Dancers levied by the City of Chicago; the New York Herald
(published in the state where Comstock also served as Secretary of the Society for the
Suppression of Vice) discovered that dancers were paid upwards of $50 for their performances

Ibid., 32
Here I am referring specifically to the “Comstock Laws.” Parallels between the edict issued by Muhammad ‘Ali
and the laws galvanized by Anthony Comstock were similar in their attempts to control vice and virtue and
ultimately use desire as a mechanism for social control.
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for the duration of the fair, a vast sum for transient women accustomed to being compensated
through informal transactions and the whims of religious authorities and endowments.147
Economics at the state level also played a part in the creation of these communities of
dancers who began to work exclusively for the tourist industry and not for purposes of devotion
or popular religious celebrations. Certainly, the dancers were always generating some kind of
meager income for their services as a result of charity or zakat. The inclusion of widowed and
other impoverished women in the ranks of dancers toward the mid to latter half of the century in
Egypt resulted from the breakdown and ultimate failure of both the waqf system and the levying
of zakat, a mandatory tax paid by Muslims. 148 The revenue from zakat was meant to support the
care for the poor and disenfranchised the majority of who were women. The waqf, according to
Islamic jurists, is an endowment established for charitable purposes, especially philanthropic
efforts that promote dawah and welfare services for the poor. 149 Zakat theoretically functions as
a kind of supplementary model of support for all members of the umma.150 It also enabled
women to inherit from their fathers under the laws set forth by the Shari’a that governed
inheritance. Until the twentieth century, when significant changes reformed the waqf system,
fathers would “bypass women’s inheritance rights…a father would specify that upon marriage,
his daughter would lose her share” of the family’s wealth.151 Under Ottoman rule, male family
members regularly excluded daughters and husbands excluded wives from their wills, leaving
widowed and orphaned women at the mercy of their families. Women’s subsequent
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impoverishment, and lack of legal recourse or agency in the family courts, meant that they would
have to seek alternative forms of income.
The diaspora of dancers to Southern Egypt conflated the dance cultures of the religious
Awâlim and the Ghawâzî. The restrictions placed upon public devotion, especially in the form of
female dancers, drove the Awâlim into the Ghawâzî.152 These women, together with prostitutes,
discovered financial benefits among these agent provocateurs-rich tourists- along the Nile. The
arrival of the European and American elite in Egypt “provided a new opportunity for
entertainers, particularly female dancers, to earn a living. The travelers invited dancing girls to
entertain them on their boats while they were anchored in one of the towns in the Delta or in the
South.”153 As Karen vanNieuwerker notes, “drastic changes took place in 19th century
entertainment, changes for which the travelers themselves were crucial agents.”154 It was on the
boats of the Nile that contemporary belly dancing was born and harem fantasies were fulfilled.
Those travelers who attended parties where the dancers were featured described them as
being unveiled, their bodies tattooed and their nose rings as prominent accessories. Their
costume “was like other women’s, except for the girdle,” indicating that the dancers wore their
gallabeyas, the traditional, shapeless gown of both Egyptian men and women, cinched at the
waist. 155 French colonial interpretations of these accounts appeared in postcards and souvenir
albums from the Columbian Exposition. The accounts of gender ignored or rejected the Islamic
social standards for modesty. The costumes themselves thus flaunted the dancers’ position as
part of the Egyptian and Islamic subaltern. These performers, as members of the entertainment
profession, were “outside the community of believers,” according to religious authorities,
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because they continued to dance a variation of the Zar within the parameters of a new public
sphere: the tourist “public” populated by infidels and Egyptians themselves, most prominently
the dancers themselves. Although the dance experienced a paradigm shift from sacred to profane,
it still remained profitable for the performers, arguably more so when it moved into the tourist’s
semi-private “public” and off the streets. Although the performances in this new public space
and received secular billing, the dance was still very much taboo and remains such into the
present.156 A tug-of-war between protecting the virtues of Muslim women and exploiting Middle
Eastern sexuality began between secular Egyptian authorities and the European and American
elite. Religious authorities turned their opposition to the dance from the impropriety of the dance
in itself, to its audience, claiming “the profane eyes of the ‘Infidels’ ought not to gaze upon
women of the true faith.”157 However, with the Egyptian state unable or unwilling to remedy the
material circumstances under which the dancers were exploited, Western visitors inevitably won
the privilege of indulging in Egyptian women.
Prior to the opening of the Columbian Exposition in 1893, only upper-class travelers
from Europe and the United States could attend the performances of female dancers in the
Middle East. The image of the belly dancer that travelers writing about their experiences
brought back, coupled with existing Orientalist imagery of women, gave validity to the notion
that the East was a place of unbridled sensory indulgences. Rarely did these accounts describe
the dancers as prostitutes. Although some dancers did exchange sexual favors for cash or goods,
the dancers were described as “gypsies.”158 Travelers, which marked them as a people apart, as
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well as artists, were fascinated by the exotic and sensual contrasted against the demurer ideals of
womanhood in Europe and the United States. The vast majority of accounts of the dancing came
from men who no doubt indulged themselves in both the visual eroticism of the performance and
also in erotic adventures for a fee.159 Men engaged in the sexual pursuit of Muslim women where
Muslim women, and to a certain degree, Islam itself, was conquered, possessed, and then
discarded. The women balanced dancing as a ritual while simultaneously attempting to maintain
a viable livelihood, a feat that required them to be both public (in their performance space) and
private (sexual favors and as prostitutes). As a result, these public perceptions of Muslim
women, imported from travelers from abroad, and blending truth and salacious imagination,
shaped their image in the Western imagination. Through visual culture, the Muslim woman’s
body became both a vehicle for sexual pleasure and a challenge to European and American
normative gender ideals.
Back in Chicago, entertainments created a provocative, and at times sexually subversive
subculture, showcasing the danse du ventre. On the Midway, the belly dance, a contrived cultural
artifact, now became a signifier of Muslim and Middle Eastern culture in the United States. A
reporter from The New York Herald aptly described the dance “denounced one moment as a
wholly degraded exhibition and defended the next as the representation of a state of ecstatic
bliss, due to the frenzy of a religious devotee.”160 The reporter was correct as contemporary
observations of both the zar movements and the danse du ventre confirm that belly dancing did
evolve from the Zar. The imported product was thus a piecemeal rendering of movements
associated with both ritual performance in Islamic mysticism and the colloquial Egyptian ritual
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of the Zar. The dance was meant only for the female gaze. The dance associated with the Zar
was a means through which women, particularly those women who were part of the poor and
disenfranchised classes, could simultaneously establish both an intimacy with God and perform a
ritual of healing.161 This intimacy otherwise stood exclusively as a privilege reserved only for
men, within Sufi Islam.162 In the new form, the dance shifted in meaning when appropriated for
European and American audiences: no longer sacred, through its new, nuanced adaptation the
dance emerges as profane through exaggerated changes in gesture and also as its relocation to a
secular space such as the Midway Plaisance.
The Zar is not unlike the practice of Vodou, something that some nineteenth-century
Americans were familiar.163 The Zar was adopted from pre-Islamic tradition and may be related
to the Islamic tradition of the jinn, mischievous fire spirits who meddle in the affairs of
mortals.164 Similarities between Vodou and the Zar include animal sacrifice, the use of amulets,
and being “ridden” by the spirits who control various elements of one’s life. These spirits are
made manifest through trance-like dancing accompanied by the rhythms of tambourine music.
Also much like Vodou, the Zar is performed amongst women and requires a lengthy process of
training including the development of a holistic knowledge that encompassed local and orthodox
religious practice, medicine, history, and social dynamic.165 The dancing closely resembles that
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of belly dancers in its sensuality and hypnotic movement.166 It is possible that Western travelers
had the opportunity to witness these ceremonies or those women who performed as Khodias, the
leaders of the Zar, joined the ranks of the professional dancers.167
The dancers on the Midway, appearing mute and docile in the numerous souvenir
volumes documenting the fair, consciously inverted the White City’s discourse of power through
their very own manipulation of a colloquial Maghreb-Islamic practice. The dancers rejected, at
least publicly, their spiritual purpose, and entered into a partnership with tourists and
entrepreneurs to capitalize on art. The results of this partnership was short-term economic agency
for the dancers who found profitability in secularization. Its long-term effect generated an image
of the Muslim majority countries completely secularized and devoid of its original, sacred
signifiers. The dancers, through deliberately profaning the dance, did not simply gain economic
agency, but to a certain degree, they attempted to protect the original, authentic dance.168 The
dance du ventre, then, can also be understood as a way of protecting women’s sacred spaces by
creating a diversion for the imperial gaze. Altering the location and context of the dance enabled
women to preserve its original meaning.

The Paris Exposition, 1889: A Street in Cairo, A Parisian Cabaret, and The Ouled-Naïl
The inspiration and precursor to the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition was the 1889
Paris Exposition (Exposition Universelle). The latest in a series of ambitions exhibitions of
French industry and colonialism, this was not the first exposition where iteration of an Islamic
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architectural landscape was imagined and presented to Parisians and a handful of Muslim
visitors. Prior expositions in 1867 and 1868 also featured interpretations of “Islamic” (North
African) street scenes.169 The inspiration for the architecture was taken from accounts of French
travelers to North Africa, in particular Algeria and Tunisia. The French presence in Algeria
began in 1830 and its colonization made it possible for artists, travelers, and diplomats to write
and create dispatches from the fragments of North African Islamic culture that they encountered.
One of the most popular exports from this early era of French colonial rule was the imagined life
inside of the harem, popularized and translated into paint by the acclaimed Orientalist painter,
Jean-Léon Gérôme. In architecting the interior landscapes of the Street in Cairo, French
designers drew inspiration from Gérôme’s body of work, creating sumptuous if not purely
imaginary, rooms of decadence and lasciviousness (Figure 1).170
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Fig. 1. “Pool in a Harem,” painted by the
French Orientalist painter, Jean-Leon Gérôme
(1875).

However, for the scenes to be perceived as authentic, “culture” must also be performed there by
“native” women.171 Many of the women who came to occupy these spaces were from the OuledNaïl tribe, one of the poorest, most rural tribes in North Africa. The French encouraged
prostitution as part of the urban economy and “the Ouled-Naïl exploited it to enhance their
marriageability,” using the money to provide their own dowries.172 Ouled-Naïl women also
posed for souvenir photos and postcards in various costumes and stages of undress (Fig. 2).173
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Fig. 2. Scenes et Types (Scenes and Kinds) – Ouled-Naïl
woman featured on a postcard published by Lehnert and
Lockhart. (Algiers, c. late 19th century).174

Common belief is that belly dancing originated in Egypt, but as alluded to above, its
origins are the result of performers coming from multiple, ethnically and culturally-related areas
in Berber centers across North Africa into performance spaces in France and the United States.175
The women came from communities where women had greater agency than imagined by
Westerners. At the 1889 Paris Exposition, the focus and stars of the show were Berber women
from the Ouled-Naïl.176 The Ouled-Naïl were a Berber tribe who were early converts to Islam,
embracing the new faith around the 7th or 8th century, within a century of the Prophet
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Muhammad’s death in 632.177 The women of the tribe, known as the Nailiyat (Arabic plural for
female members of the tribe), were free to travel outside of the rural, mountainous regions where
their tribe lived, to Algeria’s towns and its capital city of Algiers.178 The Nailiyat sold their
bodies through dance and sex, but they were always independent of men, living together with
other women from their tribe and managing their own business affairs.179 Absent from their tribal
lands, wealthy they earned was under their personal control; in the event of marrying, they still
retained control over their assets.180 This level of agency and an already established tradition of
consumer performance allowed the Ouled-Naïl in particular to be well-suited to the business of
performing at the Paris Exposition. They understood it as simply an extension of the work they
had performed for centuries transferred from local towns and cities to locations abroad.181 Some
women, after the closure of the exposition, went on to continue their careers in Parisian cabarets
and venues designed to showcase these human wares from the Maghreb.182
Belly dancing at the Paris Exposition was an export facilitated by French colonialism. Its
performers not only numbered women from the Ouled-Naïl tribe, but also by women like Rachel
Bent-Eny, the daughter of a Jewish musician who, recognizing French enthusiasm for exotic
performances by Arab and North African women, encouraged his daughter to dance while he
accompanied her. Bent-Eny was known as, “‘La Belle Fathma,’after the Prophet Muhammad’s
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daughter, even though she was of Algerian Jewish origin. She came to Paris from Tunisia.”183 In
Chicago, this same codeswitching would take place along the Midway with women whose
phenotype could “pass” as an Arab, a Jew, or even, as discussed later, a Romanian. Some degree
of authenticity was required to make the exhibits and performances passable, but the “extras”
could be borrowed from other exhibits or recruited from neighborhoods and theaters of Paris or
Chicago.
European and American male travelers described the dancers through a frame of Western
superiority to women and to Egyptians themselves: African, non-Christian, and pre-industrial.
The writers described the dance as “ ‘voluptuous’; ‘shameful’; ‘stupid’; ‘abject’; or ‘savage’.”184
A French traveler characterized the dance as “at first voluptuous, but then it became lewd…it
was no more than the most outrageous and indecent expression of bestial desires.”185
Additionally, these adjectives resonate with a morally conservative audience, but also belied a
kind of shame in the travelers’ having witnessed, and perhaps enjoyed, such lasciviousness. One
can certainly argue that such a vehement critique of the dance is less a statement about the dance
and more about its audience.186
In 1893, writers visiting the Columbian Exposition made similar observations of belly
dancing.187 The same adjectives and tropes of earlier European and American travelers
reappeared in descriptions of the dance in the Chicago papers when it was imported to the
Midway Plaisance. On the Midway in America, the descriptors assigned a rigidly Puritanical
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mask to the licentious indulgences of a generation of Americans with shifting viewpoints on
sexual and social prescriptions. Compounding this were changing American theories on race and
empire, as the United States began to expand its imperial and industrial visions: nowhere was
this more explicit than on the Midway Plaisance during the summer of 1893.188

The Midway Plaisance
Perhaps the more important vestige of the Midway however are the images taken in the
summer of 1893 of the exhibits that were featured there. The Midway was one of the most
photographed elements of the fair with the major souvenir albums written by J.W. Buel, The
White City (1893) and Professor F.W. Putnam’s Portrait Types of the Midway Plaisance (1893)
that deployed photography to relay the experience of the fair.189 The textual elements of the
books are limited to brief descriptive paragraphs. As such, nineteenth-century audiences would
have relied almost exclusively on inference to understand the images depicting the panoply of
racial and ethnic populations at the fair. In the albums, Muslim women comprise the vast
majority of women photographed, the pages displaying an array of different “types” labeled as
“Moslem” or “Mohammedan” women depending on the preferred terminology of the author.190
Books published exclusively to commemorate the fair also acknowledged the ethnic exhibits and
the racial types that peopled them. These are vast, heavy volumes full of large, glossy pictures
but that contain little way of any substantive knowledge or observation about the people who
populated the Midway. Further, they did little to substantiate the additional materials produced
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for the Midway, including the Souvenir guide for the “Street in Cairo” which depicted various
Cairene scenes, including belly dancers, Bedouins, camel drivers and other iconic images of the
Middle East, but with very few reliable observations or facts.191
Extending outward from the White City and separate, the Midway was simultaneously a
living museum and a racial and ethnographic foil for the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race
celebrated inside the White City. It was a micro-empire, delicately situated on what Robert
Rydell calls “a sliding scale of humanity” little more than an ethnographic side show. 192 The
design of the Midway followed the blueprint for nineteenth-century anthropology, situating the
more “advanced” races in closer proximity to the White City.193 These groups included the
Teutonic races and Northern Europeans; one exception found the Irish Village nestled away with
the Pygmies.194 Those designated as “savage” and “primitive” peoples outside of Europe were
arranged according to how closely “evolved” they were in relationship to the Anglo-Saxon and
Teutonic races. Grouped into the conglomeration of ethnicities and ethnological wonders were
the Moorish Palace, the Algerian Theatre and Village, and the presumably paradigmatic “Street
in Cairo.”195
The model for the Midway adopted the work of eugenicist Francis Galton, whose racial
typing established the formatting for ethnic exhibits at late nineteenth and early twentieth century
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international expositions.196 Yet visitors to the Midway were not expected to quietly browse
through museum exhibits, as were the presumably middle-class visitors to the White City. As the
Chicago Tribune pointed-out, “Public taste on the Midway would not support an instructive
display, but enjoyed and patronized a very questionable entertainment.”197 This questionable
entertainment included performances of belly dancing, the Turkish harem, where “odalisques”
lounged, and a variety of scantily-clad representatives within the exhibits. The issue of the
Midway’s “questionable entertainment” came to a head in the summer of 1893 when Anthony
Comstock, in the interest of public virtue, launched a campaign with the Board of Lady Manager
to stifle the popularity of the “Oriental” dances performed on the Midway.198 Interestingly, the of
American men toward various indiscretions offered in the various “Oriental” exhibits.199 The
ladies even went so far as to offer an alternative dress code, publishing their “Before” and
“After” images of moral reform in a local Chicago paper (Figure 3).200
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Fig. 3. “On Midway Plaisance Street of All
Nations at the World's Fair. The Oriental
Dancing Girls.” Idaho Statesman 18 Aug.
1893.

On the Midway, people were to be entertained, shocked, and permitted to indulge in the
imagined pleasures of more exotic cultures, enjoying entertainments in a manner similar to those
entertainments performed on boats on the Nile in the earlier part of the century.
The Midway Plaisance was the most popular venue at the Columbian Exposition as a
result of its blending of Barnum-esque showmanship and what was deemed at the time legitimate
scientific inquiry.201 Unfortunately, Barnum-ized racial discourse and oriental titillation
dominated the Midway’s exhibits, framing the ways the American public encountered and
enjoyed them. The Midway is a version of “scientific racism” which leant a degree of legitimacy
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to the otherwise chaotic and purely for-profit structure. 202 Intermingled with the legitimate
exhibits displaying artifacts (and people) were performances of race, gender, and sexuality that
were carefully choreographed according to popular stereotypes. For the Middle Eastern and
Islamic elements of the fair, the organizers relied on a simple reproduction of what had become
profitable in Egypt amongst Western tourists.
The Middle Eastern exhibits were situated close to the White City, placed along a
specific continuum of “whiteness” or closeness to Protestant Anglo-Saxons, the racial and social
group that drove the organization of the Midway. This group included Protestant Europeans,
predominantly Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic races. One may speculate that the placement of the
Middle Eastern races toward the head of the Midway indicated a racial as well as religious
valuation. The first group following Protestant Europeans were Arabs, Persians, and Ottoman
Turks, considered racially close to Europeans and monotheism. They were near the Irish
(Catholics), but still separate from them, indicating that although the Irish were European their
Catholic identity relegated them to a lower ranking on the Midway. The presumption illustrated
by this organizational pattern on the Midway was that all Western Europeans were Protestant
(with the exception of the Irish) and all Middle Easterners were Muslim. Furthermore, there is no
record of any Christian Arabs participating in the exhibits, nor the Protestant Irish. The
Midway’s exhibits were thus intrinsically linked to beliefs that conflated race and religion.
The Street in Cairo required an admission fee of twenty-five cents. For this fee, fairgoers
could have their name written in Arabic script, ride camels, and see the infamous Hootchy-
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Kootchy, one of the various labels by which belly dancing was advertised on the Midway. 203 At
the zenith of the fair’s popularity, 180-400 people were estimated to have made the Street in
Cairo their temporary home.204 In his book, Types of the Midway, Harvard University professor
and anthropologist, Professor F.W. Putnam describes the Street in Cairo
This brief little byway was the most sought-for resort in the
great territory of the Exposition. The good and the wicked—men
and women, and children—sought it as delightful relief from other
sightseeing. Women in grief, seigniors of divinity, men of
melancholy visages, as well as merry people, came to it as a panacea
for mental ills. The curative powers of the place were miraculous. The
varieties of life were given an Oriental flavor and fascination in this
happy imitation of an ancient and despised city.205
Over the duration of the fair, nearly 2.5 million visitors traversed the Street in Cairo, visiting and
indulging in the various sights and sounds proffered there.206
The Street in Cairo represented a fictive collective identity of the “Mohammedan”
peoples of the fair. The organizers conflated national and religious identity into one area of the
fair and added the Persian and Moorish Palaces to the array of entertainments adjacent to the
Street in Cairo. The Moorish Palace, according to Donna Carlton, was “Oriental in name only. It
was mainly a museum in the tradition of Woodward’s Gardens and P.T. Barnum’s.”207 A
souvenir booklet from the Moorish Palace describes various exhibits, a kind of hodgepodge of
historical artifacts and wax figures depicting historical personalities like Marie Antoinette. In
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addition, the Moorish Palace “housed galleries of Oriental-style items and furniture and a wax
works including figures of harem women posed in bizarre costumes lacking yardage or
authenticity.”208 The harem scene was real, if not realistic in its licentiousness; the booklet
paradoxically confirms the authenticity. Both the costumes of the ghawâzî (dancers imported by
entrepreneurs) and of the Middle Eastern Muslim women like the Bedouins who roamed the
Street in Cairo resembled their counterparts in Egypt.209 Paradoxically, the women in these
costumes labeled as “The Sultan’s Favorites,” as of a harem, were situated lounging around a
wax depiction of an imaginary sultan, guarded by yet another wax figure depicting an African
eunuch.210 This particular exhibit soundly rejected the images and strides toward European
modernity being promoted by the Ottoman government and wholly embraced the Orientalism of
such painters as Jean-Leon Gérôme, Giovanni Costa, and Richard Parkes Bonington.211
Americans embraced such writing and images of their European counterparts abroad, by making
the performers living exhibits of both Middle Eastern and Islamic culture in an Orientalist guise.
At the Columbian Exposition the Ghawâzî’s dance was performed in more than one of
the exhibits purporting to represent an Islamic country. Entrepreneur Sol Bloom, who is credited
with introducing the American public to belly dancing, recognized the potential for profit
through exploiting the exoticism of the Eastern and the Islamic. Bloom alludes to this process of
creating a false culture as he recalls observing the Algerian Village at the Paris Exposition,
writing, “I doubt very much whether anything resembling it (the Algerian Village) was ever seen
in Algeria, but I was not at the time concerned with trifles. The Algerians themselves were

Ibid, 20 and The Moorish Palace and its Startling Wonders (Chicago: Metcalf Stationery Company, 1893).
Carlton, Little Egypt, 22.
“Midway Plaisance; Shows and Shops of All Nations at the World’s Fair; A Panorama of the Human Race,” The
Baltimore Sun, June 23, 1893, Vol. CXIII, Issue 33, 1.
For an array of examples of Orientalist art, see: Genevieve Lacambre, The Orient in Western Art (Paris:
Konemann, 2001).
208

209

210

211

64

genuine beyond questions, and what was really important was that they presented a varied
entertainment that increased in excitement in proportion to my familiarity with it.”212 The
purpose of the Midway was, after all, to bring the world to the average American. In this way the
Midway proved curiously egalitarian for Americans, if not for the human attractions and
performers, because visitors of all classes were able to “travel” abroad and share the experience
of the “Islamic” world. All classes found the most exciting and popular exhibits to be those that
featured belly dancing. The Turkish Village, the Street in Cairo, the Algerian Village, and the
Persian Palace all had women performing variations on belly dancing with enticing labels such
as: “Houri’s Dance,” “Moorish Dance,” “Nautch Dance,” and in an attempt to lend some
sophistication to the dances, the“Danse du Ventre.”213 214 The names are taken from European
and American literature on the Muslim majority countries from the period. The word “houri” is
the word for “virgin” in the Qur’an, while “Moorish” signaled North African or Maghreb
origins; “Nautch” implied not an Arabo-Islamic dance, but rather one that originated in the
context of Mughal arts.215 At the most superficial level, the organizers assigned both Muslim
womanhood and Islamic identity to the dance that both exoticized the performance and made it
palatable for a white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant audience. The majority of sources that describe the
dance, included those published in contemporary periodicals of the time, label it as the “Hootchy
Kootchy,” borrowing the term from contemporary descriptions of the provocative, jerky
movements observed in the dances of African slaves, especially those in Creole communities.216
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Race, performance, and religion overlapped in multiple contexts in the United States in this
commoditized form.
The dancers performing in various exhibits along the Midway were “described in one fair
history as ‘stars in their professions.’” Meanwhile, in the Chicago Inter-Ocean, a reporter
217

describes belly dancing, calling it the danse du ventre because “it might fracture Anglo-Saxon
susceptibilities even to name it in English… The dans du ventre is quite a strain on American
sensibilities, but many want to see it as one of the Oriental curiosities of the fair.” One
218

newspaper wrote, “it is not dancing. It is walking about the stage to alleged music with peculiar
and swaying and jerking of the body, such as tends to excite passion…From [the dance’s]
association with the negro, American people are apt to conclude that all dark-skinned people are
dull.” Indeed, writers struggled to describe, identify, and categorize the dance and the
219

performers, turning to existing examples of African-American dance styles, as we have seen.
They ascribed the supposed characteristics of Southern Creole and Caribbean communities and
to the racial traits of the Middle Eastern dancers themselves.
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One cynical observer concluded

that the dancers were not at all Arab but rather native Chicagoans described as “dark and muddy
brunettes” that make “good imitation Algeriennes.”221 Another visitor scorned

Their kinky hair, dirty-butter complexions, bad features, stained
teeth, and tendency to enbonpoint are dreadfully disillusioning, and
their voices are a timbre that would drive an American cat in disgrace
from any well-regulated neighborhood.222
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The female performers themselves “had to keep obscured their identities as working women and
migrants so as to portray the fantasy of an entertaining retreat into a Middle Eastern café or even
the clichéd harem.”223 This obscuring of identity speaks to the performance of race, religion and
gender on the Midway. The dancers had to bargain as their own agents with the entrepreneurs
that controlled them, striking a balance between empowerment and exploitation.
Visitors to the Midway watched as the performances shifted from scandalous to
deliciously provocative. In some instances, dancing pushed against existing social and sexual
boundaries, especially for women. Robert Rydell argued the Midway affirmed Americans’
beliefs about Eastern, non-Christian populations while simultaneously challenging their own
sexual morality: “with its half-naked savages and Hootchy-Kootchy dancers…Americans [were
provided with] a grand opportunity for a subliminal journey into the recesses of their own
repressed desires.”224 Women and men witnessed performances intentionally and simultaneously
both secret and public displays of sexuality, manifested through the bodies of Muslim women
dancers. The dance offered entry into a means of understanding sex, a different world, and a
different religion. For women visiting the Midway, the dancing and its overt suggestion of
eroticism provided them with a venue for exploring their own sexuality and sexual agency. Julia
Ward Howe, abolitionist and suffragist, found the entire spectacle both disgusting and
scandalizing: “The Cairo dance was simply horrid, no touch of grace about it, only the most
deforming movement of the whole abdominal and lumbar region. We thought it indecent.”225
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Until the fair, the use of Muslim women and belly dancing channeled sexual desires and
fantasies of men, but on the Midway, white women were also participants in this voyeurism.
Belly dancing’s introduction to the United States was perhaps more complex for women than for
men.
The contrasting observations and engagement of men and women with the performers,
reflected how the fair resonated with and was constructed and marketed for each sex. As Gail
Bederman argues, the White City embodied their role as “the agents who lifted their race toward
the millennial perfection God and evolution intended for them.”226 Specifically, white men
“lifted their race” toward a racial and social perfectionism articulated in part by millennial
Protestantism, not Islam. They therefore created and reinforced a hegemonic rule and
masculinity over both the feminized Muslim majority countries and their white American female
counterparts. The feminization of the Muslim majority countries, along with other cultures
deemed inferior, was critical to the assertion of white Protestant masculinities.227 The
feminization of other cultures and nations justified conquest, and was easily reconciled with
American imperialism. At the Columbian Exposition, as Bederman explains, “the Midway
provided an implicit comparison between the White City’s self-controlled civilized manliness
and the inferior manhood of dark-skinned primitive men who solicited customers for belly
dancers or wore skirts and danced like women.”228 The men who participated as viewer or
voyeurs of belly dancing on the Midway asserted their white, Protestant masculinities in their
enjoyment and “conquest” of the women inside.
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Images of Muslim women at the fair appeared in two texts published at the fair’s
conclusion. F.W. Putnam, a Harvard-trained anthropologist, offered a large souvenir album,
Portrait Types of the Midway Plaisance. Putnam embarks on a cursory ethnographic study of the
populations of the Midway, highlighting various idiosyncrasies and signifiers of racial and
religious identity, with notations about “Mohammedanism” and “Moslem,” but making no
substantive analysis that would be useful to Americans’ understanding of the sociology of
Islam.229 The text largely comprised photographs and small captions that offer a snapshot of the
model’s origin but no further information that gives any of the portraits three-dimensionality. By
contrast, the second volume, J.W. Buel’s The Magic City, featured discussions about the
exposition’s architecture rather than its human exhibits. Buel places significantly more emphasis
upon the Algerian and Egyptian ethnographic areas than the Anglo-Celtic-Teutonic populations.
Additionally, Buel’s text almost entirely deploys Orientalist rhetoric, which lends itself neatly to
the inclusion of a vast store of Orientalist images. Together, the two volumes represent a small
sample of the ethnographic media to commemorate the fair.
Fair images formed part of a broader production of other photographic images produced
of Muslim women. In Algeria, still a French colony, entrepreneurs produced images of Algerian
women (primarily Ouled-Naïl women) for tourists.230 The lounging odalisque popularized by
Orientalist painters became incarnate in the Algerian postcard. Malek Alloula makes the
observation that these mass-produced images of Muslim women “provides (colonialism) with a
custom-made iconography, replete with pious and worthy intentions. It is an illustrated
breviary.”231 The Algerian photographs produced by the French differed from those of the
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Exposition; they featured stage bare breasted women and women shown behind bars in a form of
captivity. The subjugation made an explicit link between colonial and sexual exploitation. As
Alloula notes, the Algerian postcards operate along a continuum of so-called “wish
fulfillment”232 which allowed a predominantly male audience to consume women and allows the
general population an inexpensive mode of both escapism and voyeurism.
These photographs enhanced escapism and voyeurism by showing the women immodest
and unveiled. Both in Algeria and Egypt, veiling was customary. In photographs of such elite as
a Circassian women their faces are covered in gauzy veils while Bedouin women are always
heavily veiled.233 Egyptians were themselves debating whether women should or must veil
themselves, a controversy that reached its zenith through the 1899 publication of Qasim Amin’s
essay “The Liberation of Women.”234 In the essay, Amin defends the use of the veil but argues
that its use in Egyptian society has “gone to extremes in veiling our women and prohibiting them
from appearing unveiled before men, to such an extent that we turn women into objects or goods
we own.”235 In the Middle East, the veil was still very much an intrinsic element of maintaining
social order; unveiling was a sign of immodesty and subsequently the degeneration of society
into fitna or social disorder.236 Seclusion amongst the more established elite was a sign of wealth.
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Veiling in public, with the exception of the Bedouin class, was indicative of a woman’s social
status. Unveiled women were associated with the Ghawâzî, prostitutes, and the women who
performed for tourists. In both Egypt and Algeria, that unveiled status left them on the fringes of
society and thus easily exploited by tourists and entrepreneurs. In the late 19th century, the elites
of these two countries, especially those with experience abroad, began to push for more relaxed
standards of modesty. Although they were not ready to abolish the veil altogether, there was a
general sentiment amongst men in Amin’s class that the veil’s utility was archaic, inhibiting
women’s social and intellectual agency. Amin argues that a woman’s chastity should not be
linked to the veil, going so far as to write that, “those familiar with American society believe
that, in spite of this open interaction, American women, more than any other, guard their honor
and have moral standards.”237 He stops short of calling for Muslims to emulate the West, but he
deploys the West as an example of the possibility of industrialization and social progress while
retaining certain moral standards that do not require keeping women in purdah.
However, Westerners knew or cared little of these debates: they were interested in the
exoticism of Eastern women, whether veiled or not. Veiled women represented a world that was
only inhabitable by those with the cultural, racial, and religious currency to access it; unveiled
women depicted in images of harem and scenes of Turkish baths, were accessible to the voyeur.
Performers and postcard printers alike capitalized on this notion of unveiling as signaling an
accessibility and readiness: an unveiled woman meant that a man had access to the woman’s
body. By unveiling herself she was giving permission to be seen and enjoyed. In contrast, by
being unveiled by an outside force, such as the French colonial photographer or one of the
photographers at the Columbian Exposition, permission is given on her behalf and she is both
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conquered and exploited, her agency is curtailed and she becomes not only a colonial possession
of France or the United States but the possession of the voyeur.
Unveiled women on the Midway thus were living dolls, forced to temporarily relinquish
their identities as Muslim women and relegate themselves to the parameters of erotic fetishes and
human curiosities. The unveiling of Muslim women permitted the photographer, concessionaires,
and the viewing public the ability to assert authority over them and to relegate them firmly in the
position of the “other.” Unveiling also barred any association to be made between iconic
Christian figures like the Virgin Mary, the cadre of saints, or nuns. Rather, the unveiled Egyptian
women stood in contrast to those clothed in the proper social dress of the contemporary United
States where bonnets and Sunday hats significantly marked women’s social status as higher than
those without them. Immodesty, heads uncovered, and hands clasped, marked Muslim women on
the Midway and in images as captive. Yet one can read Egyptian women’s participation in the
dancing and exhibitions of the Midway as an art and a means to economic agency. Nance writes
of the troubling push-pull of women’s agency and captivity that, “the trouble for the historian is
sorting out how much of the reported agency and action of actual women performers was truly
theirs, how much a product of the reporter seeking to cross these women over to the listener or
reader comprehensibly as a wily harem girl.”238 As a result, the archive that was produced of
these women is limited to the texts put together by casual observers of the fair like Buel and
anthropologists like Putnam. The experiences these women who participated in the fair is
difficult to document and thus to understand because they left no written record. We must piece
together their stories from clues embedded in their dress and mannerisms and decode the prudish
descriptions of their performances.
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The strictly souvenir, commemorative volume by Buel evinces a different purpose than
Putnam’s work. In addition, the two volumes were published for vastly different purposes.
Buel’s imagery was meant to entertain while Putnam’s was meant to educate. Yet both volumes’
staged authenticity and casual disdain in the captioning demonstrates that these were not serious
anthropological studies but rather flimsy accumulation of images compiled to entertain, not to
educate. While the two endeavors are distinct, they shared a common purpose: to direct racial
typographies and the bodily spectacle to promote imperial discourse and the supremacy of the
Anglo-American, makes their achievement, if not their intent, quite similar. They are remarkably
insidious for such a seemingly benign set of photographs, but when the images are examined and
“read,” the images become part of the narrative white, Anglo-Saxon, and imperial narrative of
the White City.
Buel includes a photograph of a woman simply identified as “An Algerian Girl (Figure
4).” She is standing akimbo, looking away from the camera, and against a carefully constructed
back drop of the pyramids which were in Egypt. The background alone establishes that the
national or tribal origins of the subjects was of secondary concern or given that these were taken
in Chicago, was not merely displaced.
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Fig. 4. Algerian Girl from J.W. Buel’s
“The Magic City” (1893).239

The only way to vaguely validate Buel’s claims of the girl’s ethnicity is to compare photographs
of her to other anonymous Algeriennes from contemporary postcards printed in Algeria (Figure
5).
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Fig. 5. Postcard of Algerian woman
performing.240

Buel observes that the Algerian girls on the Midway were much more modestly dressed in
comparison to such dancers as those from Egypt. In fact the bulk of the existing images of
Algerian women taken by French contemporaries depicted Algerian women topless and
provocatively postured, while Egyptian postcards relied heavily on Bedouin costume and veiling.
This may reflect the artistic, albeit stereotypical, sensibilities of the colonizers, with the French
choosing to exploit the female form and explore the nuances of the Algerienne’s body while the
British in Egypt preferred a more modest imagining of the East. However, Buel acknowledged
however that “Algerian Girl” was still “bedizened with gewgaws which North Africans and
Orientals lavishly affect” which is a true statement of images of Algerian women of the time and
may denote a stand-in for what would normally be a more explicit rendering of her identity. 241
Essentialism defines the outward appearance of Muslim women. Buel approves of “An Algerian
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Girl” because of her modesty, but still does not afford her a position amongst the higher-ranked
populations of the Midway Plaisance.
The essentialist claim made about North Africa itself and the Middle East by juxtaposing
“An Algerian Girl” against the pyramids confirms that the identities of Middle Eastern-Muslim
women were cobbled together without any real concern for accuracy. Why situate her against the
pyramids when she is not identified as Egyptian? Undoubtedly the pyramids served as a kind of
marker to identify her general location in the Middle East. As well as the photograph
acknowledges cultural and consumer craze for all things derived from ancient Egypt, a fad that
was promoted by British archaeologists and anthropologists then diligently pillaging and
exporting from the Valley of the Kings.242 The work of the British metropole impacted the
landscape of the fair by including cultural signifiers, like the pyramids, that resonated with the
public and reduced Egyptians from citizens to laborers, and then reduced all subjects to generic
Middle Easterners.
The pyramids and the woman’s ethnic and racial identity merge in this portrait to evoke a
monolithic notion of the East. She is further reduced by Buel’s comment that “Algerian Girl”
was taken from the Midway Plaisance’s “side-show.”243 Even on the hierarchical scale that was
the Midway, Muslim women were subjugated further and their identities subsumed to enable
empire and imperial ambition to be highlighted in their individual portraiture.
A second portrait of a young woman in Buel’s collection, who does not look much older
than a teenager, is identified as being “An Odalisque Straight from the Seraglio (Figure 6).”244
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Fig.6. “An Odalisque Straight from the
Seraglio.” 245

This photograph is of a better quality, its close proximity of the photographer to the subject is
suggests that the photographer himself took a deep interest in his subject, perhaps himself
believing that she was an authentic, living artifact of the Sultan’s harem. He seems to know
instinctively that staging this girl as an “Odalisque” will garner both and his subject more
attention and more consumability. The subject is fetishized in her performance of an “Odalisque”
according to the artistic whims of the photographer. Presumably influenced by other existing
imperial visions of Muslim womanhood in Orientalist art, the scene is carefully constructed and
the body of the “Odalisque” is used to affirm the presumptions underlying ethnic, racial, and
religious hegemonies. She is dressed and perhaps even over dressed with trinkets and baubles
and items appropriate for a performance of on the Midway or even on a Nile boat in Upper
Egypt, but certainly not characteristic of women who inhabited a harem. In contrast, Egyptian
women’s actual clothing was both practical and, as demonstrated by portraits of elite women

245

Buel, The Magic City.

77

from Egypt and Turkey, also surprisingly Western. Ottoman women in particular, with their
proximity to Europe coupled with the Tanzimat reforms, meant to encourage the modernization
of the empire, embraced and cultivated the popularity of European fashion at court.246
Translucent “harem pants” and shoes with curled toes were a fiction of Orientalist artists, and
seldom if ever women.247
The camera controls her and guides her gaze away from the imperial instrument. The
“Odalisque’s” hands are clasped together and her head is turned to the side; like the other
subjects, she is also not looking directly at the camera. This is perhaps the most distressing
aspect of her pose: the tilt of her head and her vacant expression are more of sadness than
seduction. She is truly an empty vessel into which the observers may project their own story. Her
posture is an attempt to appear charming, innocent, and most importantly, naïve. Her age, in this
juxtaposition of innocence and eroticism lend an entirely new dimension to her objectification,
making her almost the subject of a more pedophilic fantasy than one of an ethnographic or a
more sophisticated erotic undertaking. Her clasped hands also do not give her any indication of
physical agency and add to her vulnerability in front of the lens. The photograph becomes one of
the series of homogenized images of Muslim womanhood in American popular culture.
Deployed as a way to articulate conquest and imperial endeavors, the “Odalisque” becomes a
sexual object through which generations of re-imaginings and re-stagings of her religious, ethnic,
racial, and sexual identity remain a part of the American popular consciousness.
Buel’s also featured a portrait of a dancer on stage in the Egyptian Theatre. This portrait
is different from the portraits of the “Algerian Girl” and the “Odalisque.” The photograph is of
both men and women, but at center stage is a single dancer (Figure 7).
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Fig.7. A dancer photographed on the stage of the Egyptian Theatre on
the Midway Plaisance. In the background are other dancers and
musicians.248

She is standing with her arms down, either preparing to be photographed or to dance. The
performers accompanying her are in the background, watching and waiting for the scene to
unfold in front of them. Their posturing is almost a caricature of the harem and the various poses
that populate harem imagery, languid and salacious at the same time. The photograph in its
posturing alone embodies this vision of the harem and the stereotype of the East as a region of
idle bodies and idle entertainment. However, the young woman at the center is standing and
looking out toward an empty theatre and slouched forward. She looks as if she may be mentally
impaired, cast in her starring role because she is marginally exotic, but also because she fulfills
the racial typing of an inferior intellect necessary for participation in the Midway’s
entertainments. This picture provokes discomfort; it really does appear to manifest the qualities
that Buel articulates when he describes the Egyptian Theatre as a “side show.” The scene that is
set inside the frame of this photograph is one of a Barnum-esque performance, where “artful
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deception”249 is certainly evident. This particular image illustrates the body and costume of the
dancer and enables further speculation about what she will do when allowed to commence her
performance. In reality, however, it is really more of a commentary on the Western assumptions
about Eastern culture and perhaps on the mental acumen of the “Mohammedan race.”
In Buel’s collection, amongst the portraits of single women, there is a rather classic
Victorian portrait of two young girls and an older man whose appearance seems very much that
of early portraits of Santa Claus (Figure 8).

Fig. 8. “Algerian Chief and Girls.”250

The two girls, who look more like they belong in a Pear’s Soap advertisement than in an album
from the Columbian Exposition, are staged looking intently over the shoulder of an older man
whom Clement C. Moore would no doubt declare a perfect foil for his description of Saint
Nicholas (Fig. 9).
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Fig. 9. A series of advertisements from Pear’s Soap published around 1895. The series is entitled, “Flowers of
the East” and painted by William Stephen Coleman. The advertisement to the far left indicates that Pear’s Soap
is available at “any international exhibition in the world.”251

Buel identifies the subjects in the photograph as “Algerian Chief and Girls.” What is seemingly a
benign portrait of an aging man and two young, cherubic-faced girls is perhaps not entirely what
it seems. First glance sees the portrait as charmingly paternal between father and daughters or
grandfather and granddaughters. The girls appear to be quite young and obviously doting on the
aged “Chief” and they are attending to some detail on his person. However, in the context of the
other photographs in this album, this image more likely affirms the “Chief’s” virility. These girls
could be his granddaughters or his wives. There was, in newspaper accounts of the time, a
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fascination with the concept of polygamy.252 Perhaps this photograph is meant to satiate or
indulge some of that curiosity, as it painstakingly assembles a scene in which both male fantasy
and paternal instinct are both satisfied. Like the other photographs in the albumen, there are more
sinister overtones than are initially appreciated. After all, “to analyze it is to dissolve its
charm.”253
F.W. Putnam’s book Types of the Midway Plaisance, compiles images of the various
races, cultures, and ethnicities on the Midway. His commentary is loosely couched in
ethnography. Putnam’s examination of Middle Eastern women also includes Jewish women. I
maintain that Jewish women were assigned their identities because their relationship to
monotheism was marginally more tolerable than that of Muslims. Additionally, the Jewish
dancers are described by Putnam as being much more elegant and graceful in their dancing and
movements, elevating them further above the Muslim belly dancers. Eastern Christians are not
identified in any of the texts, further confirming the notion that the Eastern “Other” did not
include any manifestations of Christianity or Christian women.254
Although Putnam presents a large collection of portraits from the Muslim majority
countries, he places less emphasis on the performance of race and Muslim womanhood than
Buel; thus his portraits lend less to the collective American perception of Muslim women.
However, one portrait in particular stands out. Amongst the hodgepodge of various belly
dancers, Bedouins, and “Odalisques” there is a portrait of a toddler. The toddler is identified as
“Colona” and labeled as a “Soudanese Baby Dancer (Figure 10).”
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Fig. 10. “Colona, the Sudanese Baby Dancer.” According to
Putnam, the baby, when asked her name, would answer,
“Mary Anderson.”255

According to Putnam the toddler was capable of “dancing” a rather uninspiring little dance and
then passing her cap around for a gratuity. In her portrait she distressingly does not even appear
to be capable of sitting-up, let alone being able to perform on-behalf of her mother. She is lying
down and looking at the camera with a grimace on her face. Her costume is nothing except an
untidy sack with some seashells for ornamentation. In Putnam’s description of Calona, he claims
that when asked her name, the child would answer, “Mary Anderson.” This, he claims brought
about “the desired shower of small coin.”256 In this circumstance, we note Calona not as a
Muslim baby girl, but a child able to code switch in a country where African-Americans, women,
and non-Christians were denied full citizenship rights. The novelty of a Sudanese Muslim toddler
claiming (or rather being assigned) a white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant identity was simultaneously
comic and tragic. Baby Colona is given a common, but still Christian name, the first step in
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Putnam, Types of the Midway.
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moving her toward salvation through this unofficial “baptism” through a camera and immersed
under the Protestant gaze. Readers might have seen the image as a sad failure of Putnam’s study,
but they could also see the child as a prism of how America viewed itself.
One peculiar instance that not simply illustrates the fluidity of race and the ease of racial
code switching occurring on the Midway, but almost entirely to Americans’ seeming disinterest
in authenticity occurs in a photograph that appears in both Buel and Putnam’s albums. There are
photographs of the same pair of women, separately featured and identified in Buel’s volume as
“Romanian Dancers” (Figure 9) and in Putnam’s as “Moorish Dancers” (Figure 10).

Figs. 11 and 12. (L) “Romanian Dancers” from Buel’s The Magic
City. The same women are identified as (R) “Moorish Dancers” in
Putnam’s Types of the Midway Plaisance.257

These sisters proved capable of racial code switching, giving credence to the observation by
some fairgoers that all was not quite what it seemed on the Midway. In Buel’s text, the sisters

Buel, The Magic City; Putnam, Types of the Midway. The appearance of the women in different volumes with
different identities suggests that they themselves may have done further codeswitching as required. Perhaps the the
Middle Eastern exhibits were more lucrative than the Romanian or perhaps in Putnam’s editing of his volume he
made the decision to codeswitch on-behalf of the women. This is the only instance that I could find where this took
place in the photography documenting the Midway.
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dance with tambourines in what could be considered a kind of Eastern dance with their hips
pushed to one side and their fingertips elongated upon their instruments. They appear to be
performing some kind of ritual of Arab-Muslim womanhood with a certain degree of skill. The
sisters undermine the racial and ethnic project of the Midway because in separate texts they are
alternatively identified as two different performative entities. If this is true in the major texts
documenting the Exposition, then what can be said of the entirety of the Midway Plaisance and
the performance of Muslim womanhood there?
Collectively, Buel’s portraits form the more innocuous versions of Muslim womanhood
because they are constructed purely for entertainment purposes with no pretense of science. Yet
Buel’s framework is set against Orientalist descriptors from his introduction invoking Aladdin
and the genie of the lamp to his overwhelming favoring of the “Eastern” elements of the fair,
both architecturally and performatively. In sum, as Alloula so eloquently described it, “the
saturation of the image sought by the photograher has no other aim than to lead the eye astray, to
set glittering traps for it, and to direct it entirely to that which is offered to view.”258 Both albums
“set glittering traps” as well as documented traps set along the Midway through the exploitation
of the Muslim majority countries and Muslim women’s sexuality. The White City itself and its
Babel ghetto was a “glittering trap” for the Americans who visited, consumed, and enabled the
imperial gaze to fix upon Muslim women and upon the Muslim world through the Columbian
Exposition.
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The Ottoman Counternarrative
The Midway Plaisance and its ethnographic bacchanalia dominated how Americans saw
and experienced Muslim womanhood. In contrast to the manipulated images of Muslim women
crafted by Bloom, Buel, and Putnam, Ottomans were promoting their modernization and
soliciting a different type of interest from the West. At the time of the Exposition, the Ottoman
Empire was in enacting a series of reforms called the Tanzimat reforms, which sought to
modernize the empire and restructure monarchical and social power in the empire.259 The
Ottomans were keen to restructure their image as a modern empire and cultivate their relations
with the West. In an effort to promote the empire’s project of Europeanization and
modernization, Sultan AbdulHamid II sent a series of albums to be displayed at the fair. The
purpose of the albums was to show the West, in particular the United States, that the Ottomans,
although “Eastern,” were also “Western.” The intention of the album was to deconstruct
inauthentic versions of the empire while simultaneously promoting a newly authentic version of
the same empire. AbdulHamid II’s intention was to portray his empire as still capable of keeping
pace with the West. Unfortunately, the albums, which consisted largely of Ottoman architectural
achievements within what is now modern Turkey and not in the greater empire, failed to subvert
the enormous volume of work already produced to fetishize and fictionalize the empire. Any
effort that AbdulHamid II put forth toward rendering a more Western image of Ottoman
womanhood was quashed by the proliferation of material of his own subjects from Egypt,
Algeria, and Syria. The sultan was waging a battle against a rapidly changing social, political,
and religious landscape.260

Halil Inalcïk, Application of the Tanzimat and its Social Effects (Lisse: Peter de Ridder Press, 1976).
The submission of albums for display at the fair was a conscious attempt by the Ottoman leadership to set
themselves apart from the rest of the Muslim majority countries and the Muslim Middle East. The empire published
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In the Sultan’s albums, there are a prolific number of photographs taken of young girls at
various schools throughout Turkey (Figure 13).

Fig. 13. Photograph by Ottoman Court Photographer, Abdullah Fréres,
of girl students posing with diplomas at the Mekteb-i Edeb-i in Istanbul.261

the albums at the end of the Tanzimat Reforms as part to demonstrate the effectiveness of the reforms and as part of
what in 2021 might be called a “rebranding” campaign.
Abdullah Fréres, Students, Mekteb-i Edeb-i (Washington, D.C.: Sultan Abdul Hamid II Albumen Collection,
Library of Congress, 1890).
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Mostly in urban areas, the girls are photographed as classes and their schools are photographed
separately. The number of photographs of various girls’ schools in the album outnumbers the
photographs of the actual students themselves. Whether this is intentional or not, or just a matter
of pieces of the archive that are lost to time, is unknown. The albums place an obvious emphasis
on female education. However, the question is more than the nature of girls’ education in late
nineteenth century Turkey: AbdulHamid II wanted to counter rhetoric about primitive Islam and
women, to blunt any critique of Turkey’s progress toward modernization, then why use
schoolgirls? Likely, AbdulHamid II or rather his advisers were closely attuned to the ongoing
debates about the utility of girls’ education that would culminate in 1899 with the publication of
Qasim Amin’s essay, “The Liberation of Women,” in Egypt. The sultan recognized the growth
of women’s education in the West and its importance to the West as a means of gauging the
civility of a nation. The photographs are to represent a counter-discourse to the “Odalisque” and
offer an alternative, modern conception of Muslim womanhood. Although the children have no
agency of their own and are simply pawns in an imperial chess game, their utility to the
government was priceless.
Practically speaking, schoolgirls were easy to photograph and although their use
amounted to probably little more than tokenism, they were representative of the contemporary
debates on women’s education as well as of the future of the empire that was both modern and
Muslim, something that modern Turkey continues to struggle with as it straddles both Western
and Eastern ideals. The albums are curiously absent of photographs of grown Turkish women
with the exception of one photograph of the tuberculosis ward at Hasköy Hospital for Women in
Istanbul (Figure 12). The patients, are attended to by veiled women but their agency is clear
through their employment outside of the home. A shift from the stereotypical and beloved
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languid odalisque will require more than a single grainy photograph of female nurses. Further,
the single frame remained a novelty as the only articulation of a female professional class in
Turkey at the time. It is easy to fetishize the portrait of the nurses and patients in the ward
because of their apparent agency.

Fig. 14. Nurses attend female tuberculosis patients at the Hasköy Hospital for Women in
Istanbul.262

However, without any other indicator of Turkish women’s agency, with the exception of a
collection of untranslated publications in the Women’s Building, the public is not able to find an
accurate, self-constructed Muslim identity for women in the pages of the album, the souvenir
portfolio, or any of the ethnographic guides. It is this gap in the counter-performance of Muslim
women’s identity that led to the popular imagining of Muslim women covered in silver coinage,

Abdullah Fréres, Tuberculosis ward of the Hasköy Hospital for Women (Washington, D.C.: Sultan Abdul Hamid II
Albumen Collection, Library of Congress, 1890).
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ornately embroidered vests, and curly toed shoes. The Ottoman attempt to refute Western
exoticism of the East and to rebrand itself as a diplomatic and industrial partner to Europe and
the United States ultimately failed. The albums were buried in an exhibition hall, and sex and
exoticism dominated the discourse on Middle Eastern as well as Muslim identities.

Conclusion
Colonization of the Middle East during the 19th century gave Europeans and Americans
the power to craft a narrative of Islam as the unsophisticated, reluctant kin of Christianity and
Muslim women as existing simply as a means of sexual gratification and reproduction. However,
what colonial powers did not realize nor anticipate were the social changes already beginning to
take form, where especially among the educated and upper classes. A greater interest in girls’
education, women’s agency, including travel, veiling, and political participation, was emerging.
Colonial rule may have expedited these changes through infrastructure and enforcement of
European standards of living, but they were not the only driver of change. Within half-a-century,
independence movements in Morocco (1956), Egypt (1956), Syria (1956), and Algeria (1962)
fought protracted battles with their colonizers for independence. The result was the loss of
European power and influence in the region that was quickly replaced by the United States and
Russia during the Cold War. Newly independent states such as Iran navigated cultural and
political identities and the nationalization of resources like Egypt. Oil wealth in the Gulf further
changed the power dynamic between the Middle East and the West as the Gulf region in the
1970s. Oil was a commodity necessary for the functioning of the industrialized West and it was
shrewdly leveraged by Saudi Arabia and smaller Gulf States to prevent too much Western power
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and influence in the region.263 These formerly non-aligned states of the post-colonial era had
become powers in their own right.
The rapid changes in the Middle East precipitated by independence and revolution are
still not widely accepted in the West. The perception of the Middle East as a conglomerate,
unified by a monolithic interpretation of Islam that has remained static for centuries, still informs
the ways Western media portray Muslim women in advertising, news media, or political
cartoons. As Sarah Graham-Brown illustrates, in the years following the decades of
independence movements, Western media still perpetuated the claim that Muslim women’s
systemic oppression was a direct product of Islamic governance at every level of society. She
uses the example of a Saudi woman walking down a street in niqaab (full, black, opaque face
veil) to make generalizations about Saudi women. Continuing this narrative of perpetual
victimhood, Graham-Brown cites images of Lebanese women mourning during the Lebanese
Civil War, situating women as victims of grotesque, state-sanctioned violence. 264 As relations
between the United States and the region became more complex, magazines like Hustler simply
defaulted to pornographic cartoons of Muslim women and plump sheikhs, eliminating any kind
of inference at captivity and oppression, and simply illustrating rape and sexual assault. 265 The
response to the region asserting its autonomy was for Western media to double-down on the
presentation of an uncivilized part of the world to retain control of the narrative.266 In a region

Bruce Riedel, Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States since FDR (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institute Press, 2019), 58.
Graham-Brown, Images of Women: The Portrayal of Women in Photography of the Middle East, 1860-1950
(London: Quartet Books, 1988), 249.
Faegheh Shirazi, The Veil Unveled: The Hijab in Modern Culture (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001),
58-59. Hustler’s relationship with the Muslim world, in particular Muslim women, is more fraught and more explicit
than that of Playboy. Hustler’s latest critique of Islam that leverages both the veil and the bodies of Muslim women
is discussed later in this dissertation.
Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East Since 1945 (Berekeley:
University of California Press, 2001), 305.
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largely governed by dictatorships and dynasties, the free press was a useful method for
controlling information and perception of emerging societies in the Middle East.267
In the century following the Midway’s performances, Buel’s portraiture, and the start of
postcolonial rule (1948), Muslim women’s public agency expanded, their visibility increasing in
the aftermath of 9/11 and the introduction of social media.268 The Midway is now Ground Zero,
the metaphorical space where Muslim women must continue to subvert the gaze of a new
colonizer in the throes of globalization. The transfer of people, information, and images means
that the veiled Muslim women must sacrifice anonymity for action and transform the
performance of Muslim-ness into political and social action in Euro-America. The days of the
glittering traps are gone, replaced with ever increasingly violent rhetoric, a new form of
Orientalism that cannot be subverted through the hootchy-kootchy.

McAlister, Epic Encounters, 305.
Postcolonial rule in the Middle East is sometimes dated from 1918 and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, or,
more correctly, from the end of British Rule in Palestine which galvanized Arab countries surrounding the new state
of Israel to assert their autonomy.
267

268

92

CHAPTER II: SCHEHERAZADE’S CLOSET:
HIJAB, ACTIVISM, & “GENERATION M”
Introduction: Cloth to Mosque: The Dynamic Meaning of Hijab in Post-9/11 America
Hijab, niqaab, burqa, all Arabic words denoting the piece of cloth that denotes modesty
and which many Muslim women wear either by choice, familial pressure, or law, is a ubiquitous
part of Western discourse on Islam: hijab is a cultural and a religious marker. In the postcolonial Muslim World, the hijab is layered with further meanings of resistance, agency,
subversion, nationalism, and, in some cases, a resurgence of a more socially conservative
interpretation of Islam. At the forefront of this ever-increasing public-facing form of Muslim
identity is “Generation M,” the generation of American and Western European Muslims who
came of age post-9/11 and spent the 2000s and 2010s developing both Muslim and female
identities and harnessing consumer power. This chapter explores their use of hijab to craft an
269

identity and to engage in social and political protest after 9/11 America and through the Trump
Administration. The increasingly public-facing hijab has become a deliberate aesthetic counternarrative to the Orientalist tropes that still flourish, despite opposition from Muslim activists and
scholars. As did the seismic changes brought by September 11, 2001, the November 2016
presidential elections and the subsequent protests of January 2017 also changed how hijab has
been portrayed, leveraged, and worn, but in recent years women have used hijab more
assertively than ever before in American religious and political life. Finally, this chapter explores
the less frequently observed meaning of hijab, and that is the sacred space created by women
within the home, or, in the case of the United States, the Women’s Mosque of America. A form
of hijab that crosses boundaries of hijab to construct a physical location of gendered space for

“Generation M” is term coined by Shelina Janmohamed of Ogilvy Noor in 2016. The term refers to the
demographic of Millennial Muslims who came of age during the post-9/11 decades.
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women of faith to gather and explore their collective heritage and belief in a manner that is also
faithful to Surah 24, the often-cited verse of the Qur’an that enjoins women (and men) to dress
modestly, including covering their heads. Hijab denotes individuals’ faith and in the Women’s
270

Mosque, claims a collective place for women.

Meaning Making with Hijab
The concept of head covering in religious communities did not originate with Islam and
its current cultural connotations are so diverse as they transcend the secular and religious, sacred
and profane. In the pre-Muslim majority countries, “Assyrian, Greco-Roman, and Byzantine
empires…veiling and seclusion were marks of prestige and symbols of status. Only wealthy
families could afford to seclude their women. The veil was a sign of respectability but also of a
lifestyle that did not require the performance of manual labor.” In these communities, “the use
271

of head covering as a marker of women’s status was partially due to its contextually interactive
role, in which covering transcended religion and added a spatial dimension to its function by
enforcing gender separation and thereby governing ‘who can interact with whom… and the
nature of those interactions.’” The meaning of hijab expanded in the 7 century with the
272
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revelation of Islam as a means to protect Muslims from harassment, and to create a similar
system of social hierarchy where Muslims were separate as monotheists from their polytheistic

“And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and guard their chastity, and not to reveal their
adornments except what normally appears. Let them draw their veils over their chests, and not reveal their ˹hidden˺
adornments except to their husbands, their fathers, their fathers-in-law, their sons, their stepsons, their brothers, their
brothers’ sons or sisters’ sons, their fellow women, those ˹bondwomen˺ in their possession, male attendants with no
desire, or children who are still unaware of women’s nakedness. Let them not stomp their feet, drawing attention to
their hidden adornments. Turn to Allah in repentance all together, O believers, so that you may be successful.”
(Qur’an 24:30)
Faegheh Shirazi, Unveiled: The Hijab in Modern Culture (Jacksonville: The University Press of Florida, 2001), 4.
Bozena C. Welborn, Aubrey Westfall, Özge Çelik Russell, and Sarah A. Tobin, The Politics of the Headscarf in
the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018), 18. Reina Lewis, “Veils and Sales: Muslims and the
Spaces of Postcolonial Fashion Retail,” Fashion Theory II, no. 4: 428.
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neighbors. Some contemporary arguments in favor of veiling often refer back to this distinction,
elevating Islam and Muslims above others, connections mostly emanating from postcolonial
actors such as revolutionary governments, asserting their own cultural and religious autonomy.
As veiling migrated through the centuries of dynasties and ever more rapid transnational and
political exchanges, its meaning also changed and adapted. For example, during Morocco’s War
of Independence (1952-56), the veil became a sign of anti-French, anti-colonial resistance, as
well as a vehicle through which women were able to be active agents in the resistance by
carrying weapons and bombs. In Iran during the 1979 Revolution, veiling empowered women
who protested the Shah’s increasingly stringent program of secularization. Moroccan and
273

Iranian women changed the veil to serve a specific purpose: to contest political action that was
detrimental to the cultural identity of the nation. It also asserted the religious identity of a
Muslim-majority nation. This same dynamic occurs to this day among the Muslims living
outside of Muslim-majority countries: using the veil to contest the encroachment of secular
society and to protest anti-Muslim violence is a regular occurrence. In the last twenty years, two
moments where the veil was used with particular effectiveness took place was immediately
following September 11 and the 2016 Presidential Elections.
th

The American public’s perception of veiling, (as described in Chapter One), was largely
limited to the exotic, the profane, burlesque shows and belly dance camps, rather than Muslim
assertiveness or even militancy. Despite images of thousands of veiled women in chador
(Iranian-style of veiling) being projected throughout 1979, Americans’ primary source of fear

Haleh Esfandiari, Reconstructed Lives: Women and Iran’s Islamic Revolution (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1997); see also: Shahrokni, Nazanin. Women in Place: The Politics of Gender Segregation in Iran
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019). (Moroccan Women) Alison Baker, Voices of Resistance: Oral
Histories of Moroccan Women (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998); Leila Abouzeid, Year of the
Elephant (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990).
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and anger was the Ayatollah Khomeini, portrayed as a diabolical anti-Western Aladdin who
would finally let the genie of self-rule out of the bottle. As Iran became a closed society and
274

Saudi Arabia an ally during the 1980s, the American understanding of veiling remained
unchanged and vague. The occasional article about the Taliban in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s
or the publication of such books like Princess (1993) or The Price of Honor (1995) jostled the
American perception of veiling toward conflating it with violence, jihad, and male hegemony.
Americans still did not assign an overwhelmingly negative value to veiling. Only after
275

September 11 , when the U.S. endured catastrophic violence orchestrated in the name of Islam,
th

and a much broader, more sinister world emerged within one Muslim-majority country that used
veiling for power and control, that American non-Muslim meanings of veiling undergo a rapid,
overwhelming, sometimes violent cultural shift.
After September 11 , scholars observing patterns in immigration and assimilation
th

anticipated that the children of Muslim immigrants “would shed their parents’ religious and
cultural markings and become more Americanized, and, if a reassertion of a cultural identity
occurred…it would not take place until the third generation.” This aesthetic component of
276

identity was hindered by the implications that wearers of hijab were inherently sympathetic to
the September 11 hijackers, and which somehow included a compulsory allegiance to violence.
th

Despite this, hijab in the 2000s, especially among second and third generation immigrant women
had something of a renaissance. Eschewing conservatism and violence, hijab’s assertion of

Chador is a uniquely Persian/Iranian form of cover that consists of a large, black cloak worn over the body. Unlike
niqaab,the face is not obscured.
The mid-late 1990s saw a surge in the number of memoirs and “tell-all’s” published about Muslim
women/women’s lives in the Muslim majority countries. See: Jean Sasson, Princess (New York: Avon Books,
1993); Jan Goodwin, Price of Honor: Muslim Women Lift Veil of Silence on the Muslim majority countries (New
York: Plume, 1995); and Geraldine Brooks, Nine Parts of Desire: The Hidden World of Islamic Women (New York:
Anchor Books, 1995).
Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, “The Post-9/11 ‘Hijab’ as Icon,” Sociology of Religion, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Fall 2007): 253
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identity made it a cultural, political, and consumerist phenomenon. Islamization, best described
as an overt undertaking of signifiers of Islam and Muslim identity like wearing hijab, dressing in
a more modest fashion, and becoming more involved in religious life became more prevalent.
Sociologist Yvonne Haddad writes that Islamization “accelerated, as an increasing number of
adolescents and young adults (daughters of immigrant Muslims) [assumed] a public identity by
wearing hijab.” Either as the first time or as a return to it, second generation Muslim women
277

began wearing hijab following September 11 to actively defy stereotypes about Islam. Haddad
th

goes on to say that, “many Americans began to identify the hijab as the standard of the enemy.
No more a marker of piety and obedience to God, it came to be seen as an affront and the
flaunting of an identity associated with those who have declared war on the United States.”
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Hijab was, of course, an easy signifier of Muslim identity as Americans grappled with the idea of
the nebulous, fluid state-within-a-state of al-Qaeda, and they found a soft target in veiled
Muslim women.
These tensions around what it means not only to be Muslim but also American and a
woman, did not result in Muslim retreat into the background, reshuffling their identities and
aesthetics, but in stronger assertions of identity, both in the American Muslim community and on
the national political stage. The 2010s saw the opening of the Women’s Mosque of America in
Los Angeles and two Muslim women, with distinct aesthetics, gaining traction in both the
national political and commercial scenes with the election of Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib in
2018. The very public presence of Muslim women in the foreground of American life was made
evident as major retailers such as the GAP and Macy’s included Muslim women in their
advertising and magazines like Allure featured Somali-American and Muslim supermodel,
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Halima Aden in July 2017. Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, Muslim women became a “normal”
element of the cultural landscape rather than one to be fetishized. A brief regression, around the
time of the 2016 presidential election, with the use of Muslim women in star spangled hijabs to
protest the Trump Administration’s xenophobic administration did nothing to limit the
production of cultural and political capital by Muslim women themselves. Although not firmly
out of the hands of non-Muslim feminists, the narrative and actions are increasingly at the
direction of Muslim-American women, especially those members of “Generation M,” the
generation of Muslim youth who came of age in the decade after 9/11. This chapter traces the
initial widespread “reintroduction” of hijab into American Muslim communities and through the
ways Millennial Muslims brought hijab further into the mainstream through engaging nonMuslims in wearing hijab, influencer and consumer culture, and participating in political
commentary.

World Hijab Day: Navigating Post-9/11 “Veiled” Activism and Meaning-Making
In response to the hate crimes and the rise of gendered Islamophobia following
September 11 , activists staged solidarity events arose to provide public support for Muslim
th

women. Interestingly, these events focused on the hijab as the most effective means of
279

demonstrating solidarity and sisterly protection of Muslim women, not only in the United States,
but globally. The first such events of this kind came from white feminist activism and not
grassroots initiatives within the American Muslim community. Two took place through the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)/U.S. Department of Justice, “2001: Annual Hate Crimes Report.”
(https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2001/hatecrime01.pdf), 2002. See also: Bryan D. Byers and James A. Jones, “The
Impact of the Terrorist Attacks of 9/11 on Anti-Islamic Hate Crime,” Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice 5, no.
1 (2007): 43-56; Ilir Disha, James C. Cavendish, and Ryan D. King, “Historical Events and Spaces of Hate: Hate
Crimes against Arabs and Muslims in Post-9/11 America,” Social Problems 58, no. 1 (2011): 21-46.
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Feminist Majority Foundation (FMF) and the Art Department at the University of Connecticut.
The popularity of such events ebbed and flowed over the last fifteen years, resurging when white
feminists felt a political and social need to reassert protection and solidarity with Muslim
women, reaching so far as to initiate a “Pink Hijab Day” for breast cancer awareness. Even antihate crime work was pink washed! Most important, events rose around the 2016 Presidential
280

Elections, where xenophobic rhetoric targeted and where the presence of Ghazala Khan at her
husband’s side at the 2016 Democratic National Convention, stirred anti-Muslim sentiment and a
return to Orientalist tropes about obedient, silent, Muslim women.

281

The Feminist Majority Foundation (FMF) announced an event (or “call to action”) for
December 16-18, 2001 called, “Scarves for Solidarity.” The FMF issued a statement saying,
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“All women, regardless of faith, are wearing scarves covering their hair during Eid, Muslim
celebratory days…This simple gesture of solidarity is to communicate love and peace for women
who wish to dress in a modest fashion. Our global days of solidarity speak volumes to those who
have been afraid to wear traditional hijab since the horrific tragedy of September 11 .” It was an
th
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event that lacked nuance, especially for an organization that devoted itself to advocating onbehalf of Afghan women. The Feminist Majority, pre-September 11 2001, sold 1” x 1” squares
284
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Pinkwashing refers to the production and sale of consumer items in shades of pink usually during the month of
October (Breast Cancer Awareness Month). Cynically, it is a marketing ploy for women consumers who believe by
buying, wearing, gifting, etc. “pinkwashed” items, they are contributing to Breast Cancer Research, activism, etc.)
Critics of “pinkwashing” say that there is little to not transparency about the percentage of proceeds given to breast
cancer researchers or organizations and that the very products that are touting support for a cure contain toxic
materials linked to breast cancer. See: Samantha King, Pink Ribbons, Inc. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2008) and Amy Lubitow and Mia Davis, “Pastel Injustice: The Corporate Use of Pinkwashing for Profit,”
Environmental Justice 4, no. 2 (2011): 139-144.
Hinda Mandell, “Ghazala Khan and the Power of Silence,” WBUR, 1 Aug. 2016.
wbur.org/cognoscenti/2016/08/01/ghazala-khizr-humayun-khan-donald-trump-hinda-mandell Accessed August 10,
2016.
Leila Ahmed, A Quiet Revolution: The Veil’s Resurgence from the Middle East to America (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2011), 206.
“Scarves for Solidarity Press Statement,” Feminist Majority Foundation, December 2001.
As an undergraduate at Dickinson College, I experienced a now buried campaign by the FMF to encourage women
to wear pieces of the screening from shredded burqas in solidarity with Afghan women in “post-liberation”
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made from the netting used to obscure the eyes in the iconic blue Afghan-style burqas to raise
awareness of the social situation of Afghan women. The overthrow of the Taliban in October
2001 and the “liberation” of Afghanistan permitted the U.S. government (in the form of First
Lady Laura Bush) and women-focused non-profits to pivot away easily from the use of the
burqa to oppose suppression of Muslim women’s agency in Afghanistan to advocating for all
women to veil in solidarity with Muslim experiencing gendered Islamophobia during a
prescribed period. The Feminist Majority, a Western, feminist, women’s organization, merely
285

rebranded the narrative by encouraging non-Muslim women to wear the veil in solidarity.
In the years since September 11 , a number of earnest “solidarity events” sprung-up at
th

college campuses across the country in an effort to respond to the dramatic rise in hate crimes
against Muslims, in particular Muslim women. At the University of Connecticut, an event called
“Scarves for Solidarity” was organized by the Art Department and led by Professor Jennifer
Schock. Similar events followed at colleges around the country and the globe. Some of the
286

events were organized by Women’s Centers or emerged as an informal response to specific
incidents of anti-Muslim violence. At SUNY Stonybrook, the Muslim Students’ Association
(MSA), hosts an annual event called, “Scarves for Solidarity,” during “Islam Awareness Week.”
The event is described as, “one of our most iconic Islam Awareness Week events. It stands for
unity and representation of millions of women around the world who choose to cover themselves
with the hijab. Wear the scarf for a day and show your allyship and support for Muslim women.

Afghanistan. A board member of the Zatae Longsdorff Center for Women brought these tokens back from her
internship with the foundation during the summer of 2002. Frustratingly, I have not been able to find any reference
to the original campaigns by the FMF of which this item was a part.
Laura Bush, “Taliban Oppression of Women,” Transcript of Radio Address, November 17, 2001.
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/laurabushtext_111701.html).
Accessed 3/5/21. See also: Kim Berry, “The Symbolic Use of Afghan Women in the War on Terror,” Humboldt
Journal of Social Relations 27, no. 2 (2003): 140.
Courtney Hickson, “Women Show Solidarity Wearing Hijab.” Daily Campus, University of Connecticut, October
2, 2001. Accessed February 4, 2020.
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Afterwards, people come for dinner and reflect on their experiences of what it’s like to be a
“hijabi."” 287 These campus events were eventually consolidated and codified into an
international movement in 2013 with the founding of World Hijab Day.288
The founding of World Hijab Day is attributed to Nazma Khan, a native of Bangladesh
who immigrated at age 11 with her family to the Bronx a few years prior to the September 11

th

attacks. In an interview with Narratively, she describes how in middle school, her classmates
would call her “ninja” or “Batman” and put gum in her hijab. Khan experimented, like her
289

sister, with not wearing the hijab, but ultimately returned to wearing it and after graduating from
City College, she launched her own business called Stunning Hijab. The business’s motto,
“Concealed. Content. Confident,” spoke to a new generation of Muslim women and offered a
sense of contemporary style and empowerment grounded in Islam. It was through the market
place that she created that she began to receive messages from women wearing hijab. The true
catalyst for the founding of World Hijab Day, however was in the wake of a 2010 incident
involving a Hollister clothing store in California. Hollister employee Hani Khan was fired from
her position at the store because her hijab violated the company’s “Look Policy.” The Council
290

on American and Islamic Relations (CAIR) filed a complaint with the Equal Opportunity

“Scarves for Solidarity,” Stonybrook University, November 9, 2019. stonybrook.campuslabs.com/
engage/event/3251267. Accessed February 4, 2020. Details for an upcoming, annual event held at Stonybrook
University each February/March to celebrate World Hijab Day.
World Hijab Day Homepage (https://worldhijabday.com/). Accessed February 25, 2020.
Melissa Berman, “That’s My Hijab,” Narratively, January 14, 2014. narratively.com/thats-my-hijab/. Accessed
November 10, 2019. Berman interviews the founder of World Hijab Day and adopts the hijab for a day.
Laura Northrup, “Muslim Hollister Employee Fired Because Of Headscarf,” Consumerist, February 25, 2010.
http://consumerist.com/2010/02/25/muslim-hollister-employee-fired-because-of-headscarf/. Accessed February 2,
2020. Chain stores catering to the teenage/adolescent market have been slow to adopt to the changing consumer
landscape of the United States in particular, the consumer power of American Muslim teenagers. Abercrombie and
Fitch, as well as Hollister, have both been in the judicial spotlight due to claims of bias and discrimination against
hijab-wearing employees. The argument from corporate leadership is that the hijab is not on-brand, nor, it is
assumed, does it represent (yet) a wide-enough swath of the market to be integrated into the branding. Other
companies like Target and Macy’s have begun to include hijab in their marketing efforts and in their product ranges.
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Employment Commission on Khan’s behalf. In 2013 a federal judge ruled that Abercrombie &
291

Fitch, Hollister’s parent company, violated Khan’s civil rights. However, before the case
292

restitutions Khan decided to create and promote an official day for wearing hijab that would
include women who already wear hijab and women who do not wear hijab, including nonMuslims. In establishing World Hijab Day, Khan was able to not only begin a mission to
increase awareness for hijab; the event also cleverly operates as a kind of dawah, introducing
non-Muslims to Islam through a positive, affirming, and community-oriented event.

293

The first World Hijab Day took place February 1, 2013 and now, entering its eighth year
in 2021, takes place in an estimated 190 countries worldwide. Khan has since closed her hijab
business to focus on full-time advocacy work for hijab-wearing women and leading the World
Hijab Day organization. The theme of World Hijab Day was “Unity in Diversity,” announced
294

on December 6, 2019:

Henry Lee, “Muslim goes to Feds over headscarf firing,” SF Gate, February 10, 2010,
https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Muslim-goes-to-feds-over-head-scarf-firing-3198425.php Accessed
September 26, 2020.
Eyder Peralta, “Judge: Abercrombie & Fitch Was Wrong To Fire Woman Over Headscarf,” NPR, September 9,
2013, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/09/09/220822451/abercrombie-fitch-was-wrong-to-firewoman-over-headscarf. Accessed September 26, 2020.
Kathryn Kattalia, “World Hijab Day Takes to Social Media as Part of Global Effort to Encourage Tolerance and
Understanding.” Bustle, February 1, 2015, www.bustle.com/articles/61771-world-hijab-day-takes-to-social-mediaas-part-of-global-effort-to-encourage-tolerance. Accessed February 4, 2020.
“About Us.” World Hijab Day Organization, worldhijabday.com/about-us/.
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Fig. 15. Advertising for the 8 Annual
World Hijab Day on February 1, 2020.
Designed by idotdoodle
(instagram.com/idotdoodle).295
th

The branding for the 8 Annual World Hijab Day is a cozy graphic representing the diversity of
th

women who wear hijab (and niqab) designed by Zayneb H, a Sri Lankan graphic designer living
in the United Kingdom. Zayneb’s designs are cute, non-threatening, and include, among her
advocacy for veiling, verses from the Qur’an and “Hijabis Wearing Masks” for the Covid-19
Pandemic. The graphic, like most of Zayneb’s work, is full of pastels, a feminine aesthetic, and
296

to be social. The graphic is infantilizing in its cute aesthetic, which is part of why it seems nonthreatening, but it is meant to evoke the complementary identity of women in Islam and signal
distinct gender roles. It is also a welcoming, safe image, and thus perfect for dawah, an added

Zayneb H. (@idotdoodle), “World Hijab Day 2020 Logo,” Instagram post, January 31, 2020,
https://www.instagram.com/p/B7_Ylwjnk3S/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link. Accessed February 4, 2020.
Zayneb H. (@idotdoodle), “Types of Masked Hijabis,” Instagram post, September 16, 2020,
https://www.instagram.com/p/B7_Ylwjnk3S/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link. Accessed September 26, 2020.
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benefit of World Hijab Day. The image is a translation of the common images of Muslim
297

women from exotic, restrained, and unapproachable to feminine, soft, and social.
Following the arch of inclusivity by inviting and encouraging non-Muslims to participate,
the event is a now much-documented occasion globally, especially on social media, with nonMuslim women posting their events, selfies in hijab, meme’s, and what they learned through
wearing the hijab publicly for a day. Unsurprisingly, the majority of events take place on college
campuses and include professors, students, and staff. Many of the participants stated that
participation in the event also elevated awareness around hijab and deepened their outside
knowledge of Islam. The majority of women interviewed for World Hijab Day news pieces cite
the desire to understand what it is like to wear hijab and an curiosity about Islam, in particular
the stereotypes about Muslim women. At Manhattan College, a Catholic institution in the Bronx,
student Darby Zelaskowski said, “I just want to learn about other people’s cultures and
practices,” she said. “I think it’s really cool that we get to do this, even though we are a Catholic
campus, which is really important.”298 Another woman, Katrisha Milligan wrote, “Major life
lesson. My eyes are opened to subtleties of racism. In my mind, racism is big hate-filled gestures.
I saw today that those incidents are rare. It takes the form of passive actions. It’s opening my
own door a lot more than normal. It is someone’s eyes to the floor in the elevator. It’s the lady
behind me at Kroger stepping back and white knuckling her cart when I turned around and

Oxford Islamic Studies Online, “Dawah,” http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e511, Accessed
September 29, 2020. Dawah means to call others to convert to Islam. Historically, dawah was practiced through
conquest and empire-building. Contemporary Muslim communities’ practice dawah through good deeds, inviting
non-Muslims to events at local mosques for community building, and events like “World Hijab Day” and “Meet a
Muslim.”
Aaron Mayorga, “A simple scarf is an effective tool for campus cultural communication.” Riverdale Press.
February 9, 2018., riverdalepress.com/stories/a-simple-scarf-is-an-effective-tool-for-campus-culturalcommunion,64654.
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smiled.”299 Finally, Megan Baase told the organizers of World Hijab Day that it was their event
that eventually resulted in her conversion to Islam in 2015: “I’ve always been interested in Islam
but until I heard about World Hijab Day, I didn’t know much. After reading what Islam is about
and why women wear hijab, I decided to convert. I still have a lot to learn but I believe I made
the right decision. I would’ve never learned about Islam if it weren’t for World Hijab Day.”300
Women are also encouraged to submit photos for World Hijab Day via the website or through
the organization’s Facebook page:

Fig 16. Facebook posts featuring non-Muslim women in the United
States experiencing and describing World Hijab Day: “I am a
middle school teacher and chose to wear a hijab to school today to
support my Muslim sisters. I am Christian and wanted to stand in
solidarity and teach my students about World Hijab Day. Many
students were surprised or confused to see me wearing the hijab, but
a lot of my Muslim students complimented my hijab or smiled as
they saw me.” (Emilie Scott).301

Katrisha Mulligan, “Major Life Lesson-My Eyes Are Opened to Subtleties of Racism,” Facebook, March 6, 2017,
worldhijabday.com/major-life-lesson-eyes-opened-subtleties-racism/. Accessed February 2, 2020. There are an
abundance of first-person narratives relating to the experience of wearing hijab as part of World Hijab Day and the
transformative power of the hijab: women discuss the reactions of peers, being introduced to subtle (and overt)
racism; and for some, the experience ultimately leads to embracing Islam.
Megan Baase, “I Would’ve Never Learned About Islam if it Weren’t for World Hijab Day,” Facebook, February
1, 2016. worldhijabday.com/2836-2/. Accessed February 2, 2020.
“World Hijab Day,” Facebook, February 1, 2015. Accessed February 2, 2020.
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Fig. 17. “My experiences in hijab have been mostly positive. I have
certainly received stares and double-takes. I was surprised the first
year at how quickly I got used to wearing the hijab and how
comfortable it was. This is the 3rd year I have participated in World
Hijab Day. I do so to show solidarity and support for the rights of all
people to peacefully practice their faith without prejudice and
harassment. My post from the first year I participated sums my feels
up best, I think… Because women should be able to wear what they
want without fear; because my Christian friends can wear their
crosses in public in this country as a sign of their faith without being
harassed but hijabi women face stares, disrespectful comments, and
attacks daily; because I was raised to understand that religious
freedom and diversity make the world better, not worse.” (Danalin
Beckett)302

Critics of World Hijab Day and other hijab-required solidarity events refer to the
temporary donning of hijab as “hijab tourism,” and “sweet, but uninspired.”303 For Muslim
women critiquing the event, it is merely an exercise in colonialism in a supposedly postcolonial
world. 304 Critics contend that although meaningful, World Hijab Day is largely devoid of any

“World Hijab Day,” Facebook, February 11, 2015. Accessed February 2, 2020.
Christina Cauter, “A Christian Professor Wore a Hijab to Protest Islamophobia. What do Hijabi Women Think?”
Slate, December 16, 2015, http://slate.com/human-interest/2015/12/a-christian-professor-wore-a-hijab-to-protestislamophobia-what-do-hijabi-women-think.html. Accessed December 30, 2019.
Russel Contreras, “University of New Mexico students join ‘World Hijab Day’,” The Washington Times, February
1, 2017, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/feb/1/university-of-new-mexico-students-to-join-world-hi/
Accessed December 30, 2019. Contreras quotes Mouna Mana, Director of Arabic Language and Culture at the Qatar
Foundation, saying that the event is, “sweet, but uninspired.” She later goes on to call it a kind of hyped-up
symbolism.
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kind of meaningful change or a deterrent to gendered Islamophobia. The overarching theme in
the various critiques of these events is that they promote a shallow understanding of hijab, when
for the better part of the 20th century it was a tool of anti-colonial movements, especially in
Egypt, Algeria, and Syria; also a tool for elite women in Syria and Egypt to make radical
statements about women’s agency; and a bold symbol of antipathy against the Shah and Western
interference in Iran.305 Hijab is the subject of much of the earliest writing on women and Islam in
the late 20th century, as scholars and critics continue to unpack its meanings, origins, and
evolution. An understanding of hijab and its roles in opposing Western influence and
interference in Islam should be a prerequisite for non-Muslim women using hijab as an
expression of solidarity.306 Simply wearing hijab for a protest or to cultivate a feeling of personal
power in sisterhood hollows out the distinct spiritual, emotional, and political experiences of
Muslim women and puts non-Muslim women in leadership roles where they do not belong.
Blogger “Ms. Muslamic” writes, “Even though the day is ostensibly about Muslim women and
their experiences, the spotlight is firmly on the experiences of non-Muslim women who are
merely tourists in the world of hijab. As such, it privileges the experience of non-Muslim women

Writing on this subject by women is best illustrated through memoirs and literature. In Egypt, Hoda Shaarawi’s
memoirs, Harem Years (1924); in Algeria, Assia Djebar’s, Women of Algiers in their Apartment (1980); and in
Syria, Ulfat Idilbi’s, “Sabriya: Damascus Bittersweet,” originally published as "“( "دﻣﺸﻖ ﯾﺎ ﺑﺴﻤﺔ اﻟﺤﺰنDamascus, the
Smile of Sadness”) in 1989. Further exploration of the subject, especially in Iran, is undertaken by Ziba MirHosseini in Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran (1999). Mir-Hosseini’s work is also
interesting because it was published shortly before the election of a reformist government led by President
Muhammad Khatami.
Qasim Amin, The Liberation of Women, trans. Samiha Sidhom Peterson (Cairo: American University in Cairo
Press, 2000). The essay was originally published in 1899 in Egypt. Amin believed that the “liberation” of women
was the first step to making Egypt into a modern society. He is often credited with inspiring the Egyptian Women’s
Movement. Amin linked the practice of purdah (harem life) and veiling with Egyptian vulnerability to colonial
(British) rule. He argued that women should have rights to education, in particular, to elevate Egyptian society
thereby lessening the influence and power of colonial governments. His fellow countryman, Sayyid Qutb, would
make a similar argument under Nasser in the 1950s which would lead to his execution. The difference between the
two men being Amin’s position among the Egyptian bourgeoisie and a secular lawyer as opposed to Qutb’s
affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood and a radical shift from secular to Islamic rule in the wake of British
departure from Egypt.
305

306

107

over and above the stories and narratives of actual Muslim women who wear hijab every day.”307
“Solidarity through cultural appropriation is extremely problematic because the consequences for
non-Muslims wearing hijab are never as severe as they are for Muslims.”308 Non-Muslim women
do not have to commit to hijab or navigate the codeswitching dynamics of a hostile society nor
do they have to participate in a Muslim-majority community or society where hijab is obligatory
and where authorities do not acknowledge one’s personal ijtihad (interpretation of the law) as
valid.
The critical response to World Hijab Day by Muslims and others to solidarity events
represent a cross-section of public intellectuals who, through various overlapping critiques, made
strange bedfellows. Robert Spencer of the anti-Islam website “JihadWatch,” found his
complaints about wearing hijab outside of the sphere of conservative Muslim-majority societies
in sync with those of Muslim activists like Asra Nomani and Dilshad Ali. Spencer wrote, “Who
is standing in solidarity with them (women in Muslim-majority countries where hijab is
mandatory)? Those who taunt or brutalize hijab-wearing women are louts and creeps, and should
be prosecuted if they commit any acts of violence. At the same time, the women who don’t wear
hijab in Muslim countries are far more likely to be victims of violence than hijabis in the West.
Who speaks for them?”309 Nomani is also critic of hijab and often aligns herself against
progressive Muslims who wear hijab or more strictly adhere to the faith-based/cultural
accoutrements of practicing Islam. She is the founder of the “Muslim Women’s Freedom Tour,”

Ms. Muslamic, “Hijab Tourism Redux: World Hijab Day Edition,” Ms. Muslamic Blog, February 1, 2014,
msmuslamic.wordpress.com/2014/02/01/hijab-tourism-redux-world-hijab-day-edition/#more-101. Accessed
December 30, 2019.
Ibid.
Robert Spencer, “World Hijab Day encourages non-Muslims to don hijabs in solidarity with Muslims, ignores
victims of forced veiling,” Jihad Watch, December 29, 2018, http://www.jihadwatch.org/2018/12/world-hijab-dayencourages-non-muslims-to-don-hijabs-in-solidarity-with-muslims-ignores-victims-of-forced-veiling Accessed
December 30, 2019.
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the earliest attempt at not only integrating mosques but more importantly desegregating them
along gender lines. Her book, Standing Alone in Mecca (2005), is one of the more well-known
and provocative memoirs to come from the American Muslim community.310 Nomani pleads
with her readers to, “Please do this instead: Do not wear a headscarf in ‘solidarity’ with the
ideology that most silences us, equating our bodies with ‘honor.’ Stand with us instead with
moral courage against the ideology of Islamism that demands we cover our hair.”311 Finally, Ali
argues, “they are not exploring Islam, but rather the ideology of political Islam as practiced by
the mullahs, or clerics, of Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Islamic
State.”312 Nomani and Ali cite the interpretation of Islamist thought (like that of the Salafi) that
segregates the sexes, enforces purdah, and uses violence as a means to an end. Islamism does not
require violence; it is simply a means of governance fully situated within Islamic precepts and
rejects secular rule.313
For critics like Nomani and Ali, World Hijab Day is above all an exercise in privilege.
Placing such emphasis on hijab oversimplifies the variety of ways in which veiling can be used
as a tool to limit women’s agency and to obscure the multiple reasons why women may or may
not wear hijab. Hosting a day where women are allowed to wear hijab, to put it on and then to
take it off, with no obligation to or acknowledgment of faith or government mandate is

Asra Nomani, Standing Alone in Mecca: An American Woman’s Struggle for the Soul of Islam (New York:
HarperOne, 2006).
Asra Nomani and Hala Arafa, “As Muslim women, we actually ask you not to wear the hijab in the name of
interfaith solidarity,” The Washington Post, December 21, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-offaith/wp/2015/12/21/as-muslim-women-we-actually-ask-you-not-to-wear-the-hijab-in-the-name-of-interfaithsolidarity/. Accessed December 30, 2019. Nomani is a long-time critic of hijab and often aligns herself against
“progressive” Muslims who wear hijab or more strictly adhere to the faith-based/cultural accoutrements of
practicing Islam. She is the founder of the “Muslim Women’s Freedom Tour,” the earliest attempt at not only
integrating mosques but more importantly desegregating them along gender lines. Her book, Standing Alone in
Mecca, is one of the more well-known and provocative memoirs to come from the American Muslim community.
Dilshad Ali, “Please Do (If You Want) Wear the Headscarf in the Name of Interfaith Solidarity,” Patheos,
December 21, 2015, http://www.patheos.com/blogs/muslimahnextdoor/2015/12/please-do-if-you-want-wear-theheadscarf-in-the-name-of-interfaith-solidarity/ Accessed February 2, 2020.
Nomani and Arafa, “As Muslim women, we ask that you do not wear the hijab.”
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problematic and represents a privileged positioning. Temporarily wearing hijab diminishes the
religious obligation to wear hijab that many Muslim women acknowledge and encompasses a
deeply held set of beliefs central to women’s identity in Islam.314 The privilege of removing the
hijab to return to life in a secular society with expansive agency for women erases entire
communities of Muslim women where removing hijab or flexibility in how hijab is interpreted is
impossible, due to enforced modesty through family, community, and government.
The well-intentioned, but shallow efforts of mostly Western and non-Muslim feminists to
express solidarity through appropriating hijab is problematic, yet it continues to be an annual
tradition, one very visible in the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections there a now
iconic image of a Muslim woman draped in an American flag hijab was part of a triptych of
images representing American women, pluralism, and protest against the incoming Trump
administration. The overarching critique is fair, arguing that, “the headscarf means different
things to different women, and those nuances are not always captured in a day-long experiment,”
but in defense of Khan’s vision, it was never meant to be an all-encompassing experience of
Muslim identity but a form of dawah, learning, and strengthening bonds between women and
their communities.315 Unfortunately, the event evokes more privilege than dawah because at the

“ReOrienting the Veil,” Center for European Studies, University of North Carolina,
https://veil.unc.edu/religions/islam/quran/. Accessed September 29, 2020. The Qur’an enjoins modesty rather than
offering a specific prescription for women’s dress. The surah (verse) most often quoted as a
rationale/justification/inspiration for veiling is Surah 24: 30-31: “[Prophet], tell believing men to lower their glances
and guard their private parts: that is purer for them. God is well aware of everything they do. And tell believing
women that they should lower their glances, guard their private parts, and not display their charms beyond what
[it is acceptable] to reveal; they should let their headscarves fall to cover their necklines and not reveal their
charms except to their husbands, their fathers, their husbands’ fathers, their sons, their husbands’ sons, their
brothers, their brothers’ sons, their sisters’ sons, their womenfolk, their slaves, such men as attend them who have no
sexual desire, or children who are not yet aware of women’s nakedness; they should not stamp their feet so as to
draw attention to any hidden charms. Believers, all of you, turn to God so that you may prosper.” [emphasis
mine]
Ibid.,
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conclusion of the event, white, non-Muslim women are able to return to their insular, privileged
worlds and do not have to consider the implications of wearing hijab in society.
An additional event, which is important to briefly recognize, and which was
unfortunately subsumed by the more general events surround hijab, was “Global Pink Hijab
Day,” founded in 2004 by high school student Hend El-Buri in Columbia, Missouri. The
intention of the event was twofold: to increase awareness about Islam and to promote Breast
Cancer awareness among Muslim communities, where the subject can be taboo.316 The event
garnered international attention and appeal including a partnership with the Susan G. Komen
Foundation and the Canadian Islamic Congress.317 In October 2007, U.S. First Lady Laura Bush
attended an event in Riyadh to support the de-stigmatizing of breast cancer among women in the
Arab world and the Muslim-majority Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.318 Unfortunately, the annual
event never gained the same cohesion or traction that World Hijab Day enjoys, but various
iterations of the event take place globally each year. As of 2017, in the United States, the event
was organized and hosted by Muslim Southern Bell Charities.319 As of 2020, the event still

Anne Stein, “Faith-Based Messaging Leads to More Mammograms for Muslim Women.” University of Chicago
Medicine, May 29, 2018, http://www.uchicagomedicine.org/forefront/cancer-articles/faith-based-messaging-leadsto-more-mammograms-for-muslim-women. Accessed February 2, 2020. The University of Chicago launched a
faith-based initiative in 2018 for Muslim women at mosques in the Chicago area: “Religiously tailored messages
were used to motivate behavior change and address the religious concerns women had about mammography. For
example, the barrier belief “breast cancer screening is not important because God will decide who will get cancer”
was addressed by discussing the idea that “although God controls disease and illness, it is my religious responsibility
to take care of my body and get cancer screening.”
Katie Lewis, “Hijabs go pink for breast cancer.” The Toronto Star, October 15, 2017.
www.thestar.com/news/2007/10/15/hijabs_go_pink_for_breast_cancer.html. Accessed November 10, 2019.
Donna Abu-Nasr, “Laura Bus helps Arab women battle Breast Cancer stigma.” Houston Chronicle. October 28,
2007, www.chron.com/news/nation-world/article/Laura-Bush-helps-Arab-women-battle-breast-cancer1794737.php. Accessed November 10, 2019. First Lady Laura Bush returned to the region in 2009 to continue her
breast cancer advocacy work and support in the Gulf States. The former first lady’s support of breast cancer
initiatives represent a shift from her work to enable her husband’s administration to go to war with Afghanistan,
through her advocacy and support for Afghan women living under the Taliban. A great deal of cynicism could be
applied to an analysis of her work in the Gulf States with women and breast cancer, but her advocacy is not heavily
covered outside of Texas, so it remains somewhat discreet.
Muslim Southern Belle Charities, Inc. Facebook Page, www.facebook.com/Muslim-Southern-Belle-CharitiesIncorporated-1964946513532401/. Accessed November 10, 2019.
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continues but as standalone events without a cohesive central organization like World Hijab Day
to manage and organize the event globally.

Fig. 18. The logo for “Global Pink
Hijab Day,” founded in 2007.320

Like World Hijab Day’s logo, the logo for Pink Hijab Day is meant to be non-threatening and to
appeal to both Muslim women and non-Muslim women. The smiley face at the center of the pink
ribbon doubling as hijab is to allow Muslim women to join the tribes of Breast Cancer “warriors”
and “fighters.”321 The imperfect, slightly goofy, slightly infantilized smile of the pink washed
hijab is non-threatening, needing the support of other women, other warriors, because her
community does not have the same robust support mechanisms, lack of strong cultural taboos, or
commercialism, that the secular world around her has in abundance. If Pink Hijab Day were to
adopt the same aggressive language as the wider Breast Cancer Awareness movement like
“fighter” and “warrior,” they would not receive the same attention because these words are
already part of the Islamophobic narrative and the belief that Islam and Muslims are inherently

“Pink Hijab Day Logo,” Pink Hijab Day, http://www.pinkhijabday.org/. Accessed February 2, 2020.
Samantha King, Pink Ribbons, Inc.: Breast Cancer and the Politics of Philanthropy (St. Paul: University of
Minnesota Press, 2006). King coined the term, “Pink-washing” to describe the manufacturing of everything in
“pink” during October for Breast Cancer Awareness. Beyond the standard pink ribbon appropriated by the Estee
Lauder Company, the most mundane items are “pink-washed” and sold with the promise that consumers would be
supporting breast cancer research through the purchase of the item.
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violent. This language is no longer accessible, so they must default to modest, infantilized, and
unthreatening images to garner attention and support. The public face of any initiative supporting
Muslim women has to be nonthreatening.

Hijab in the Age of Trump: Women, Protest, and Piety
In the Trump presidency, World Hijab Day took on a new significance. Just days after
taking office, on February 1, 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 13769,
colloquially known as the “Muslim Ban,” because of its inclusion of mostly Muslim-majority
countries.322 The bill was a predictable culmination of Americans’ fears reaching their fevered
pitch over the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and the influence of its vast network of
allies globally. It was also yet another installment of the Republican Party’s long-term Middle
East strategy dating back to the First Gulf War in 1990. The Boston Marathon Bombing in April
2013; the massacre at the Bataclan nightclub in Paris in November 2015; the murders of 14
people in San Bernardino in December 2015; and the murders of 14 the Pulse Nightclub shooting
in June 2016 all brought to public attention violence driven by Muslims after a decade of relative
calm and security outside of the theatres of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. The increase in
domestic terror attacks helped to steer the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections and the introduction
of the “Muslim Ban.” In at least one incident, the San Bernardino shooting, a woman served as
an accomplice and co-conspirator, complicating Americans’ perceptions of Muslim women as
passive and repressed. That association as well made them easy targets for anti-Muslim abuse
and Islamophobia. Muslim women in turn experienced widespread frustration. As Laila Alawa, a
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Law Center, June 2019, http://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-enforcement/understanding-muslim-ban-one-yearafter-ruling/. Accessed December 30, 2019.
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millennial Muslim woman and entrepreneur who grew-up in the post-9/11 world contended like
other American Muslim women, she was tired of apologizing: “I don’t believe in apologizing
[for] or condemning the actions of people who are, frankly, pieces of shit who happen to call
themselves Muslim. I think that coming out and publishing an apology recognizes that we’re not
a part of the American diaspora and instead tells America that we’re still not part of it
(America).”323 For Alawa and others, the question then became: how would Muslim women and
their allies navigate hate of the Trump Era?
Between January 21-February 1, 2017, American women made public protests to express
their anger at Donald Trump’s election and his campaign promises to limit Muslim migration
and also mitigate social and economic advances for women. Both the Women’s March, on
January 21, 2017 in cities around the United States and Europe, and World Hijab Day on
February 1, 2017, with particular significance for Muslims in New York City, where the event
was combined with an anti-Trump rally. At the helm of this event were three women, one of
them was Linda Sarsour, an American-Palestinian-Muslim from Brooklyn, New York. Sarsour is
an experienced activist in social justice issues, Arab-American and Muslim advocacy, and a
leader within the American Muslim community.324 She spoke to the gathered crowd on the Mall
at the 2017 Women’s March: “Many of our communities – including my community, the

Emma Green, “The Objectification of Muslims in America,” The Atlantic, November 22, 2015,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/paris-attacks-muslims-america-trump/417069/ Accessed
December 30, 2019. Interview with activist Laila Alawa and the Muslim Millennial attempt to reconfigure the
narrative of Muslims in America post-Paris massacre. Alawa is the co-founder of a project for young Muslims and
people of colour called, “Coming of Faith.” The blog (and the project) was active until September 2019, covering a
number of projects and issues from fatphobia to feminist support of psychics.
Women’s March: Board Member Linda Sarsour Biography: https://womensmarch.com/national-team/lindasarsour. Accessed February 2, 2020. Sarsour was removed from the Women’s March Board following accusations
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Muslim community – has been suffering in silence for the past 15 years under the Bush
administration and under the Obama administration. The very things that you are outraged by
during this election season – the Muslim registry program, the banning of the Muslims, the
dehumanization of the community that I come from – that has been our reality for the past 15
years.”325 Her message was powerful and spoke to the election of Trump in 2016 as the
culmination of American anxieties about Islam and Muslims.326
Sarsour’s presence in the leadership of the Women’s March was just one part of the
higher profile Muslim women assumed at the event. In the weeks leading up to the event,
promotion of the Women’s March was heavily supported and marketed by artists and designers,
including Shepard Fairey, the creator of the now famous “HOPE” portrait of Barack Obama for
his 2008 Presidential Campaign.327 Collaborating with Amplifier’s “We the People are Greater
than Fear” campaign, Fairey created a triptych of portraits of women who represented a
multicultural, multiethnic, and complex portrait of contemporary America. One of the portraits
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was of a Muslim woman wearing an American flag hijab.328 As part of Amplifier’s strategy that
tied in grassroots foundations, the images were made available for download from their website
and also through Kickstarter, as a fundraising effort.329 The image was also disseminated through
newspapers so that protesters would have immediate access to poster-sized images before the
event.

Fig. 19. The image produced by Shepard
Fairey for the Women’s March on
Washington.

Shepard Fairey, “We the People are Greater Than Fear,” Amplifier, January 2017,
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Fig. 20. Women attend the Women’s March on Washington on January 20, 2016 carrying the image of the Muslim
woman produced by Shepherd Fairey on-behalf of Amplifier. The women are carrying the images as printed in
newspapers for the event.330

Hundreds of women carried homemade signs and adapted the image of the “American Hijabi”
artfully portrayed and echoing in style and substance the previous administration, a fact that no
doubt enhanced the images gain popularity and traction with protestors. The image is
unintentionally ironic; organizer Linda Sarsour reminded the crowds that the Obama
administration had betrayed American Muslims through an ongoing war with Afghanistan, Iraq,
and support for Saudi intervention in Yemen, and yet Fairey’s image is one of the most
memorable and prolific artifacts from that day.
The image that Fairey used for his design originated in a photograph of Munira Ahmed, a
32-year-old freelance writer who does not actually wear hijab. The photo of Ahmed is titled, “I
am America,” and was taken by Ridwan Adhami in 2007, nearly a decade before it became
iconic, for the now out-of-print Muslim lifestyle magazine Illume.331 The image was staged to

Image is a screenshot taken from the campaign homepage for “We the People.” Amplifier.org.
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commemorate the anniversary of September 11th.332 Adhami said of the photograph, “I wanted to
make a power statement. I wanted to create something that we as a community could be proud
of. I wasn’t apologizing for anything, I wasn’t asking to be accepted, I was merely stating that I
too was an American. Wholly and completely and nothing anybody would say could take that
away.”333 However, it was not the male Adhami who was the recipient of much of the criticism
about the image, but his subject Ahmed, who responded to her critics after the image gained
notoriety through Fairey’s reinterpretation. Amhed wrote, “The hijab is not a prop or a costume
to me, just like the traditional sari and shalwar kameez sets that I wear to Bengali
functions…(they are) a big part of me and my cultural identity, even though I don’t wear them
daily. All that to say, I know in my heart I’m just as unapologetically Muslim as anyone else;
vices and all.”334 She rejected the claims of critics that Muslim women who oppose the image
“worry that this is a project designed for the white gaze. Some people have said the poster
somehow promotes the idea that Muslims need to succumb to bigots to prove they are
American.”335 In an interview with The Guardian UK, she related her encounter with a US
Congresswoman who recognized her from Fairey’s image and “one group of girls asked me
when I stopped covering, and I told them I never did.”336 Ahmed has always been transparent
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about the fact that she has never worn hijab, but her posing in hijab, an American flag hijab no
less, adds yet another layer to how problematic the image is in the context of widely consumable
political activism and anti-Trump resistance. She was cast as an iconic image of Islam, feminism,
piety, and patriotism, four loaded words and concepts in post-9/11 America and concurrent with
the election of an administration whose slogan was simply, “Make America Great Again.”337
Adhami’s image is not the original iteration of a Muslim woman wearing the American
flag as a hijab. Boushra Almutawakel, a Yemeni artist, was the first to capture the image of a
woman wearing the American flag as hijab in a photographic series in 2001.338 According to
Almutawakel, she took the photograph immediately following 9/11. In a 2017 interview, when
asked which portrait of her Hijab Series is her favorite, she answered: “Woman with U.S. flag. I
did it right after September 11, and unfortunately or fortunately, it’s still very
relevant.”339 Amutawakel’s commentary on veiling in Western countries was also captured in
photographs of a woman wearing the French flag as hijab and another wearing the German flag
as a hijab.340 Credit for this original image was never publicly given to Almutawakel and
Adhami’s interpretation of the same subject is now the iconic image. In 2018, an exhibition at
the DeYoung Museum showcasing the diversity of Muslim fashion opened in San Francisco with
both Almutawakel and Fairey’s work exhibited, but without an acknowledgement of the origins

women from brown and white men. There can be no greater symbol of gendered global oppression than that of a
veiled Muslim woman. The other images featuring a Latina and African-American woman lack the same cultural
cache (despite the latter’s dreadlocks). White women are likely to be more comfortable carrying the banner of
someone who looks like them and who they cannot say they have actively oppressed or undermined, especially true
in light of the fact that the majority of white women voted for Trump in 2016.
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or inspiration for Fairey’s interpretation of Almutawakel’s art.341 Almutawakel’s art was
plagiarized by not one, but two male American artists and made into a centerpiece of the
Women’s March in 2017.

Fig. 21. From left to right: Boushra Almutawakel’s portrait of a woman wearing an American flag as hijab
(2001); Ridwan Adhami’s portrait of Munira Ahmed (2007); and Sheard Fairey’s interpretation of Adhami’s
portrait created for the first Women’s March (2017).

Resistance to the image came from both hijabi and non-hijabi Muslim women
themselves, both hijabi and non-hijabi. For those living in the Muslim diaspora, coming-of-age
in a post-9/11 world and in the wake of the Arab Spring and the rise of the Islamic State
(IS/ISIS), all in the aftermath of upending American cultural and military incursions into Muslim
states, the image proved problematic at best. Finally, criticism from Muslims focused on the fact
that the artist was a white man reinterpreting an image of a Muslim woman for a national protest
that was overwhelmingly attended by white, non-Muslim women.342 The image itself was an
embodiment of the imperial gaze, a case yet again another non-Muslim, white, male man
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controlling how Muslim women present themselves to Americans and globally. On this subject,
Muslim-American-Iranian blogger Hoda Katebi wrote,

It was created by a white man, Shepard Fairey, artist and founder of the
clothing brand OBEY, created this image from a photograph taken by
Muslim-American photographer Ridwan Adhami. Were we unable to
uplift the work of Muslim women instead? Are our images only able to be
consumed when they are white-washed and sanitized?...Know that the
hijab—for me at least—represents a rejection of materialism, of
capitalism, of euro-centric beauty standards (among other significance)
and draping an American flag over it erases almost everything the hijab
means to me…Know that Muslims are tired of having to ‘prove’ they are
American, but also, know that one does not need to be American to
deserve respect, humanity, dignity, equality, rights and freedom from hate
and bigotry. An over-emphasis on being American as a prerequisite of
deserving respect is harmful for immigrants and refugees.”343

The old idiom, “wrap oneself in the flag,” was played-out literally for a national audience
and for an underrepresented religious and cultural group who were the primary victims,
domestically and abroad, of violence committed under the guise of patriotism. The hijab in this
context was co-opted once-again into a distinctly American vision of Islam, aggressively used in
a shallow narrative of unity, diversity, and, perhaps most dangerous of all, freedom. The tensions
that exist between non-Muslim women and Muslim women, white women and non-white
women; women in hijab and women who do not wear hijab are all embodied in this image. It
should be noted that much was made of Munira Ahmed’s face amongst the triptych of images
created by Fairey for Amplifier and public distribution. Her face was overwhelmingly the most
popular: exotic, playing into decades of white women being called-upon to intervene on-behalf
of Muslim women from the earliest publications by missionaries to Muslim lands (Zwemer,
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1903) to the Feminist Majority’s campaign for Afghan women (1995-present).344 For the
majority of white women present, it was a comfortable continuation of the narrative of the
“oppressed Muslim woman.” Such images allowed white women to avoid unpacking the
uncomfortable systemic racism experienced by Black and Latinx women, images of whom were
also produced by Fairey.345
Interestingly, although Fairey’s iconic image is still for sale as a piece of art work in the
Women’s March storefront, images of Muslim women have not been leveraged for subsequent
annual events sponsored by the Women’s March organization. The absence of Fairey’s image
likely resulted not only from its power in the wake of a deeply unsettled electorate and the
Muslim ban, but also charges of anti-Semitism brought against the original board members.
Sarsour, the only Muslim on the board, stepped down from her position in September 2019 after
several months of criticism from affiliated groups and a long piece in Tablet Magazine, outlining
the disintegration of the leadership. At issue in particular was antagonistic relationship of the
board members to Louis Farrakhan and the Nation of Islam.346 Additionally, Vanessa Ruble, an
early member of the Women’s March leadership charged the “Unity Principles” of the March
excluded Jewish women: “We must create a society in which women, in particular women—in
particular Black women, Native women, poor women, immigrant women, Muslim women, and
queer and trans women—are free and able to care for and nurture their families, however they
are formed, in safe and healthy environments free from structural impediments.”347 It was not
until 2018 that Sarsour, when questioned, responded to criticism of the exclusion of Jewish
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women from the “United Principles,” saying: “It’s not because there was some deliberate
omission. The unity principles were written as a visceral response to the groups that were
directly targeted by Trump during his campaign. … They were really written for the people who
during campaign seemed to be the first on the list for this Administration. There was no
deliberate omission of our Jewish sisters. In fact, you know, one of the groups that is one of the
most directly impacted since in America are Sikh Americans, those are people who wear turbans
and unfortunately, they are the largest group that are impacted by violent Islamophobic attacks.
Even though they’re not Muslim, people think they’re Muslim.”348 Sarsour deflected criticism of
the board’s composition, but the leadership of the Women’s March was eventually replaced in
September 2019 and now included two Muslim women and a Jewish woman in attempt to more
fully represent the challenges of women nationally and of faith.349
Amidst the ongoing discussions and unpacking of hijab online by liberal-leaning Muslim
women activists, conservative outlets also drew attention to Fairey’s image. Surprisingly, what
could have and perhaps should have been the most inflammatory and press-worthy lampooning
of the image was on the cover of the June 2017 issue of Hustler. The “Anniversary Edition” of
the magazine features a woman wearing an American flag hijab with the veil pulled far enough
up around her features to be more of a niqab than hijab, but the point remains the same. The
magazine’s editor and Trump supporter, Larry Flynt, was determined to see how far the new
rules of patriotism could be extended six months into the new administration.350 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the cover did not generate the same kind of outrage, interest, or analysis as
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Fairey’s image. Hustler belongs to a niche market of mostly men and no one was holding the
cover aloft on the Washington Mall.

Fig.22. Cover of Hustler magazine, published June 2017.351

The cover did receive some press from Yahoo! Style whose headline drew attention exclusively
to the fact that the model is showing “underboob” while then briefly examining the viral (and
sometimes violent) images created in the first quarter of the Trump presidency.352 The piece
concluded with the shallow and well-trod observation, “Though the image of the American flagas-hijab appears on a porn mag cover, don’t discount the platform. Much of sex is politics, after
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all. Or maybe it’s the other way around.”353 Or, in the case of Muslim women living under the
gaze of the American press, it is a conflation of both sex and politics.

2.6 “Generation M” and the “Hijabae’s” Marketing to Millennial Muslim Women
A 2018 study of the Millennial Muslim market entitled, “Unapologetically Muslim,”
conducted by strategist and writer, Nayantara Dutta, examines all of the characteristics and
motivations of a diverse generation.354 Since approximately 2010, members of “Generation M”
have leveraged their coming-of-age experiences into a major market segment not just for politics,
but for consumer goods. Dutta explains, “This generation is all too familiar with Islamophobia,
but this fluency in explaining their identity to skeptics has strengthened their faith and
determination to succeed despite boundaries. A lifetime of debating has lent itself to internal
questioning which has strengthened their beliefs, helped them know their worth, and made them
refuse to accept any less than they deserve. In reaction to the interrogation they have
encountered, Muslim millennials don’t hesitate to challenge brands’ values and motives. The
Muslim middle class is aware of their consumer power and wary of brands who exploit,
tokenize, or shallowly engage with them for capital gain.”355 Generation M is conceptualizing
and creating a global brand for the entirety of the umma and one that will have longevity as
debates about citizenship and what it means to be Muslim, especially a Muslim woman in the
West, continue.
The term, “pious fashion,” was coined by Elizabeth Bucar in her work, Pious Fashion:
How Muslim Women Dress, a work that contributes to the ongoing political, social, and cultural
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discussions of the meanings of Muslim women, particularly the various “dress codes” sanctioned
by religion, state, culture, and community. Bucar defines “pious fashion,” as “not entirely
empowering for Muslim women since it relies on traditional gender ideologies and structured
injustices. However, pious fashion is a form of meaning-making that can succeed as political
critique, rework the ethical meanings of clothing, and shift the visual culture of public religion.”

356

The fluid meanings of hijab are central to women in diverse Muslim communities who negotiate
their hybrid identities through citizenship and aesthetics. In the United States, “second generation
American women are more focused on reinterpreting the headscarf as a mechanism for
negotiating a unique, non-immigrant identity than were their immigrant mothers who primarily
saw it through the lens of religious obligation.” Magazines and merchandisers alike capitalized
357

on the new market of “Modest Fashion” and signaling the inclusion of Muslim women through
their advertising and product development.
Pious fashion existed within American culture prior to the Muslim fashion “boom” of the
post-2016 elections, mostly in corners of the internet where “modest” fashion was marketed and
sold to conservative Christian communities, evangelicals, and members of the Quiverfull
movement, in particular. Over the last decade, designers have slowly begun to create Muslim358

friendly fashion, mostly catering to clients in oil-rich states like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the
United Arab Emirates. The coming of age of millennials and the rise of influencer culture means
that there is both a greater demand for modest fashion and platforms through which major luxury
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and mall brands can advertise to Muslim consumers. It is estimated that by 2021, Muslim
359

consumer spending on fashion alone will reach $368 billion worldwide. In an interview with
360

Business of Fashion, Reina Lewis, an expert on the Muslim fashion economy said, “For a long
time, Muslims felt disregarded by the fashion industry. That is, until many Muslim designers and
fashion bloggers, who love fashion but want to honor their spiritual practices, started to speak
up," says Lewis. "Women, in particular, aren't afraid to express their desire for modesty while
recognizing their admiration for beauty.”361 As the primary consumers and drivers of modest
fashion, “Generation M” is a generation savvy about their visibility and potential for political
and social capital.
The challenge for designers and advertisers, however, was reminiscent of the challenge
faced by the organizers of World Hijab Day and the Women’s March: how to design and market
modest fashion without replicating traditional tropes of Muslim woman as subjugated by male
authority or reinforcing the idea that hijab is a necessary component of religious practice and
belief. As Lewis points out, “brands have to take the time to understand the religion before it can
market to its followers.”362 For a world used to the aesthetic of Muslim women being hijab and
not gradations of modest dress, it is easy to default to simply believing that a reconstituted hijab
is sufficient or lengthening of sleeves or skirts. Blogger Hoda Katebi of JooJoo Azad writes,
“We need to make sure that we are not going back to surface-level inclusion. We should stay
critical of the capitalization or commodification of a symbol that is very spiritual and intimate
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and has a lot of personal significance for the people who choose to wear it.”363 The emphasis on
hijab as an essential component of Muslim fashion risks alienating women who dress modestly
but do not wear hijab.
According to Wired Magazine’s “Guide to Influencers”: “True influencerdom
presupposes a particular type of relationship between content creator and viewer, at scale, one
that hinges on the willingness of the viewer to be influenced. Users consider influencers more
akin to a close friend than an advertiser or paid endorser, as the stream of content they produce—
and the more casual way in which it is shared with the public—imbues influencers with an air of
authenticity that is rarely seen in semicommercial spaces.”364 In 2018, Harper’s Bazaar
Singapore edition featured twelve Muslim influencers from “Generation M” to feature. The
women represented a global cross-section of Muslim women globally, demonstrating that as a
consumer force Muslim woman have power and, simultaneously, their participation in influencer
culture means that they are able to control, at least in part, the narrative around their appearance
and position in the greater Muslim majority countries, but also outside of it.365 The rise of
Influencer culture has also impacted “Generation M” and their consumption choices with the
hashtags #hijaBAE, a combination of the words “hijab” and the slang, “bae,” and #hipsterhijabi
to attract and capture followers interested in both Islamic fashion and looking good. On
Instagram, there are 4, 851 posts tagged #hijbae, the majority pertaining to modest fashion.366
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Influencers are an easy source of cost-effective marketing for brands from aspirational brands
like Bulgari to more accessible brands like J. Crew and GAP.367
Melanie Elturk, arguably the first of the Muslim influencers established her company
HauteHijab 2010 and focused on catering to the American Muslim marketplace. Up to this point,
Muslim women filled the gap in the American market by either ordering abroad, sewing their
own hijabs, or adapting scarves made as accessories. In an interview looking back at the first
decade of her company, Elturk says that she was nervous about not only founding her own
company but also openly using the terms “Muslim” and “fashion” together.368 After
experimenting with a fashion line, she switched exclusively to producing hijabs in 2017 when
the firm realized that 70% of its revenue came from sales of hijabs. Globally Muslim women on
average own approximately 100 hijabs.369 That number alone is astonishing and disrupts the idea
that Muslim women are neither allowed to be fashionable or have similar aesthetic goals as nonMuslim women. The hijabs produced by HauteHijab appeared in Elle Magazine and at New
York Fashion Week, marking their official entry into fashion’s mainstream. By February 2019,
HauteHijab had secured $2.9 million in funding from investors to accelerate growth.370
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Fig. 23. The HauteHijab shop homepage featuring Muslim supermodel Halima Aden in a hijab from
HauteHijab, styled by Elle Magazine.
371

Central to Elturk’s business is also its HauteHijab blog, which is an inspired resource for Muslim
women, including those who do not wear hijab. The blog addresses topics from styling hijab,
challenges about Muslim marriage and parenting, and relationships with non-Muslims. This blog
is a luxurious space for consumption but also community. For some Muslim women, the blog
community is more cognizant of their specific needs and questions that cannot be answered
within their non-virtual communities. In this respect, hijab is embodied in both the aesthetic and
the spiritual and that is, perhaps, what makes HauteHijab a successful, savvy, and rapidly
expanding company servicing the Muslim marketplace. Prior to HauteHijab Muslim women’s
fashion was limited to scarves procured from traditional retailers or from retailers abroad in
Indonesia, Saudia Arabia, and Egypt.372 HauteHijab also represents the American Muslim
market with designs and trends that may be distinct from those in Muslim-majority countries.
HauteHijab tapped into Millennial desire to move away from sourcing modest dress from
traditional sources of modest clothing abroad, while also retaining an accessible price point of
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under $50.00. Most of the hijabs featured on the site are approximately $20.00. Among the
various styles of hijab for sale, there is also a “New Hijabi Starter Kit,” to help new wearers of
hijab in styling and building confidence in their decision to cover.373

Fig. 24. The “New Hijabi Starter Kit” marketed by HauteHijab includes everything that a new hijabi would
need to begin to wear hijab. It also includes a guide written by Elturk with styling tips and encouragement.
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Their latest marketing features a “Fall Edit,” including a feature on “Sweater Weather” and
hijab. Capitalizing on the recent American consumer interest in all things autumnal and cozy,
HauteHijab seamlessly integrates a new staple of American identity with Islamic practice.375
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Fig. 25. The HauteHijab edit, “Sweater Weather.” The marketing integrates the change of seasons, the recent
American consumer interest in all objects related to autumn, and references maghreb, the evening prayer at
sundown.

By the late 2010s, major brands began to cater to Muslim consumers outside of Muslimmajority countries. In July 2017, mall staple American Eagle, making what could be considered
one of the boldest moves in the merging of American and Muslim aesthetics, sold out of its
denim hijab in just two weeks winning praise from influencers and members of “Generation M.”
The introduction of the denim hijab was lauded for its inclusivity and also made a quiet
statement about the inclusion of Muslims in America during the summer following the “Muslim
Ban.”376 The garment does not appear to be a staple of American Eagle’s regular line, but it set a
powerful precedent in its inherent “American-ness.” The brand’s first (and only) hijab is made of
denim, a staple of the American wardrobe and worn in thousands of iterations from jeggings to
overalls. There is something inherently cool, youthful, and unmistakably mainstream American
about denim and American Eagle chose to convert it into a hijab. Denim is one of the few
materials that is a great unifier, worn across cultures and classes, in varying degrees of quality
and purpose.377 It is one of the few universally recognized and worn items of clothing. It is also
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inherently American in its composition. By using denim to create a hijab, American Eagle
accessed one of the most prolific cultural products of the United States: blue jeans. Denim is
worn in some form or fashion by nearly all Americans from jeans to jackets to overalls. The
manufacturing of a denim hijab by American Eagle expands the denim’s American identity to
include Muslim women.

Fig. 26. American Eagle’s denim hijab
released to wide-acclaim, selling-out in
just under two weeks during July 2017.
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Another powerful precedent was set in December 2017 when Nike introduced the “Nike Pro
Hijab” to a global market.379 In their press release, Nike describes working with Muslim women
athletes, in particular U.S. Olympic Fencer, Ibtihaj Muhammad, who illustrates not only the need
in the global market for athletic apparel for Muslim women beyond the “burqini” but also the
challenges of wearing hijab in a non-Muslim culture and in the microcosm of sports: “When I
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was in school, I always had to have a letter from a local imam that said that it was safe for me to
wear my religious covering during sport. My coaches had to have that with them at all times."380
Muhammad made Olympic history when she wore her hijab in fencing competition in 2016 and
set an Olympic-level precedent for wearing hijab in competition.381 A side effect of Nike’s
mainstreaming of the hijab led to what American toy companies, prior to this point had resisted:
making the first hijab-wearing doll, in this case a Barbie, honoring Ibtihaj Muhammad. Skeptics
claimed that the move was to appeal to millennial parents, but the demand for a mainstream
Islamic doll exists.382 Mattel used Muhammad as the vehicle to test the market. Still others
argued that its introduction was predictably, and obviously, a way to profit from a heightened
interest in diversity and intersectionality rather than corporate interest in inclusivity.383
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Fig. 27. Ibtihaj Muhammad Barbie released in 2018. 384

Hijab as Space: The Women’s Mosque of America
The concept of hijab, is both an aesthetic and an idea: it functions both as a piece of
cloth, a portable curtain behind which women (and men) are protected and boundaries enforced.
It can also be iterated as space, such as in the Prophet Muhammad’s time when hijab was not
only a feminine garment, but also a spatial concept. The first appearance of the hijab occurs in
Surah 33, Verse 53:

Shenila Kholja-Mooji, “Don’t be quick to celebrate the hijab-wearing Barbie,” Al Jazeera, November 26, 2017,
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/dont-quick-celebrate-hijab-wearing-barbie-171126114202958.html
Accessed November 10, 2019.
384

135

O ye who believe! Enter not the dwellings of the Prophet for a meal
without waiting for the proper time, unless permission be granted you. But
if ye are invited, enter, and, when your meal is ended, then disperse.
Linger not for conversation. Lo! That would cause annoyance to the
Prophet, and he would be shy of (asking) you (to go); but Allah is not shy
of the truth. And when ye ask them (the wives of the Prophet) anything, ask
it of them from behind a curtain. That is purer for your hearts and their
hearts. (Emphasis mine.)385
Fatima Mernissi’s The Veil and the Male Elite expertly unpacks the Quranic interpretation of
hijab as not being solely a garment, but a means of separating oneself from the outside either for
pleasure or company. Mernissi writes, “reducing or assimilating this concept to a scrap of cloth
that men have imposed on women to veil them when they go into the street is truly to impoverish
this term.”386 This spirit of hijab as a woman-centric geographical entity informed the
establishment of the Women’s Mosque of America in Los Angeles in 2015. Although mosques
are not new to the American landscape, the concept of an exclusive, strictly gendered place of
worship, learning, and gathering for Muslim women was new.
The first U.S. mosques were established at the turn of the 20th century to serve the ethnic
Muslim communities in their areas.387 They lacked adequate space for women to worship and
build community. The first purpose-built mosque was built in 1921 in Iowa to accommodate
mostly men. New immigrant communities relied on existing models they imported from their
countries of origin in building their new mosques. Depending on their society of origin, women
may not have gone to the mosque at all, centering their religious life at home. While today
mosques in the United States function more like synagogues and churches, with family-centric
activities and weekend religious schooling, the earliest mosques planted a stake in the American
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religious landscape.388 Despite the social evolution of the American mosque, there remains a
distinct divide between the genders that goes beyond the separation of the sexes during prayer,
but into the actual living of Islam.
In a study conducted by the Islamic Society of North America in 2014, researchers found
that only 14% of mosques do a “great job” of including and welcoming women.389 A statement
issued the same year by ISNA and written by women scholars states:
We, the undersigned Muslim scholars, leaders, organizations and
concerned Muslims, voice our strong commitment to uphold and realize
the Prophetic ideal of masjids being open and inclusive of women.
Striving to realize the Prophetic model, we call upon all masjids to ensure
that (1) women are welcomed as an integral part of masjids and
encouraged to attend, (2) women have a prayer space in the main musallah
which is behind the lines of men but not behind a full barrier that
disconnects women from the main musalla and prevents them from seeing
the imam; and (3) women actively participate in the decision-making
process of the masjid, best realized by having women on the governing
bodies of masjids.390
The statement published by the ISNA Taskforce for Women-Friendly Masjids was published a
year after the official opening of the Women’s Mosque of America in Los Angeles, reflecting the
same commitment to inclusion that underlay the mosque’s first year serving Muslim women.
Hind Makki, the founder of Side Entrance, a project to document the disparity in access to
worship spaces for women in mosques, told Al Jazeera, “They [many women] just had no idea
that this was somewhat typical of women’s experiences at a mosque, that you go to a mosque
and you don’t see a dome; you don’t see the imam, certainly; you don’t see the architecture. You
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see a big wall in front of you.”391 Describing the climate among many American mosques, Sarah
Usmen added, “Mosques in America are generally very Old World. You go there to pray, maybe
there’s a lecture about not wearing a headscarf, and that’s the range.”392 Women attended Friday
prayers, but found that the mosque leadership, their Imam, was generally inaccessible due to
being segregated with men following prayer and so their questions and concerns were
indefinitely delayed and sometimes never addressed in an effective, spiritually nourishing
manner.393
The Women’s Mosque of America was founded by M. Hasna Maznavi, a writer,
comedian, and a millennial woman whose experience with Islam from childhood on made her
interested in reviving women’s role in the umma. Drawing upon the existing precedent not only
for the transmitting Islamic knowledge through women but also the existence of women-only
mosques, the Women’s Mosque of America is the first space in the United States to be dedicated
to Islamic scholarly knowledge, community, and inclusivity among the myriad degrees of faith.
Maznavi described for Muslim Girl how as a child, her dream was to build a mosque. Her
adolescent experiences with mosque culture made her acutely aware of gender disparities. She
concluded there was something inherently missing from the that women’s experience in the
Muslim community, especially inside the mosque. Maznavi’s intention is to revive the legacy of
women scholars of Islam and to restore women’s place in the community as transmitters of
Islamic knowledge: “I… learned about the vast history of female Muslim religious authorities
and scholars. Thousands of them during the time of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH (peace be
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upon Him) and up until a few hundred years after his death were female Muslim scholars, and
they were chosen to memorize hadith (sayings of the Prophet) and pass them on. They chose
women because the translators wanted as short a train of narrations as possible, and women had a
longer life span and sharper memories. They picked them as young girls and had them sit with
scholars, at three or four years old, learning and memorizing hadith, and then passing them on
until the end of their lives.”394 Maznavi elaborated her vision for a community of women
scholars in the FAQ’s section of the Women’s Mosque of America
We are inspired by our legacy of female Muslim scholarship and
leadership in the earliest years of Islam, and we hope to work toward
sparking a revival in women’s involvement in the Ummah (community)
today through our efforts. We firmly believe that a major part of uplifting
the Muslim community is to harness the potential of the whole Ummah,
including Muslim women, who make up more than half of
our community. We believe that The Women’s Mosque of America,
which provides a platform for Muslim women to speak and be heard in a
religious capacity, will play an important role in strengthening the Ummah
by increasing women’s access to Islamic knowledge, encouraging female
participation in mosques, and fostering female leaders and scholars for the
benefit of the entire Ummah.395
The Women’s Mosque of America maintains an archive and profiles of all the women
khateebahs (women who give sermons) on its website along with their sermons. This is a major
component of the mosque’s mission as women scholars produce and transmit knowledge through
the Friday prayers. Maznavi’s dream of a mosque, the Women’s Mosque of America, opened its
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doors on Friday, January 30th, 2015 in Los Angeles, with its first Friday prayers and khutbah
(sermon) given by Edina Lekovic.396
The mosque received some pushback from detractors who perceived the mosque to be
too radical a step that seemed to circumvent more comfortable reforms, despite it having a
precedent in some of the most conservative Muslim-majority societies like Yemen.397 Women’s
Mosque of American attendee, Ruqayya Khan, said, “There’s nothing really radical about having
an all-female space where people praying are all women, being led by a woman, and the sermon
is given by a woman.”398 It is true that there is nothing particularly radical about it historically:
the Women’s Mosque of America can trace its history to the early community in Mecca and
Medina. As far as American flag hijabs go, it is perhaps the Women’s Mosque of America that is
the truest to hijab with its sense of knowledge, community, and intersectionality.

Conclusion
Hijab encompasses an infinite number of meanings and actions: cover, modesty,
seclusion, activism, space, mosque, knowledge, etc. As a concept, it is extraordinarily
complicated as it is deployed in different spaces and times and with laden simultaneously with
different meanings depending on what its wearer, merchandiser, or oppressor wants it to convey.
In the United States, the hijab for millennial women, members of “Generation M” and
subsequent Generations Y and Z, is no longer something their immigrant or second generation
parents wanted to discard, but something that is inherently powerful for reinterpreting Islam
either in aesthetics (such as HauteHijab), politics (World Hijab Day), or space (the Women’s
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Mosque of America). The newer, rooted generations of U.S. Muslim women are forging
identities and continuously contesting and expanding the meaning of hijab to extend beyond the
Western construct of hijab and Muslim womanhood.
“Generation M” is politically savvy and active, but also understands the necessity of
integrating dawah into their charitable and economic ventures. World Hijab Day, despite being
problematic for many Muslim women (“Hijab Tourism”) is a space through which non-Muslim
women can, even if superficially, experience the feeling of hijab, even if through simple textures
and not through the lived-experience. World Hijab Day and its participants do their small, if
altruistic, part to normalize hijab and as a global phenomenon, it has encouraging prospects in
the future as it continues to grow and leverage its influence. For commercial enterprises like
HauteHijab and the proliferation of Muslim influencers on Instagram and blogs, there is balance
between the commodification of practice and the idea that this is a more “correct” form of dress
and alienation of Muslim women who do not observe hijab. To their credit, “Generation M” and
their corner of the influencer market has balanced this well, acknowledging and emphasizing the
diversity and plurality of the umma, and in doing so, functions as a unifying force for American
Muslims.
In the Trump Era, “Generation M,” its influencers, and its allies, must negotiate how to
leverage their social, economic, and political power. At stake is their ability to protect their
citizenship and their communities at home and abroad. The leveraging of hijab was not a
collective decision by American Muslim women for the 2017 Women’s March, although tacitly
approved of by the organizers and appropriated by white, non-Muslim women. The fetishized,
loaded image of a Muslim woman (who herself does not wear hijab) remains a major part of the
visual and artistic record of the Women’s March, but the space it occupied has been reclaimed by
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new, inclusive, collaborative, and intersectional iterations of women. Muslim women’s political
power is growing and in the wake of the 2016 elections, they are increasingly bold and publicfacing, demonstrated by the 2017 election of Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib to the US House of
Representatives. Gratefully, their faces replaced that of the Muslim woman superimposed on an
imperial banner.
Finally, the Women’s Mosque of America, a space where hijab becomes not simply a
garment, but a geographical, spiritual, and educational space. The establishment of the Women’s
Mosque of America is a revolutionary moment for America, not the umma, because at its core
are women gathering to harness religious knowledge, freedom, and all of the attributes of a
utopian America that conservative pundits gleefully expound upon whenever they critique Islam
and Muslim-majority societies. The collective intellectual and social power of this mosque,
coupled with the national and global reach of a generation of savvy consumers, politicians,
activists, and influencers will ensure that hijab in the United States is as Islamic as it is
American.
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CHAPTER III:
SCHEHERAZADE’S CIRCLE OF KNOWLEDGE:
Young Women, ISIS, and the Stories they Tell
My name is Baghdad / Disfigured princess /
Scheherazade has forgotten me/ My tales of a thousand and one nights /
No longer interest anyone / They destroyed everything
-Tina Arena, “Je m’appelle Bagdad.”399
3.1 Introduction
Scheherazade’s story is often romanticized by poets, artists, and dancers simply as the story
of a beguiling woman whose storytelling wins her the love and trust of her husband, Shahryar.
However, Scheherazade’s rise from the daughter of the Grand Vizier to the Sultana is rooted in
violence. Shahryar’s Sultana was executed for adultery and an unknown number of young brides,
living only one night as Shahryar’s Sultana, met the same fate after their wedding night.
Scheherazade volunteers herself as Shahryar’s next bride, telling her father, "I am aware of the
danger I run, my father, but it does not deter me from my purpose. If I die, my death will be
glorious; if I succeed, I shall render my country an important service."400 In Scheherazade’s words
to her father, there are parallels to the words and motivations of the young women who joined the
Islamic State: “My death will be glorious” means, “I will die a martyr.” The second phrase, “if I
succeed, I shall render my country an important service” means that “My jihad will enact some
revenge on-behalf of the umma.” The women of the Islamic State are part of this first chapter of
the 1001 Nights because their motivations and actions originated in state-sanctioned violence that
directly effected their communities. They are inserting themselves into the narrative in an effort to
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mitigate the violence and oppression against Muslims particularly by Western governments.
Young women growing-up in the aughts experienced a dramatic rise in hate crimes following
September 11th, 2001 and the effects of two conflicts in Muslim-majority countries, Afghanistan
(2001) and Iraq (2003) launched by the United States and its Western allies.401 Radicalization
through violence abroad in a distant Muslim land is not a new phenomenon: Al-Qaeda and the
contemporary mujahideen are a direct result of Osama bin Laden’s radicalization while fighting
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s.402 Al-Qaeda’s organizational successors, Al-Qaeda
in Iraq and then the Islamic State, also prioritized the security of the umma over nationalism.403
In the wake of 9/11 and two ongoing conflicts, Muslim children of Muslim immigrants
must navigate multiple communities: (1) their country of residence; (2) their own ethnic enclave
or neighborhood; (3) their community of origin abroad (even if they have never visited or been
involved in that community); and (4) their place within the global umma. They are constantly
switching between narratives related to their identities as Muslims from the media, peers,
community, and family:
Youth embody and perform the very economic, and we would add
cultural, conflicts that constitute global politics. Adolescence is precisely
the moment in which international, national, social, and personal 'crises'
erupt most publicly and spontaneously, and, unfortunately, they are more
often than not misread as simply personal, hormonal, disciplinary or
developmental "problems.” Growing up in the midst of … Islamophobia,
[Muslim] youth offer us a lens into the developmental challenges that
confront teens who live on the intimate fault lines of global conflict; teens
who carry international crises in their back- packs.404
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In most cases, as illustrated in Chapter 2, the “international, national, social, and personal
‘crisies’” were channeled into youth activism like World Hijab Day, media platforms like
Muslim Girl, and political protests to translate Muslim stories and identities for a Western
audience.405 However, some young women (Aqsa Mahmood, Hoda Muthana) whose early
concerns centered on the state of the global umma (primarily Muslims involved in the civil war
in Syria) became enmeshed in a much more complex and dangerous form of activism whose
stories prioritized the umma over nationalism and security through the manipulation of original
Islamic texts that lead them to embrace and endorse violence in the Islamic State.406 Their
involvement in the Islamic State began with storytelling in a localized context (i.e. Circles of
Knowledge) or in digital forms through the internet, in particular Twitter, Tumblr, or message
boards. The content of the stories was deeply rooted in early Islamic practice and thought, which
enabled them to leave their communities and validated their decisions.407

Circles of Knowledge and the Salafi Scheherazade
In discreet spaces in mosques and community centers, a Salafi Scheherazade weaves
Quranic exegesis, expectations for dress and conduct, and, in some circles, a violent antiWestern rhetoric which encourages interest in extremist groups like the Islamic State (IS).408 A
Circle of Knowledge is an informal gathering, segregated by sex, where men and women are
taught about Islam in the context of Salafism. A women’s circle might be led by a man, but it is
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still segregated by a partition. Women are not permitted to lead a men’s group.409 These
gatherings are hosted frequently during the week by self-appointed scholars (Salafi Islam does
not require credentials) mosques or other community spaces and they are an intensive learning
and indoctrination into Salafism. In the 1001 Nights, Scheherazade tells her stories in a private
space with her husband present, an intimate Circle of Knowledge not explicitly concerning
Islam, but broader questions related to life and loss. As Hanan al-Shaykh writes, “her stories at
the beginning…are very brutal and dark, but they show us that adultery usually happens for a
reason and that jealousy and violence typically bring misery to all concerned. With time, though,
they become more about social values, adventures, they were less dark than when she started,
and concern higher questions. Who are we human beings? What do we do in life? What is our
aim of living? How do we become better citizens? And the answer, so often, comes through
telling important stories and listening closely to what others have learned.”410 Scheherazade, like
the women and men leading the Circles of Knowledge, converts her husband to a humanist
perspective of his world, which includes his wife and kingdom. Scheherazade’s storytelling is
exhaustive and intensive over 1,001 consecutive nights, but she succeeds in restoring her
husband’s faith. Her storytelling parallels the content in Circles of Knowledge which range from
violence to charity and aspects of human struggle and frailty: “How to Stop Sinning” and “The
Believing Women’s Reward in Paradise.”411 The objective is a correction of belief to enable the
believer to live a more faithful life.
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There is no single profile of women who joined the Islamic State, their only commonality
is that they have real and perceived grievances against their family, community, and/or their
country of residence. In her attempt to understand the motives for the young women who join IS,
author Azadeh Moaveni writes, “Every national sphere that touched Isis, each distinct society,
teemed with its own grievances. It quickly became evident that there was not one story of Isis
women, but many separate stories, bound together by one truth – the ease with which jihadist
militancy could exploit women’s frustrated hopes and desires.”412 The Western women who
joined IS range from white Midwestern women (“Alex,” Ariel Bradley) to second generation
Muslims (Aqsa Mahmood, Hoda Muthana, Shamima Begum) and they came from different
socioeconomic and educational backgrounds.413 Despite the disparities in their backgrounds, they
all felt an overarching need to belong to a community, a need that was not fulfilled by their local
community or country of origin due to Islamophobia, racism, and/or insular education and
socialization. Any one or a combination of these factors frustrated them enough to seek out and
be vulnerable to joining the Islamic State.414 The Islamic State was a conduit through which they
could project and act upon these grievances in a way that, to them, was more meaningful and
impactful than grassroots activism.415 For all these women, IS seems to have offered a sense of
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belonging in world forever altered by the ripple of violence unleashed on September 11, 2001
and, in some cases, violence from their countries of origin brought into their childhood homes as
children through television, internet media, and politically active parents.416 These women are
now ex-patriated from not only the caliphate, but also from their home countries. They are, onceagain, thrust into communities and countries where they still cannot be citizens because the
perceived and real risk of their citizenship is too great for their communities.
Ground Zero, for women embedded in Islamic extremism, is an inverted memorial: it
memorializes the destruction and the sacrifice of nineteen mujahideen but also represents yet
another incursion of Dar al-Harb (The House of War) into Dar al-Islam (The House of
Islam).417 It foreshadows another brutal assault by the West against Muslims and symbolizes the
rapid securitization of the United States through war and circumscribed rights that occurred in
the days and weeks following September 11th leading to a climate of permanent unease and
suspicion. I argue that only a small minority of Muslims and an even smaller minority of Muslim
women are involved in terror, that the essential ethos of Scheherazade is the same: surviving in a
world dominated by patriarchal power structures, seeking social and political agency within that
power, while also preserving and leveraging feminine ideals of piety, service, and obedience.
Scheherazade’s struggle also forms part of a larger struggle for transnational Muslims for
citizenship in communities that are suspicious and outwardly hostile to their presence. The
caliphate offers citizenship: for women, it also offers safety and inalienable rights through Islam.
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Women who join the Islamic State listen to the stories in Circles of Knowledge, both
local and distant, as through and also from abroad shared via WhatsApp, Twitter, Tumblr, and
TikTok.418 They also listened to their parents’ conversations in exile and shared their adolescent
dissatisfaction with their lives in Western countries among their classmates. They spun these
fragments into tales of why they had to flee London, Glasgow, Chattanooga, and Atlanta for
Syria. They spun them again when the fairy tale violently, abruptly ended, and they desired to
return to the safety of their rural lives and council flats. They told these stories to themselves and
sometimes to each other to spur them on their mission to the Caliphate and to survive the
realities of living within IS’s world. For many of these young women, the fall of the caliphate
means that they must now tell new stories to survive in refugee camps and to beg for
governments to repatriate them. Stories of immense grief told by women with a flat affect who
are barely out of childhood, told to reporters, aid workers, and lawyers in an effort to survive.419
The countries where they have citizenship do not want them to return nor do their countries of
origin, many of which are struggling against a political unrest driven by Islamists and young
people with disparate ideas of governance. So, the women keep telling their stories in the hope
that some iteration of it will allow them to return home and to live.
Researching and understanding women’s motivation for joining IS from officially
secular, progressive, and liberal societies in the United States and Great Britain is challenging.
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American and British women were only active on social media for a brief time between 2014-15.
Although we know that over 100 women (40 from the United States and 60 from Great Britain)
joined IS, we only know the identities, virtual (and legal) footprints of a handful.420 Many of
these women fall into the demographic of younger Millennials (e.g., Aqsa Mahmood) or older
members of Generation Z (Sharmeena Begum, Amira Abase, “Alex”).421 They represent a
generation imprinted by constant access to technology and means of communication. While
Millennials came of age when the internet reached full accessibility, Generation Z (born 19972010) has grown up with the internet always accessible. As well, both generations also are
among the first to be inundated with information from social media. Members of Generation Z
grew up without either remembering or experiencing a pre-September 11th world. For U.S.
Muslims, this means a world before a dramatic rise in hate crimes, xenophobia, wars and drone
strikes across the Muslim world instigated by Western governments. Technology, social media,
and an endless news cycle meant that young Muslims coming-of-age post-September 11th
marinated in a constant stream of anti-Muslim violence both at home and abroad. Young women
resided in countries whose governments were slaughtering other members of the umma, the
global Muslim community. Meanwhile, in their neighborhoods and local communities, both
subtle and overt forms of Islamophobia influenced their social and economic agency along with
their identities as Muslims, women, and Americans. It did not require a great outlay on the part
of recruiters/groomers from the Islamic State to exploit the vulnerability of young women living
under these circumstances trying to negotiate their identities.
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Between 2015-2019, many of their social media accounts were removed by Twitter and
Tumblr, most in late 2015, Tracking the young women of IS has become almost impossible.422
They have retreated to the so-called “Dark Net” or they are silent or dead.423 Some are in a less
hospitable forms of captivity, stateless, occupying refugee camps, such as Shamima Begum and
Hoda Muthana, two of the so-called “ISIS Brides,” whose citizenships were revoked by the
United Kingdom and the United States respectively.424 Even their countries of origin,
Bangladesh and Yemen, refuse to repatriate the women as they not only endanger cordial
relations with the United States, but their history of radicalism is liable to be leveraged by
Islamist groups in these countries, further destabilizing precarious governments. Their families
are reluctant to speak out because of backlash as suspected enablers and purveyors of radicalism.
The brevity of their careers in the Islamic State as muhajirat is tantalizingly brief with tragic
outcomes: widowhood, the loss of multiple children, and ultimately, the loss of family and
citizenship. What confounds researchers is that the young women are different: some of the
women are capricious, almost precocious victims of dysfunctional homes and prolonged
adolescence who were searching for meaning and stability; some came from stable homes, were

Danny Yadron, “Twitter deletes 125,000 Isis accounts and expands anti-terror teams,” The Guardian, February 5,
2016. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/05/twitter-deletes-isis-accounts-terrorism-online.
Accessed March 3, 2021.
Laura Mowat, “’I’m scared’ Bethnal Green schoolgirl Kadiza Sultan’s chilling call before death,” The Express,
August 12, 2016. https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/699366/Bethnal-Green-schoolgirl-Kadiza-Sultana-s-chillingphone-call-from-Syria. Accessed September 10, 2020. See also: Lizzie Dearden and Richard Hall, “The Britons
who went to join Isis: Where are they now?” The Independent, February 15, 2019.
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/uk-isis-recruits-syria-return-british-caliphate-terrorismjihadis-a8781056.html. Accessed September 10, 2020. The most prominent of the “ISIS Brides,” Aqsa Mahmood,
remains unaccounted for in Syria. The last internet activity attributed to her took place in late 2015 and early 2016.
Saul Elbein, “The Un-American,” The New Republic, March 23, 2020.
https://newrepublic.com/article/156793/isis-american-hoda-muthana-trump-birthright-citizenship. Accessed March
5, 2021. The Trump Administration made the decision to revoke Hoda’s citizenship after an interview with ABC
News. Trump tweeted: “I have instructed Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and he fully agrees, not to allow Hoda
Muthana back into the Country!” (Twitter, February 20, 2019). As of March 2021, the Biden Administration has not
publicly addressed the repatriation of any ISIS women, including Hoda Muthana.
422

423

424

151

stellar students and well-liked still others developed a protective narcissism that in the wake of
September 11th that became a virulent strain of extremism and ego.
Women may join IS for the same reasons that men do: religious commitment and a sense
of community. Extremism “is not built on factors inherent in fundamentalism, but that individual
disaffection with the West—spurred by colonialism and exclusion—finds comfort in
extremism.”425 There is no “one size fits all” approach to the rationale given for women’s joining
IS; the sample is far too small and the motivations vary, but there is commonality. The women
who join IS seek some sort of stability and are motivated by feeling a sense of isolation in their
community, whether that be an ethnic enclave or a town of 2000 in rural America.
Historically, women’s involvement in terror was within a supportive, rather than
combative, role. Women provided material support to male fighters, instead of acting as
independent, uncoerced agents.426 Until the mid-2000s, analysts usually explained that women
engaged in terrorism as a result of social pressures mostly stemming from the concept of
“honor.”427 In some instances, such as women suicide bombers in the Occupied Territories, honor
perhaps was the primary motivator. However according to Laura Sjöberg and Caron E. Gentry,
terrorist women in fact were more likely to be autonomous, independent actors, uncoerced by
social or familial pressures rooted in honor. Sjöberg and Gentry argue that, “women who commit
violence have been characterized as anything but regular criminals or regular soldiers or regular
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terrorists; they are captured in storied fantasies which deny women’s agency and reify gender
stereotypes and subordination.”428 Women in fact engage in terror for reasons similar to men. They
are also identified as “women terrorists” rather than “terrorist,” as applied to their male
compatriots.429 This represents the observer’s refusal, even denial, that women are capable of
engaging in violence as state and non-state actors. The assumed passivity of Muslim women, so
ingrained in the Western psyche through centuries of propagandizing the East in Western art and
entertainment, shaped the analysis of terrorism. However, this has now been upended repeatedly
by tales of female terrorists, real and aspiring, most recently by young women leaving the safety
of their American and European homes to join IS. Naturally, the steady diet of both harem fantasies
and systemic oppression within Muslim-majority societies led to the Western understanding of
Muslim women as passive actors due to either restraints of luxury (harem life) or politics (Islamist
rule). Sjöberg and Gentry emphasize the importance of recognizing motivations and “personal and
political choices (as) complicated and contingent.”430 Mia Bloom reinforces the agency of women
in extremism observing that “psychopathology and personality disorder (are) no more likely
among women terrorists than among non-terrorists from the same communities.”431 This in turn
demands that we stop accepting as fact the contention that the average Muslim woman, especially
those living in transnational communities, does not have the luxury of agency. Some Muslim
women some choose to use their transnational identities to influence change within their own
communities that ensures that communities thrive and acceptance of Islam through commerce,
politics, or Islamic reform while a small minority reject grassroots activism in favor of extremism.
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Researchers have identified three fundamental reasons for women’s entry into terrorist
groups: (1) terrorist attacks by women have unique propaganda value; (2) women have to fight for
their right to fight, and ideological warfare gives them an opportunity to circumvent traditional
gender roles in conservative countries/regions (e.g., Palestine, Chechnya); and (3) terrorist groups
overcome internal cultural resistance to women’s involvement when tactics require it.432 As
women participating in networks and as actors, their actions are considered to be dawa, a form of
proselytizing unique to Islam.433 Women interviewed by Janny Groen and Annieke Kranenberg in
the Netherlands explained that their participation in groups affiliated with violent Islamists is
“good dawa” because “they can also spread their message and possibly make converts through the
nonbelieving media. Islam says dawa is their sacred duty.”434

Although terrorism initiated an

exploration into Islam, conversion to Islam does not mean immersion into or affiliation with
factions of Deobandi, Salafi, or Wahabi groups that promote or incite non-state violence. One can
adhere to any of the aforementioned conservative interpretations without becoming engaged in
violence.
Women have to fight to for their right to fight. This is unquestionably a component of what
is called “Greater Jihad,” and it is used by recruiters for terror organizations gives an additional
layer of legitimacy to their mission. Greater Jihad “has the connotations of a moral struggle within
one’s own self, along with an armed struggle, in this case against the West. It thus carries the
hermeneutics of a moral endeavor directed toward one’s own improvement or self-elevation on a
moral plane, which Muslim jurists of eminence have been quoted as calling jihad al-Akbar, or
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greater jihad.”435 They first must establish contact with someone within the network; this might be
a “Brother,” as the men of the Islamic State are referred to, or it might be a “Sister,” a female
member of IS or a sympathizer. They have to establish trust with the source, which is more than
just chatting online or sending messages through WhatsApp.436 If possible, contact is made
between the Sister and her target, commencing an extended period of establishing the religious
and political credentials of the other. It is a long process of hours and months of grooming. Through
contact with these anonymous sources, who often hide behind Twitter Avatars and/or eventually
meet fully-veiled, fully-anonymous women for Circles of Knowledge gatherings or socialization,
these Islamist and Salafi women simultaneously develop and enhance their Islamic knowledge and
fight to establish their credibility as potential fighters and citizens of the Islamic State. Women
who had once previously navigated their transnational identities as Muslim women living outside
of Muslim-majority countries and governments, later adopted a spiritual and aesthetic identity that
aligned with the needs of the Islamic State. Put simply, women who had only worn hijab and jeans
suddenly were determined only to wear long skirts, shirts, and “Islamic” dresses.437 These newly
radicalized women will no longer patronize establishments that represent global imperialism or
have links to the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, or Germany. Azadeh Moavani
describes this transition of one of the Bethnal Green Girls, Amira: “She started peppering her
English with Arabic expressions and posted photos that showed her friends in London wearing
black flowing robes. ‘Our abaya game is strong. 😌🧕 ,’ she wrote. Amira wondered whether ‘nose
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piercings are Haram.’”438 Even Amira’s emojis were modest, using one of the more innocuous
ways of teenage communication, she was signaling to her audience, a mix of ISIS members and
school friends, that her priorities were shifting. Amira was fighting to establish credibility and to
demonstrate her commitment to serious, conservative practice of Islam, so that she could travel to
Syria and engage with the jihad there.
Finally, terror groups overcome cultural resistance to women’s participation by assigning
them social roles that are still within the parameters of Islamic female propriety. In the case of
ISIS, women are non-combatants: their role is to occupy the bed and populate the house of the
mujahedeen. Unlike in other situations where women are active agents in terror (Chechnya,
Palestine), women in IS fulfill strictly defined roles of wife and mother. Some women may join
the al-Khansa Brigade, a group of ISIS women whose role is to police other women. According
to ISIS officials, "We have established the brigade to raise awareness of our religion among
women, and to punish women who do not abide by the law…Jihad is not a man-only duty.
Women must do their part as well.” 439 Gender roles are not fluid but retain the Islamic belief
that men and women are not created equal, but complementary, working in tandem to retain
order and grow the caliphate.440 IS operated within the bounds of Islamic theology and
jurisprudence (fiqh), which makes them savvy and possibly more dangerous than their
predecessor. ISIS made women’s involvement a necessity and grounded it in theology.
The complication of geography makes the movement of young American and Canadian
women into the geography of the caliphate nearly impossible. However, it did not stop a handful
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of young women from becoming radicalized and offering either support or acting as independent
agents in the United States. The Counter Extremism Project (2014), a non-partisan policy
organization dedicated to studying extremist organizations and actors, developed a roster of
American-born women involved in support of IS.441 Many are under 30 and are the products of a
dysfunctional and extended adolescence. Others, as mentioned previously, are the children of firstgeneration immigrants, raised by religiously conservative and politically disenfranchised
households.442 For the purposes of this chapter, it will be necessary to go beyond the geographical
scope of the United States and include the United Kingdom where some of the most notorious
female actors and subjects of terror networks such as “The White Widow,” Aqsa Mahmoud, and
the “Bethnal Three,” involving women emerged.443 As recently as August 2017, the Crown
brought charges against three women accused of plotting a knife attack in Westminster.444 Indeed,
this seeming surge of women willing to be agents of terror perplexes analysts trained that women
are inherently non-violent state actors, and that Muslim women have limited agency, itself an
assumption that I argue was not widely contemplated before September 11th. These oversights
originate in discourse by Orientalists and popular culture which delegated Muslim women to the
position of passive rather than active arbiters of Islamic political thought and action. The migration
of women from the United States and Western Europe into IS and their subsequent punishment at
the fall of Raqqa in 2018 demonstrates clearly that these women are not the passive courtesans of
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Orientalist imagination but active participants in political movements that may also include
violence.445

3.2 The Muhajirat at Ground Zero

446

September 11th threw a generation of Muslim youth from the United States and the United
Kingdom into two a decades long debate on the intersections of citizenship and belonging,
especially for transnational communities. Young Muslims are “positioned as inassimilable
outsiders to the imagined national community and threatened by government policies and
practices that compromise the civil and human rights of their communities, therefore young
people from transnational Muslim communities often find neither the sense of belonging nor the
political conditions for substantive inclusion into this society… As a consequence, [they] often
struggle to exercise their rights and to forge pathways to citizenship.”447 These Muslims “live
lives at the crossroads of several political conflicts,” all of which have shaped the way in which
they develop identities and their sense of citizenship. Many young women there seek purpose,
identity, and structure, having borne the most vehement racial and systemic abuse from their
communities in the wake of terrorist events in their countries, including the 7/7 Bombings in
London. The caliphate offers validation, shelter, identity, and empowerment. These social
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official state ties, Palestinians in the diaspora have difficulty obtaining citizenship because they are untethered to a
recognized Palestinian state. September 11 , 2001 compounded that struggle by making the United States more
inhospitable. The association of Palestine with violence by non-state actors further compounds this anxiety about
Palestinian citizenship in the United States post-9/11.
445

446

447

th

158

connections are enticing to first- and second-generation Muslims, as well as converts seeking to
excise themselves from the social, cultural, and/or political baggage that they may carry as a
result of their pre-conversion lives or that they may have rapidly acquired upon conversion. For
example, first- and second-generation Muslims may find a deeper sense of connection to their
Muslim identity that their parents may have relaxed as a strategy of settlement and assimilation
into a new country and community. In the case of converts, some are seeking structure that was
lacking in their childhood homes, such as “Alex,” profiled by the Thew New York Times, or
rejecting a childhood limited by Christian fundamentalism, as in the case of Ariel Bradley.448
Affiliation with groups like IS gives structure, meaning, and answers to life’s questions.
Additionally, women may also adopt a new name and aesthetic appearance that allows them to
completely divest themselves from their previous life.449
The unique gendered Islamophobia that emerged has a greater impact on young women’s
daily lives, one that Women “ may help explain their move towards extremism.”450 Muslim
women in the West are natural targets of hate because many wear some form of hijab which
identifies them as belonging to the “other” and as Muslim. Unlike their male counterparts,
muhajibah (women who wear hijab) do not disguise their belief and are unwilling to compromise
their belief for their safety by removing the aesthetic marker of faith. A 2016 Gallup poll found
that 48% of Muslims are more likely than Americans of other major religious groups to have
experienced racial or religious discrimination in the past year.451 That same year, between
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November-December, there was a spike in incidents, according to the Southern Poverty Law
Center (SPLC), with American Muslims being second only to Jewish Americans in religiously
motivated hate crimes and African-Americans in culturally motivated hate crimes.452 AntiMuslim sentiment rapidly increased following September 11th. Between 2002-2014 there were
105-160 anti-Muslim hate crimes annually in the United States. In 2016, there were 257 hate
crimes reported against Muslims, the highest since 2001 and 67% more than in 2014. This
occurred simultaneously with the full saturation of media coverage of IS.453 The repeated
broadcast of IS atrocities and ongoing assaults against women, children, Christianity, Yazidi
women, and, most graphically, their recorded executions, certainly provoked the majority of
these incidents. These crimes in late 2016 account for 4.4% of all reported hate crimes, despite
Muslims being estimated as only 1.1% of the US population.454 Further complicating the struggle
to define Muslim citizenship in America after 2016 were the pervasive and constant anti-Muslim
sentiments offered by the emboldened President Donald Trump and his constituents, along with
like-minded Brexit supporters in the U.K.455 The clearest options for Muslims living in anxiety
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over the shifting boundaries of citizenship and anti-Islamic sentiments were: 1) to channel the
anxiety of being Muslim in America into advocacy groups and campaigns; 2) to return to their
country of origin; 3). or the most radical alternative: to become a pilgrim, a muhajid/muhajira, to
the new caliphate in Syria.
FBI statistics show that there were only 28 reported hate crimes against Muslims in the
2000, but just a year later following September 11th, 2001, 481 took place, a 1618% increase.
The average age of a woman recruited to IS was 15 at the time of the September 11th attacks, the
age range at 6-20. From then until the first women left to join IS in 2014, hate crimes against
Muslims averaged 139 annually in the United States, a 414% increase from 2000.456 This means
that in the decade after 9/11, young American Muslims were part of a community five times as
vulnerable to being a victim of a hate crime than in a decade prior.457 Children remain the most
vulnerable to Islamophobic experiences even when they are experiencing them secondhand:
“Exposure to this type of discrimination may leave children feeling marginalized and
disempowered; this could lead to the internalization of negative stereotypes associated with
Islam.”458 It is this disempowerment that recruiters from IS leveraged to attract young people to
the group by demonstrating the innate power of Islam and Muslims through the caliphate. IS
recruiters often used one of the pathways to radicalization called, “perceived grievances,” which
for transnational Muslims (as well as those living under Muslim rule) primarily centered on the
U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.459 These “perceived grievances” may include:
disenfranchisement or lack of opportunity within the country of residence; Western, especially
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U.S., aggression and violence in Muslim-majority countries like Iraq and Afghanistan; and U.S.
support of Israel and lack of action to provide substantive humanitarian or political aide to
Palestinians.460 These are all themes that extremist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
draw upon to recruit
In 2015, anti-Muslim crime peaked; attacks on Muslims were the highest reported
numbers of hate crimes in the United States. Within these crimes, Muslim women were more
likely to be victims than Muslim men as a result of their visibility (i.e., veiling, modest dress).461
That year, 69% of Muslim women who wore hijab reported being targets of some form of
harassment or discrimination, while for those who did not wear hijab the number was 29%.462
Muslims, especially Muslim women, had no claim to status, rights, and privileges of citizens, as
seen in their assailants’ attacks and the inaction or slow response of governments and law
enforcement agencies..463 Viewed by some as traitors, their rights were nullified by the vigilante
patriotism that blossomed following September 11th. As Sahar Aziz points out, “sparse attention
is paid to the impact of the post-9/11 national security era on Muslim women, and specifically
those who wear the headscarf. Irrespective of their place of origin or the color of their skin, the
headscarf marks these women as sympathetic to the enemy, presumptively disloyal, and forever
foreign.” Some women removed their hijab following September 11 to mitigate some of the
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risk of violence. The same day as the attacks, footage of Palestinian women in hijab, was
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broadcast to Americans as part of coverage of the attacks.466 The images from Palestine lacked
historical and political context which more than likely would not have made any difference to
viewers.
The new monolithic Muslim woman wore a hijab and reveled in the violence of 9/11.467
In the weeks that followed, Americans went from viewing veiled Muslim women as exotic,
sexualized, passive, and oppressed to complicit actors in anti-American violence. Ironically,
authorities suggested that Muslim women either remove the hijab or stay at home in selfimposed exile, fulfilling harem fantasies in the interest of national security. As Barbara Perry
writes, “Muslim women’s experiences shape their sense of ease and of belonging in their
environment. Such violence is intended, in fact, to encourage victims to (re)consider their place,
to send the message that they are, in fact, out of place.”468 The women in this chapter chose to
emigrate in response.
Only in the spring of 2014 did the world became truly aware of IS. Over a three-year period
ending in 2017, there were an estimated 4,000 women identified as members of IS.469 Most of the
women recruited by IS were adolescents and, contrary to the popular narrative of young women
being seduced into violence by young men, many were recruited by other women, not by dark,
almond-eyed avatars of noble mujahidin. As Deeyah Khan writes, “it is assumed that the ‘holy
warriors’ of the Islamic State have a dangerous sexual allure, like a boy-band accessorized with
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beards and semi-automatic weapons,” and while some may fit that profile, the bulk of recruitment
is largely limited to interactions between men and men; women and women.” 470 Even when some
of the recruitment is done by men, it is done virtually through the purdah (seclusion) of the internet
where the digital screen serves as a division between the sexes and the exchanges resemble a
negotiation rather than an online flirtation.471 The grooming of adolescent women was done by
other women already enmeshed in the network, as even in the sphere of recruitment and
cyberspace, the boundaries between the sexes were kept very much intact.
Yet, while grooming, often included some tales of romance and heroism, many of the
women chose to join IS for its promises of autonomy and freedom.472 What that autonomy and
freedom entailed varied: for some women, it is was reductive as a teenage crush, while for others
it was a noble endeavor and calling not dissimilar to that of a teenage saint’s first mystical
experience. Still others were as “bloodthirsty, disaffected, and politically engaged as men.”473 It
does adolescents a disservice to assume that they are all motivated by, to borrow from Katy Perry,
a “teenage dream,” as opposed to having at least some level of political and social sophistication
that allows them to make mature, albeit drastic, decisions about their futures.474 Some of the young
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women who join IS offered explicit, well-articulated reasons and goals for membership, most
carefully couched in a seriousness about their faith.
The most important and often neglected aspect of adolescent girls’ involvement in ISIS is
the timeline of their growing up. Analysts focus on the narrative of the oppression and violence
against Muslims globally that influenced these girls, but what made them vulnerable particularly
to violence, instead of non-state actors, social organizations or community advocacy work? The
2001 and 2005 terror attacks destabilized adolescence for a generation of Muslim children. Young
Muslims speak of understanding yet not fully comprehending the seismic shift in their
communities after the attacks; dramatic changes occurred in many homes. Some families left their
adopted countries or relinquished signifiers of “Muslim-ness” like hijab to present a more
secularized identity. Still others adopted a more religious identity as empowerment. A cultural
shift occurred in the midst of their early development that shaped the world in which they came of
age in profound ways: as girls they experienced anti-Muslim racism, the rhetoric of war, and a
society deeply suspicious of immigration ultimately leading to closed borders and to Brexit.
Compounded with negotiations of identity and citizenship within the household, this unsettling
proved to be fertile ground for IS recruitment among young women whose lives were shaped by
9/11.
In public interactions with families of those women who fled to join IS the girls’ fathers
generally speak for the families, not their mothers. Occasionally, an older sister who is more
comfortable living and speaking in a Western context will speak to the press, like in the case of
Kadiza Sultana, whose sister spoke to the press following Kadiza joining the Islamic State in
2015. Mothers of women who join IS are often new immigrants themselves, raising the first
generation of daughters in the West and are likely not the product of European or American-style
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schooling in their countries of origin. The lack of language, support structure, and systems of
integration have had a negative effect on Muslim mothers. Although these women may have had
social capital in their community of origin, emigration to the West diminished their social power;
now in a country and enclave where entry must be negotiated by newcomers rather than
assumed, mothers withdrew from public interaction. This left fathers to become the sole
advocate for the family. Fathers of the muhajirat have given interviews with The Guardian and
475

Buzzfeed News, and have taken to Twitter to appeal for the return of their daughters. For
example, the father of Hoda Muthana, the 20-year-old college student from Alabama who joined
IS in 2014, admitted that although her mother knew that Hoda was in Syria, she did not yet know
that she was married. Young women may be frustrated with their mothers’ own identity crisis
476

and negotiations for status within a community.
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Women joined IS for exactly the same reasons as men: religious commitment and the
sense of community. Recruiters for IS leveraged Western ideals of empowerment, girl power,
and romance to enroll young women. IS representatives inverted popular culture and deployed
the frenetic, appealing power of “girl talk” amongst anonymous avatars and Twitter handles,
Tumblr blogs, and message boards.478 These appeals found favor among a generation of women
feeling adrift: first and second generation Muslim women contended with the escalation of
violence in their adopted communities, discrimination, and the uncertainty of how much of their
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rights of citizenship will be enforced in their adopted countries. This uncertainty, compounded
with the fragility and instability of adolescence proved an explosive combination. In the United
States, women who joined IS can be likened to women participating in gang violence: they
sought structure, community, and commonality in a chaotic landscape of conflicting demands
placed on them and their identities by multiple entities at home and through the state.479 In
Europe, one analyst noted, “plagued by Islamophobia, many girls and women long for a society
where their use of hijab will not alienate them or make them a target for racism.”480 This pattern
re-occurs throughout our continued struggling to understand why young women leave the safety
of their communities, deceive their parents and families, and risk their lives to become citizens of
the caliphate. The adolescent craving for belonging, the conflicting messages from home and the
state are relentlessly manipulated by IS and their recruiters. Whether or not these young women
will be more at home with IS does not matter.
As Groen and Kranenberg point out in their work on an Islamist network in the
Netherlands, “These women are responding not to sinister al-Qaeda recruiters but to self-generated
motives, influenced by world events.”481 Young women who in contrast to young Muslim men,
feel a different kind of adolescent disenfranchisement make up the majority of women involved in
these networks. They are groomed in the same way that young women are groomed by sexual
predators but the grooming is veiled in dawa to make it appear less pernicious.482 Young women
learn repeatedly about the horrors facing Muslims globally, the injustices of Western political and
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cultural rule, and the erosion of Muslim belief and practice by secular society. For the teenage and
young adult mind, this is heady stuff that expedites growing up, promises them autonomy
(especially appealing in more traditional households), and, I would argue, enables them to remove
themselves defiantly from societies with persistent, overt racist, anti-Muslim rhetoric and violence.
When they leave their Western societies and households, they join a group, first within virtual
reality and then in reality where they are insulated, elevated, and respected. Anti-Muslim hatred
creates new recruits to the caliphate.
In leveraging empowerment, recruiters hid behind dramatic avatars ranging from the
feminine to the strictly Islamic; they manipulated gendered popular culture, luring young women
with the appeal of a dour, but noble and virtuous sorority.483 One of the most active Tumblr
accounts of the 2014-15 period when IS recruitment of young women peaked offered a narrative
of the romanticized journey into Raqqa, Syria (IS territory) and also referenced the connections
made on social media between young women before and during their travel. On this Tumblr, “Bird
of Jannah,” whose Tumblr account was called, “Diary of a Muhajirah,” wrote:
Umm Tamīm al Britaniyah - she’s my best friend that I met two years back
on Facebook. We always discussed matters about jihad and hijrah, and Al
Hamdulillah a month after she made her hijrah, I made mine. We promised
to meet each other in Raqqah.
About 9am, the bus arrived. I hugged the house owner and other sisters
and thanked them for everything.484
I looked at the bus, the word “Dawla Islamiyah al Iraq wa Shaam” was
written on it.
"Shams, you are about to witness big things very soon." My heart
whispered.
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As usual I sat next to window, thanking Allāh over and over again.485

Her Tumblr also contains feminized images from inside IS territory including study materials in
pink folders and ID cards with roses blooming against the flag of the Islamic State:

Fig. 28. Images from the Tumblr account “Diary of a Muhajirah. The images
feature a study guide for Qur’an and an ID card.
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The materials are tidy, feminine, and give the appearance of an orderly society where roles and
responsibilities are defined and controlled. The pink study materials and ID cards represent an
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identity that has already been created for them and that does not exist in the West except virtual
communication and in person through Circles of Knowledge.

3.2 Salafism, Women, and the Islamic State
The second-half of the twentieth-century saw independence movements and the
installation of secular, authoritarian governments in countries like Egypt, Algeria, Libya, and
Syria, but it also saw an increasing movement of former colonial subjects out of newly
independent nations and into the boundaries of their formal colonizers. This movement,
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precipitated by economic necessity (since the colonizer provided the infrastructure staffed by
indigenous communities) was not always productive or successful. The ghettoization of large
populations of the formerly colonized, especially in Parisian suburbs or in London’s Brick Lane,
cultivated localized strands of extremism which only burgeoned with the internet’s array of
transnational cyber communication platforms. The natural and expected outcome of such social
arrangements, along with the preclusion of the formerly colonized from full citizenship, was a
violent movement that contested the status quo of a Christian dominated culture, using Islam and
violence as its vehicle. There have been some moderately successful revolts masquerading as
terror attacks orchestrated and carried-out by Salafi-identifying perpetrators in Europe: the July
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7, 2005 (7/7) London bombings, the 2015 massacre at the Charlie Hebdo offices, and the grisly
carnage left at the Bataclan night club in Paris later that year. These were “successful” in that
488

they made pointed statements against the perceived decadence of European culture in contrast to
Islamic, Salafi ideals, but they did little to advance any European society toward Islamization.
This statement offered a convincing alternative to life in the West for young European and
American Muslims: to seek out and populate a tangible caliphate in a Muslim-majority country.
Ironically, in the case of Iraq, the US and its European allies toppled a secular government, doing
the heavy lifting first for Al-Qaeda in Iraq and then IS to establish itself as an outpost for Dar alIslam (The House of Islam) in the chaos of Dar al-Harb (The House of War). The appeal of
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Salafi Islam is fairly straight forward: it is an alternative to the chaos of modern life, a longing to
return to a simpler time, a return to that most ubiquitous of historical living terms, the
“authentic.” The nostalgic desire to engage authenticity in history represents a temporary
distraction, escapism from a chaotic day, month, or period. For most, it is not a life-altering
change, but for many young Muslims, Salafism is a permanent, nostalgically viable vehicle to
being spiritually and socially secure and satisfied.

Salafi refers to someone who subscribes to the interpretation of Islam called Salafism. It is closely linked to
Wahhabism. It emerged from the writings of Sayid Qutb and refers to a strict interpretation of Islam. The name
refers to the first three generations of Muslims (salaf) and endeavors to strip away what it sees as bid’a (innovation)
from the practice of Islam. It is specific to Sunni Islam. France is perhaps the European country that has suffered the
greatest insurgence of Salafi-led terror attacks. France’s refusal to grant full citizenship rights to its former colonial
citizens, particularly in the case of the hijab, has made it a productive target for Salafi groups. In the case of Charlie
Hebdo, the debate over France’s officially secular identity with a free press was met with gratuitous violence in
response to equally gratuitous and obscene caricatures of French Muslims. The mutual provocation between the two
groups continues to destabilize French security and identity. Hebdo’s own manifesto states: “It’s a rag that has
nothing to lose in the afterlife for the laudably simple reason that there is no afterlife.” Its explicit subscription to
“New” Atheism is not only provocative but also anathema to Salafi objectives in France. For examples of Charlie
Hebdo’s work, see: https://charliehebdo.fr/en/.
Dar al-Harb v Dar al-Islam. “Dar al-Harb” is the “House of War” where non-Muslims and some Muslims reside.
For those in the Islamic State, there is a religious obligation to leave Dar al-Harb for Dar al-Islam, which are the
lands of the caliphate and those populated by a Muslim majority. It is a medieval conceptualization of the world and
one re-adopted by contemporary Islamists to illustrate a dichotomy between the secular and religious worlds in the
advent of colonialism and secular rule.
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The Islamic State is a Salafi-jihadist organization. The “jihadist” is particularly important
to this descriptor because Salafis, although ultra conservative, are not inherently violent or any
more prone to violence than any other Sunni group. They are Islamists, but they are not (in
keeping with the majority of Islamists) inherently violent. Rather they focus on political reform
in favor ultimately of a true embodiment of an Islamic state. They do not, as a majority, condone
violence. Salaf, in Arabic, means “ancient one” and is one of many names for the earliest
companions of the Prophet Muhammad.490 Muslims regularly strive to live by sunnah (the
tradition of the Prophet Muhammad), modeling their social structures and behaviors on the way
of the Prophet Muhammad. Salafi ideology contends that Muslims strayed far from sunnah and
aspire to live lives as in close approximation to those of the early community. As Giles Kepel
explains, “Salafists originally are supposedly not violent, they are not advocating the revolt
against one who holds power, against the powers that be. They are calling for re-Islamization at
the daily level.”491 Organically, the Salafi movement is rather innocuous, the rough equivalent of
the Amish in their desire to remove the impediments that modern materialism pose to faithful
service of God. This does not, contrary to popular interpretation, mean that they regularly or
faithfully invoke violence as a means to an end.
Salafism originated in the mid-20th century with the Egyptian intellectual and Islamist,
Sayid Qutb (1906-1966), a product of the Muslim Brotherhood (1928) and postcolonial Egypt,
whose many tracts on the subject of returning his home country of Egypt back from the
decadence of secular rule, formed the underpinnings of political violence as a viable component
of Salafism. Sayid Qutb, before inking the cornerstone of Salafi belief, was Western educated,
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admired the West, but was shocked disenchanted by the West’s postwar materialism. He rejected
the Renaissance, Darwin, and Freud, accusing them of contributing to Western decadence over
the latter half of the millennia and found intellectual and spiritual refuge in the writing of the
medieval Islamic scholar, Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328).492 Ibn Taymiyya was a literalist, insisting
that the Qur’an and Sunnah were to be taken literally. He also emphasized the social and
spiritual divide between Muslims and non-Muslims.493 After aligning himself with Ibn
Taymiyya’s writing and jurisprudence, Qutb accused fellow Muslims of living in the jahaliyyah
(the period of ignorance before the revelation of Islam). In his seminal work, Milestones (1964),
Qutb wrote: “that the world had reached a crisis point: The human race had lost touch with
nature. Man's inspiration, intelligence and morality were degenerating. Sexual relations were
deteriorating ‘to a level lower than the beasts.’ And he laid blame at the doors of Judaism and
Christianity, arguing that these faiths had strayed from God's true path. Qutb concluded that only
through Islam would humankind be saved from its alienated state.” 494 Here indeed are the
underpinnings for the Salafi animosity toward Jews and Christians, compounded by colonialism
and the incursion of the State of Israel into Muslim-majority countries in the Levant. An umma
already suffering from centuries of increasingly despotic and destabilizing dynastic rule looked
to the possibility of an Islamic renaissance, embodied in groups like Hassan al-Banna’s Muslim
Brotherhood. Qutb is still cited and alluded to by contemporary jihadists; despite the intellectual
arguments being watered down with blood and bravado, the roots of contemporary Islamist
rhetoric begin with Ibn Taymiyya and evolved with Qutb. During the latter part of the twentieth-
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century, as colonial rule was upended by independence movements and secular authoritarian rule
supported by Western governments took over much of the Muslim world, the minority Salafis
gained more traction especially with their ideas of a violent, rather than spiritual jihad as an
authoritative and effective way to force change and gain traction.495
Qutb’s body of work represents not only a prolific archive on the subject of Islamic
beliefs and thought in a decadent form, but it also remains the most important component of
contemporary Islamism in the form of Salafism. For Qutb, the Islamic state “is to be founded on
the Qur’an as its constitution; on shura [consultation] as the method of governing; and on a ruler
who is bound by the teachings of Islam and the will of the people. Such a state would have a just
and efficient government, consistent with the traditions of society, and would, therefore, be able
to ensure its people’s welfare.” Indeed, these sentiments are all articulated in IS’s propaganda,
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appeal, and social media interactions, arguing that IS is the true “welfare state,” unlike England
or the United States. He also has strong opinions about the role of women in the model Islamic
state, attributing the most obvious cause of jahaliyyah is the movement of women outside of the
home and the slackening of relations (especially sexual) between men and women. Qutb objects
to the movement of women outside the home as co-breadwinners as it focuses her attention on
material production (an adjunct cause of jahaliyyah) and not on what he refers to as, “the
manufacture of humanity.” Half-a-century later, Qutb’s injunction is spelled-out in “Women of
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the Islamic State: A manifesto on women by the Al-Khansa Brigade.”
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The Al-Khansa Brigade is a group of women charged with the duty of cultivating
recruits, maintaining the strict gender barriers in and outside of the domestic sphere, and
enforcing the social and legal codes that pertain to women in the Islamic State. It also takes aim
at the materialism to which Qutb ascribed the return of Muslims to the jahiliyya, referring to the
“Arabian Peninsula,” meaning Saudi Arabia, in particular, whose gross materialism and
exploitation of Mecca and Medina is the subject of widespread criticism even outside of Islamist
circles. Its manifesto is only available in Arabic, a deliberate maneuver on the part of the Islamic
State to make it accessible to its primary audience: Arabic-literate women. It is primarily for
propaganda, drawing upon Qutb’s writing, and was only recently translated into English in 2015
by the Quilliam Foundation. The manifesto outlines three main points for its existence:
1. To clarify the role of Muslim women and the life which is desired
for them, that which will make them happy in this world and hereafter.
2. To clarify the realities of life and the hallowed existence of women in the
Islamic State, in Iraq, and in al-Sham, and to refute the rumors that
detractors advance against it, using evidence support and experienced by
women living there.
3. To expose the falsity of the tawheed in the Arabian Peninsula [Saudia Arabia],
which claims to be unique in protecting the women and preserving her rights
and religion.
If you ask any Muslim, male or female, on the reason for the choice of this
country as a comparison with the Islamic State, I say, thanks be to God the
highest: It is not a secret from those who know expertly that the Arabian
Peninsula has a deceptive Islamic model that is intended to be an example
for Muslims, not only regarding women, but also economics, education and
politics. The genuine article will become clear from the imitator, by God’s
leave.
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The most Qutbian chapter in the manifesto describes “How the soldiers of Iblis [Satan] keep
women from Paradise [jannah].” The manifesto argues that the West has undermined
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women’s place in the divine landscape by encouraging her to leave the home to work, to learn,
and to gain an abundance of secular knowledge unnecessary to live faithfully. “Woman, as our
best thinkers delineated in the past, if they learn to read and write, about their religion and fiqh
(law), they become part of this worldly knowledge. This is what is appropriate and appointed
for her, the job that the Creator ordained for her. Hence, there is no need for her to flit here and
there to get degrees and so on, just so she can prove that her intelligence is greater than a
man’s.” Women’s education, which al-Khansa claims that IS endorses and supports, is to be
501

limited to religious schooling and imparted upon their “cubs,” the future generation of caliphal
citizens and jihadis. Education is also to be limited, arguably as a measure of control, to the
502

ages of 7-15, with marriage being permitted as young as nine years of age, thereby further
truncating the ability of women to have intellectual agency outside of some literacy in Arabic,
in the Qur’an, and knowledge of the basics of Islam as interpreted by Salafism. This robust
503

piece of propaganda is not meant to signal a life of leisure but a life of living fully within
Allah’s purpose, holistically, and Islamically. As Twitter user, @UmmKhattab__, one of the
more prolific propagandists on Twitter, tweets to her followers and potential recruits:

Ibid., 21.
In a chilling shift in propaganda, IS began referring to children in the caliphate as “Cubs” and deploying young
boys, barely old enough to hold a weapon, to execute “enemies of the Islamic State.” The indoctrination of children
into such brutality was particularly disruptive and unsettling.
Ibid, 22. The age of marriage is set by the age of the Prophet’s favorite wife, A’isha, at the time of her marriage to
the Prophet Muhammad. In some Muslim-majority countries, nine is still the legal age, although over the centuries,
and especially in the colonial and postcolonial decades, the age is typically older and coincides with menstruation.
Arguments against the age of marriage being nine relate to practical issues of human development over the millennia
including the average lifespan of a person on the Arabian Peninsula in the 7 century being significantly shorter than
2018 and the equally plausible argument that betrothal to the Prophet Muhammad occurred at age 9 for A’isha and
not consummation of the relationship.
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Fig. 29. Tweet by Aqsa Mahmood (@UmmKhattab_, also known as
“Al-Britaniyaa.”) (Translation: The Briton (f.): “You know what me
and the sisters here in Syria/Lebanon all had great families and we were
all in university or going to university but like pilgrimage is a duty.”
504

These soundbites pulled from now-suspended Twitter accounts are as close to non-native
speakers of Arabic will get to the manifesto written for women in the caliphate without aid of
translated materials. They are the “Cliff’s Notes Version” of the al-Khansa manifesto but still
have a powerful impact on young women and neatly encapsulate some of the appeal of the
Salafism for young women not inclined to perform hijra to Syria. On the surface, the emphasis
on domesticity and abandoning secular higher education seems that it would appeal to women
seeking a passive lifestyle. In reality, al-Khansa, as is life in the Islamic State, is a difficult and
deliberate life not suited for passive or frivolous actors, nor is the adoption of Salafism outside of
the Islamic State.
For some Muslim women struggling to define their own citizenship in secular,
multicultural, rapidly evolving Western societies, some fostering a state level contempt for
religion, the appeal of conservatism, a straightforward, dogmatic approach to religion, and one
that extends into social interactions, is appealing. Salafism is Islam without the cultural baggage

Aqsa Mahmood (@albritaniyaa), “You know what me and the sisters here in Syria (Shaam is the name of the
Mediterranean region of Syria during the earliest caliphate) all had great families and we were all in uni (university)
or going to uni but like (Yani is an Egyptian-style colloquialism, a conversational pause that is articulated, “like” or
“uh” to English-speakers) pilgrimage (hijra refers to the specific pilgrimage or flight of the early Muslim
community from Mecca to Medina and return) is obligatory (wajib is an Islamic concept that refers to those things
that are incumbent upon all Muslims to obey and tasks to perform.) Twitter, September 8, 2014.
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or ethnic enclaves serving as a barrier to admission or immersion by converts. In her
ethnographic work on Salafi women in Britain, researcher Annabel Inge quotes school teacher
and convert to Islam, Wafa, on Salafism’s appeal: “‘[It was] straightforward,’ she said, clicking
her fingers. ‘No mucking about… [Salafism] had an answer for everything. It’s just as simple as
‘hear and obey‘[clicks fingers] – That straightforwardness is such a… aaaaah,’ she heaved a sigh
of relief. ‘I don’t need to think ... don’t need to make it complicated… I’ve got a set way to
understand [the Qur’an] … It’s given me that certainty.’”505 Wafa was raised Christian in
England and converted to Islam at 14. She represents a demographic of young, non-Muslim
women who find common ground with born-Muslims in seeking meaning and structure in an
increasingly ethically manic landscape. “Salafi teachings actually encourage followers to
understand their journey into Salafism as a radical identity renegotiation.”506 Inge observes that
women’s affiliation with Salafism is a completely immersive experience that alters their
complete identity from personality to appearance to social relationships, making converts out of
white women born Muslims and women who convert directly from largely Christian
backgrounds to Salafism. These women are known as “total converts.”507 Indeed, the dogmatic
as well as aesthetic (wearing niqaab is a common, but not absolute, signifier of adherence to
Salafism) aspects of conversion are immersive. Not only are there rules for dress, there are also
rules for using the toilet, eating, drinking, and socializing. To convert to Salafism is an immense
shift for Western-born and West-immersed women: it bypasses any iteration of moderate Islam
including Sufism, which is why the Salafi represent only a fraction of the community.
Annabel Inge, “Extreme Islam: What makes a young British woman turn to Salafism?” The Independent,
November 26, 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/young-british-salafi-womena7436611.html. Accessed September 10, 2021.
Inge, The Making of a Salafi Muslim Woman, 148.
Ibid., 63. Inge cites Brenda Brasher’s study of fundamentalist women referring to converts as “total converts” as a
means of encapsulating the entirety and submersive nature of negotiating an Islamic identity in the context of
Salafism.
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Within these conversions are two strands, which I have alluded to earlier in this work:
those Muslims who are “born” into Islam and Muslims who convert, commonly during their
teenage years or early adulthood with overlapping experiences that lead them to Salafism.
For Muslim women who were born into Islam, their pre-Salafi religious life is often described as
being permeated by bid’a or innovation, cultural accoutrements that are a natural byproduct of
the mixing of populations within empires. These women “point out that the Islam they had been
508

taught by their parents was infused with cultural innovations rooted in their countries of origin.
The women later became convinced that these rituals and prohibitions were not from the Qur’an
or Sunnah, and consequently adjusted their practices.” Women who converted from outside of
509

the umma from Christianity or agnostic backgrounds were not burdened by the infiltration of
bid’a into Islam. The appeal of Salafism is in its apparent authority and inclusivity. Both groups
overlap in their backgrounds and conversion processes which means that Salafis are surprisingly
diverse. The women come from backgrounds where religion was either haphazard, casual, or
non-existent. Salafism rejects the Sunni “tendency…to take jurisprudence rulings only from the
madhab (school of law) associated with their country of origin,” thereby diluting and corrupting
the purest form of Islam as well as alienating those converts to Islam who do not share the same
ethnic space as their local co-religionists. The spectacular violence of the September 11 attacks,
th

two wars, and subsequent organized attacks like the 7/7 London bombings provoked not only
introspection among Muslim communities in the United States and England, but also among
non-believers. Rates of conversion, particularly among women following September 11 were
th

particularly high. As one Muslim leader told Yvonne Haddad, “Not even a billion dollars to
support dawa would have made it possible to reach as many Americans with the message of
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Bid’a is roughly translated as “innovation” and indicates a deviation from the accepted practice in Islam.
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Islam.” American conversion to Islam after September 11 was precipitated by the attacks.
510

th

When the dust literally settled, many Americans sought out more information on Islam and
Muslims.

511

Women who identify as or convert to a Salafi identity appear to be in their teens or early
20s, a time of changes and experimentation with identity, rebellion against cultural norms
imposed upon them by transnational communities, immigrant parents, and/or from the broader
culture. Young women compete with multiple overlapping areas of cultural saturation at home,
512

school, and in the general public all jockeying for dominance. Salafism offers young women in
these circumstances something to tether themselves and their identities to in the midst of
adolescent and social upheaval. Recognizing this, Salafi entitities encourage what Inge calls,
“Circles of Knowledge.” These circles are informal, small gatherings where women who have
513

gained a specific degree of Islamic knowledge impart their knowledge onto young or new
charges in their spiritual care. The relationship is that of a teacher to a student, creating a
comfortable atmosphere for the transmission of knowledge and also one that reflects the
domestic responsibilities incumbent on young Salafi women. Salafists have crafted their own
isnad or chain of transmission in which the teacher embodies the sunnah (tradition of the
Prophet) and who has come to become part of the chain through lengthy study with intellectual
authorities approved of by Salafis, such as at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia. Here, the
Salafis appear to deviate from the IS critique of Saudi Arabia. No woman in the Islamic State
would be permitted to travel abroad to study Islam, but the University of Medina remains at the
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forefront of the transmission of Islamic knowledge as the city that gave refuge to the Prophet and
his revelations. Credibility is given to “scholars” who can demonstrate some familiarity with
Arabic. This credentialing is done informally by the non-Arabic speaking community who
recognize Arabic the sacred language of the Qur’an and thus imbued with power. The advent of
the internet and other forms of wireless communication is a boon for dawa and the recruitment of
new Muslims, Salafis and otherwise, but it has challenged to Salafism. The semi-private world of
the internet enabled Twitter accounts and blogs to contest the authority of the traditionally
educated. Competing, virtual “Circles of Knowledge,” other channels of women sharing
knowledge, undermine and corrupt the intent of Salifism.
The cozy appeal of “Circles of Knowledge” and bonding through sisterhood was
disrupted by the use of Twitter, Kik, Facebook, Tumblr, and an array of other social media sites
with greater reach and immediate access than the methods of knowledge transmission favored by
Salafists. While these “Circles of Knowledge became fertile grounds for recruitment for IS,
curious adolescents, young women are not prepared to out themselves as favoring a stricter, more
controlled religiosity, and women without access to religious instruction in person all were
vulnerable to the Islamic State’s aggressive avatars of scholarship on the internet. Indeed, a
cursory search of something as simple as, “Salafi Mosques” will provide you with websites with
a gratuitous use of bold fonts and fire graphics, more about overwhelming seekers with
knowledge than any rigorous scholarship. Concise and catchy communication in this age of
screens proved essential for religions to compete for young adherents, a fact that IS, with its
population of tech savvy adolescents and 20-somethings, capitalized on with great success. On
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social media, “the group’s narrative portrays [IS] as an agent of social change, the true apostle of
sovereign faith, a champion of its own perverse notions of social justice, and a collection of
avengers bent on settling the accounts for the perceived suffering of others.” Individuals within
515

this group “are radicalized by personal grievances and by identity-group grievances as conveyed
by mass media, rumor, or the testimony of others.” The insularity of the Salafi movement and
516

its accessibility and the online savvy of its IS-aligned membership, offered a sense of
comradeship and security for young women. A range of women have found security, friendship,
and community with other like-minded women, had offered stability, security, and, as far as
emotions can be conveyed through cyberspace, seemingly deep reserves of empathy. As one
sexual abuse survivor told Guardian journalist, Deeyah Khan, “a sense of comradeship with
pious young women helped her feel safe and protected; that her status as a mother was honored:
that it gave her life a sense of purpose. Eventually she left, saying the experience left her feeling
spiritually hollow. But for women like her, dealing with exclusion (emphasis mine), pain, and
disaffection, the Islamic State is only a click away.” IS offers stability in crisis, trauma, and
517

adolescence.

3.3 “U dnt hav 2 pay 4 ANYTHING if u r wife of a martyr”: Recruitment 518
In a 2014 issue of the magazine, Dabiq, a magazine produced by IS for recruitment, one
IS member argued that no Muslim should be living in the West, “independent” of IS and called
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for Muslims to join and “redeem themselves in death.”519 The majority of women are under 30
years-old and range from 19-33. They encompass women born and raised in Muslim
communities with Muslim identities to women who converted to Islam in the decade after
September 11th, 2001. These are women spent their formative years during the post-September
11th decade with two wars in Muslim-majority countries, along with a global rise in
Islamophobia and hate crimes. The distancing from the U.S. was compounded with the cycling
through of three global Islamic organizations (Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and the Islamic State)
promoting jihad and the message that the West was using unilateral violence against Muslims in
service to its own interests. The advent of social media and a generation of internet savvy
entrepreneurs and activists meant that the boundaries of nation-states and the definition and
parameters of citizenship were forever altered.520 Furthermore, as Guardian journalist Nabeela
Jaffer discovered in her interviews with IS women, they “struggled with ambiguity or disorder—
in theology, in identity, and in life.”521
The 550 women IS indoctrinated and entranced and who then emigrated to the caliphate
in Syria call themselves, muhajirah/muhajirat (pilgrims), denoting their affiliation not only with
Salafism, but also their allegiance to the Islamic State. Women, “by leaving the West to perform
hijra... demonstrate that they see a superiority of IS’s ideology over the Western worldview,
providing important gratification and a significant morale booster for jihadist fighters.”522 Hijra
in the early days of Islam was a mass-migration of new Muslims from Mecca, a hostile city
dominated by pagan tribes, to Medina, a city of sanctuary. The emphasis on this language is to
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relate the movement of Muslims from the non-Muslim “West” to the sanctuary of the Muslim
“East.” Inside the caliphate, traditional Arabic titles of “Abu” and “Umm,” “Father” and
“Mother” emphasize gender roles but also the reproduction of the caliphate and the household as
the nexus of society. The use of Arabic and Islamic terms is laden with symbology, allowing
contemporary Muslims in the Salafi movement to assume the mantle of the early companions.
By constructing this ancient kinship inside of the contemporary umma with those in the early
one, “muhajirah” offers legitimacy to the movement and draws boundaries around the
community within the umma. In sum, it dovetails neatly with the Salafi ideology to which IS
belongs.
An admittedly inadequate term (based on a narrow understanding of the complex
motivations of women who travel to join the Islamic State) women who are successfully
recruited are called “Jihadi Bride” or “ISIS Bride.”523 This patriarchal label to describe women
who join the Islamic State assumes that women join IS to fulfill some kind of romantic fantasy.
This term coined by the Western media diminishes the significance of the sincere faithfulness of
many recruits, their agency, and the sophistication of IS as an organization.524 It essentializes the
motivations of all women who join IS, creating a monolithic entity that fails to fully articulate
women’s roles and motivations for joining the organization. Mia Bloom argues that women
recruited are simply “baby making factories” which is a crude and reductionist view of women’s
role within IS.525 IS is fixated on producing human capital either through slavery, reproduction,
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and/or recruitment, but it is also building a society constructed on what they believe is demanded
of the faithful, and that means marriage and children.526 Women in this caliphate are living a
particular understanding of their deen (custom) which does not solely revolve around
reproduction of babies but also of Islamic knowledge, kinship ties, and the management of a
diverse region thanks to the emigration of foreign fighters, including women.
IS propaganda materials are prolific, polished, and represent a sophisticated use of
Western stylization to appeal to Western audiences. IS’s propagandizing replaced the clandestine
release of a VHS tape or YouTube upload of an al-Qaeda release and, in respect to violence and
propaganda, IS has replaced al-Qaeda. Tape recordings of Osama bin Laden now seem almost
quaint compared to the lavish productions staged by IS. According to the Quilliam Foundation’s
report on the “Virtual Caliphate,” the official IS social media accounts generate an average of
38.2 individual posts every day.527 This number, however, does not include the number of memes
and other content developed by accounts that are not officially part of IS’s “brand” nor does it
include material shared between recruiters and their recruits via social media chat functions and
apps. The images are sophisticated and clever, like the parody of a Cover Girl ad and the more
typical IS “brand” in the second image:
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Fig. 30. Parody meme of Cover Girl ad posted
by IS account for women.528

Fig. 31. Typical of the IS “brand” with its muted, foreboding colors, and capitalizing on the Western stereotype
of Muslim women as an exotic, veiled woman. The premise of the advertising being membership in IS as a way
to achieve status, beauty, and power. The landscape, green, lush, a reflection of Paradise and not dusty,
dilapidated landscape of Syria or Iraq.529

@shakhabeeet, Telegram, https://t.me/shakhabeeet, c. 2016.
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IS excels at propaganda, in visual messages, and in appropriating images for their usage:
everything from the lions in a pride (above) to beautiful, veiled women superimposed on rolling
green hillsides. They excise the green of the West as a stand-in for Jannah and the exoticism of
stock image models as a promise as ubiquitous as that promised by Western consumerism: join
IS, come to Syria, fulfill your deen and be a queen. The sophisticated media campaign is in
every way a “Virtual Caliphate:” its utopian attributes only exist in cyberspace, is very much a
deliberate media strategy to entice Western viewers. It is a kind of “soft launch” of the IS brand
meant to generate interest in IS. The Tumblr blogs and Twitter accounts of women in the
movement are a mix of romantic meme’s, teacups, and inspirational quotes that mask the
realities of living in the caliphate, a war zone.530 A post on Tumblr has a photo of a teacup and a
book open to a page from Huckleberry Finn, ironically the story of an American runaway, but
used as a prop in a pro-IS post. It represents the supporter’s encouragement of her sisters, but it
also represents the women’s inability to fully disengage from their Western backgrounds.531 This
image strategy evokes what Katherine Brown called, “naïve romanticism” in her analysis of IS
for the BBC in 2014.532 The women of IS are responsible for not only growing the caliphate
through reproducing the next generation of mujahideen, they are responsible for “reproducing”
more wives for the current generation of mujahideen.
Unlike previous violent Islamist groups, IS actively recruits women, and they do so out of
necessity. In recruiting young women to join IS, members of the group seek out those who are
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isolated and adrift. American and British women are the most effective recruiters due to their
533

intimacy with Western culture and English being their native tongue. Some, like Aqsa
Mahmood, achieve a degree of online notoriety for their bravado as well as their ability to draw
new recruits. This process replicates the “Queen Bee” social dynamic that Western women are
534

familiar with in their immediate social orbits and also in popular culture. Young women who
535

are already on the periphery of their social and religious groups and/or who lack strong maternal
support, flock to the virtual persona of the “Queen Bee” who draws them into her world. One of
536

the most well-known examples of this “Queen Bee” is Tumblr user “Al-Amriki,” a still
anonymous American woman who was 19 at the time of this post in 2016. “Al-Amriki” clutters
her Tumblr with stylized images of jihad, weapons, and cups of tea all presented through a soft,
ethereal filter. Her Tumblr is a manic pastel scrapbook and captures the essence of the adolescent
mind and the young women who have joined the Islamic State.
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Fig. 32. Userpics taken from Al-Amriki’s Tumblr from January and March
2016, respectively. Her tagline, “eatin’ funyuns in the dunya (the mortal
world” speaks to both her American and Muslim identities. The background
of her photo may be Afghanistan as many of her meme’s refer to Osama bin
Ladin and Anwar al-Maliki, leaders of al-Qaeda. The second photo, which is
unusual, speaks to her age and adolescent status and seems to be in
opposition to her identity as a woman prepared for jihad.537

These social media accounts used for recruitment are also especially narcissistic, a boon for
groups like IS, with social media encouraging the cultivation of a more explicitly narcissistic
culture and generation. As one of Hoda Muthana’s friends pointed out, before the 20-year-old
co-ed from Alabama fled to join IS in Syria, she was two separate personalities in life and in
cyberspace: in reality she was quiet, distant, and adrift in a religious and conservative region.
Online, she could reinvent herself as devout, confident, and popular without self-conscious
vulnerability.538 Recruiters and recruits become part of a cyclical reproduction of narcissistic
behavior and are finally, and most importantly, perhaps for the first time in their own lives, they
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Ellie Hall, “Gone Girl: An Interview with an American ISIS,” Buzzfeed News, April 17, 2015,
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are able to achieve the dream of being a “Queen Bee” in their own right. They are the dominant,
influential, and admired in a community that accepts them wholly and gives them social and
political power, aspects of their current lives that are either lacking or non-existent in their
communities and countries.
Studies of the social media presences of women who successfully join IS note that
women consistently “reveal their alienation from their host … and even from diaspora
communities.”539 They are ethnically and socially diverse, but the one element they all have in
common is that they are alienated to some degree from their communities.540 They have deep
interests in Islam, but despite the number of hours they may spend on YouTube, Kik, TikTok,
Twitter, Skyping with more “knowledgeable” contemporaries, or Islamic apps they may
download, their knowledge of Islam is, at best, superficial, their understanding of the conflict
limited.541 They are part of what Peresin and Cerrone call a “jihadi girl power subculture” one
that could easily be limited to the boundaries of cyberspace, but also evolved into occupying real
space in Syria and Iraq, with some women occupying both.542 This notion of “jihadi girl power”
is also echoed by Nabeelah Jaffer in her interviews with IS women, including one called “Umm
Kulthum,” Jaffer notes that, “for all her hostility to the west, her western education had helped to
shape her. Like the other women, she used the language of ‘human rights’ and ‘girl power.’ She
shared stories of women in niqabs, with weapons, charging into battle.”543 These are women who
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came of age listening to the Spice Girls and the funneling of second wave feminism into
girlhood, so it is not surprising that the language is demonstrative of the conflict of identity and
the dislocation that the women drawn into IS feel can be remedied through joining IS, but it fails
to do so. The women who inevitably joined IS did not finally find their place in the wider world
or in the umma: they found a war that was more than a spiritual struggle and one that they could
not, and in some instances would not, escape.

3.5 “I don’t want to be IS poster girl.”544
There are many storytellers among the women of the Islamic State. As the organization
continues to lose ground both ideologically and geographically, the number of women who fulfill
these roles will increase. For the purposes of this dissertation, I chose two women whose stories
are important and still unfolding: Shamima Begum (UK) and Hoda Mathana (Alabama, US). No
standardized profile of the “average IS woman” exists: they come from a range of backgrounds
from affluent to impoverished, some with strong social and familial support, and some with
strong ties to conservative religious groups.545 Most of the women were considered bright, social,
and precocious teenage girls with developing adolescent interests and goals. Their “diary entries
(were) about youthful Muslim political grievance and identity agony… in sharp contrast to the
deeply theorized political and ideological writings of ISIS female leaders in Arabic, anchored in
the discord of their societies. For Arabic-illiterate Western women, going on the hybrid
aesthetics and lofty resistance narratives of ISIS videos, and their own scattered, naïve longings
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for community, joining ISIS was not unlike a rebellion.”546 The girls embraced family, good
grades, Forever 21 (clothing store chain for young women), and Islamic extremism.547
A common trait amongst all of the women involved in recruitment to and within the
Islamic State is the originally benign desire to know more about Islam and the global Muslim
community. Their interested questions were answered quickly by extremists lying in wait for
their prey. Exploiting grief, disenfranchisement within these young women’s homes and wider
communities, and their developing adolescent identities, IS recruiters were able to convince them
to leave everything behind and travel to a war zone. That the majority of them are older
millennials or members of Generation Z is no coincidence, as their comfort with technology and
constant messaging and their relatively young age, made them easy targets of influence. They
were all vulnerable children grossly exploited for the benefit of an organization that terrorized
the areas they occupied and the girls they lured into their world.
Shamima Begum’s recruitment into the Islamic State originated when her classmate
Sharmeena Begum (no relation), began an online correspondence with Aqsa Mahmood, a 19year-old college co-ed from Glasgow University. Aqsa was among the first of the so-called
“Jihadi Brides” to travel to Syria.548 Aqsa’s social media presence coupled with being one of the
first known members of the Islamic State in 2013 made her a celebrity among young women
interested in IS.549 Her online identities were “Umm Layth” and “Al Britaniyya” on Tumblr and
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Twitter respectively.550 Although she denied it, authorities believe that she was the primary
recruiter of the Bethnal Green school girls: Shamima Begum, Kadiza Sultan, and Amira
Abase.551
On her Tumblr, Aqsa writes advice and encouragement to other young women
contemplating traveling to Syria
The first phone call you make once you cross the borders is one of the
most difficult things you will ever have to do. Your parents are already
worried enough over where you are, wether [sic] you are okay and what’s
happened. How does a parent who has little Islamic knowledge and
understanding comprehend why their son or daughter has left their well
off [sic] life, education and a bright future behind to go live in a war torn
country. Most likely they will blame themselves, they will think they
have done something. But until they truly understand from the bottom of
their heart that you have done this action sincerely for Allah’s sake they
will live in hope that you will return. They might assume this is a ‘phase’
you are going through or a huge mistake you have made. I know of
people who have been here in Shaam for over 2 years and their parents
still try to persuade them to come back and live in false hope. Make Duaa
that Allaah makes it easy for your parents to understand and accept your
Hijrah.552
Her Twitter accounts are also scattered with references to travel to Syria and offers of sisterly
advice to would-be pilgrims to Syria: “Sisters please don’t forget to pack thermal clothing or
you’ll regret it later on.”553 In examining her digital world, author Azadeh Moaveni writes of
Mahmood, “…she used all the tools of her western upbringing to marshal that idealism, so she

Like “Umm Kulthum,” Aqsa Mahmoud’s online identity is embedded in her Muslim identity and is demonstrative
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became this hybrid phenomenon, sharing her experiences in an individualistic, millennial
way.”554 Her effectiveness as a recruiter and communicator came from the power of millennials’
ability at effective, broad messaging and creating personal brands through social media platforms
rather than more traditional and nuanced forms of recruitment via in-person meetings and
passing pamphlets. Aqsa, like “Umm Kulthum” and “Diary of a Mujahirah/Green Bird of
Jannah,” referred to earlier in this chapter, skillfully used social media to manipulate their peers.
It was through her clever correspondence that Aqsa drew Shamima Begum and the Bethnal
Green schoolgirls into IS.
Shamima Begum’s radicalization began in 2014 with her group of friends: Sharmeena
Begum, Kadiza Sultan, and Amira Abase. All three of the girls came from London’s East End
and the Bethnal Green Area. The neighborhood is home to immigrants from Pakistan, India,
Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka and proximate to the famous Brick Lane where vendors of saris and
Islamic fashion exist side-by-side. The area’s Muslim enclave makes up “rows of housing
complexes behind Bethnal Green’s main street…(and a) deeply conservative Muslim community
where the lines between religion and extremism can be blurred, including in at least one of the
girls’ families. In this community, the everyday challenges that girls face look very different
from those of their male counterparts.”555 According to Zahra Qadir, an anti-radicalization
activist working in Bethnal Green, “Girls used to want someone who is good-looking; nowadays,
girls want Muslims who are practicing. It’s a new thing over the last couple of years. A lot of
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girls want that, even some nonpracticing girls.”556 According to Qadir, this shift in what girls in
this conservative enclave are looking for is the product of a post-9/11 world that deeply effected
the community’s economic and social agency. Religious conservatism bloomed in Muslim
enclaves in East London and with it more social pressure on girls.557 Families banked intangibles
like girls’ piety and educational achievement to provide the wealth that neither the economy nor
society at large would offer Muslims. The Bethnal Green schoolgirls were an example of this
shift but with disastrous consequences.
Sharmeena was the first to be radicalized after the death of her mother and her father’s
remarriage in September 2014. Her interest in Islam and her isolation was understandably
attributed to grief and her father’s quickly arranged second marriage.558 She left London in
December 2014 to join the Islamic State in Syria. On February 5, approximately six weeks after
Sharmeena’s flight to Syria, school officials and police asked to take statements from her friends,
Shameema, Kediza, and Amira, about Sharmeena’s activities and motives. The authorities made
a fatal mistake; instead of giving the letters asking for parental permission to the parents directly,
they gave a copy of each letter to the three girls separately.559 The three girls were briefly
questioned but remained evasive. Twelve days later on February 17, 2015, admiring their clever
friend, Shameena, and emboldened by the visit from the counterterrorism officer, Shamima,
Kadiza, and Amira left London and were smuggled into Syria from Turkey. They did not leave a
digital footprint of their plans, only a crumpled list of items they needed to bring with them to
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Syria, so we can only conjecture what their conversations and planning entailed.560 From the
moment that the girls disappeared from the grainy surveillance footage, they were lost. Kadiza
was killed in an airstrike in August 2016 and Amira, according to Shameema, is still in Baghuz,
one of the Islamic State’s last strongholds.561 Sharmeena, coached by Aqsa to lure her girlfriends
abroad, is still missing.562

Fig. 33. (L to R): Kadiza Sultana, Shamima Begum, and Amira Abase pass
through airport security on their way to Syria in February 2015.563

For four years, Shamima’s whereabouts were unknown until 2019, when Anthony Lloyd
of the Times in London discovered her in the Al-Hol refugee camp in northeast Syria where she
was known simply as, “No. 28850.”564 In one breath, she told Lloyd, “I’m not the same silly little
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15-year-old schoolgirl who ran away from Bethnal Green four years ago…And I don’t regret
coming here.”565 In taped interviews with Shamima, she speaks with a flat affect, still a teenager
but already a widow who had lost three children to war.566 In another interview with the BBC in
2019 from a refugee camp in Syria, she told reporters, “I don’t want to be the poster girl for
IS.”567 After all of the media attention, Shamima was moved to Al-Hol Refugee camp where
there are more women who abandoned the Islamic State and its ideology.568 At the camp, she
removed her hijab and returned to Western dress (her transition pictured below). According to
Vera Mironova, “I don’t think it’s a strategy, a woman who is pro-ISIS wouldn’t take it off to get
repatriate [sic],” adding that women who retain their connections to the Islamic State in refugee
camps receive money, phones, and other resources through a clandestine network.569 A return to
Western dress is a bold move for women who, despite living in the relative safety of a refugee
camp, still move among women who have not disavowed themselves of affiliation with the
Islamic State. For Shamima, the return to a Western style of dress is perhaps the biggest sign of
her maturity and recognition of her actions as an adolescent and coming to terms with her
Western and Islamic identities.
Shamima’s British citizenship was revoked in 2019; in June 2020, she won the right to
return to the UK in an effort to restore her citizenship.570 The June 2020 ruling was subsequently
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overturned in February 2021, but Shamima can still fight to restore her citizenship from the
refugee camp where she resides among the other stateless women, waiting to be returned and
repatriated. She no longer gives interviews after regrettably being made the “poster girl” for the
Islamic State as the only surviving member of her group of school friends who traveled to Syria
in 2014.

Fig. 34. Shamima Begum’s age progression through her journey with the Islamic State. Left to Right: Age
15 in Bethnal Green in her school uniform. Age 19 as “No. 28850” in a Syrian refugee camp after fleeing IS.
Age 21 in a new refugee camp wearing Western dress and a expressing a desire for anonymity while the
court hears her appeal for citizenship.571

Hoda Muthana, the second of the IS storytellers, had years of Islamic education in
Alabama where she memorized the Qur’an and was active in the local Muslim community but
without the close bond shared by the Bethnal Green schoolgirls.572 Her family was religiously
and socially conservative, so Hoda grew-up in an environment where the foundations of
conservative Islam were in place. Part of this conservatism was the lack of a cellphone until she
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turned 18. Access to the internet was monitored by her father, Muhammad, to make sure that she
was not talking to boys. Sharing photos of her face, even wearing hijab, was off-limits.573
According to Hoda, her family appreciated her growing sense of modesty and her deepening
interest in her faith. This changed, Hoda said, when “they saw me getting jihadi.”574 A devout
and well-educated daughter was an honor, but one who ran away from home, unaccompanied, to
join the Islamic State was a disaster.
In 2015, Hoda was interviewed by Ellie Hall of Buzzfeed news via the app Kik.575 Hoda
told Hall, “I started getting interested in my deen [religious life] around 2012. I felt like my life
was so bland without it. Life has much more meaning when u know why ur here.” Like Aqsa
576

Mahmood, Hoda’s interest in Islamic political thought began around the time of the start of the
civil war in Syria (2011-ongoing). Access to the internet gave Hoda unrestricted access to an
endless array of information and interpretations of Islam. She watched sermons on YouTube and
in Fall 2013, she created a secret profile on Twitter where she eventually gained over 1,000
followers, one of which was Aqsa Mahmood. One year later, in November 2014, Hoda left
577

Alabama for Syria and life with the Islamic State.
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Unlike Shamima, Hoda left a social media trail before Twitter and Tumblr suspended IS
accounts in 2015.578 Her Twitter account (@ZumarulJannah) was where she proudly renounced
her US citizenship along with three other women traveling to Syria with her stating that soon she
would burn her passport.579

Fig. 35. Photo from Hoda Muthana’s
Twitter account on December 1, 2014,
just days after she left her home in
Alabama.580

Hoda tweeted from her account in Syria and called upon American Muslims to commit terrorist
attacks in the United States: “Americans wake up! You have much to do while you live under
our greatest enemy, enough of your sleeping! Go on drive-bys [sic] and spill all of their blood, or
rent a big truck and drive all over them.”581 The war against the West was easier to fight on
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Twitter and like Shamima, Hoda’s enchantment with IS was short-lived: by 2016 she was
already widowed, remarried, and pregnant with her only surviving child.582
In 2019, Hoda lived amidst famine in what was supposed to be a land of plenty and
subsisted on boiled grass: she wanted to come home.583 The Constitutional Law Center for
Muslims in America and attorney Charles Swift, helped make clandestine arrangements for Hoda
to escape and surrender to American or allied forces. Hoda and her baby successfully escaped IS
on their third attempt, surrendering to Kurdish forces (peshmerga).584 She was transported to the
Al-Hol refugee camp where she and her infant son were given care. In 2019, she told journalists
from ABC News, “I wish I could take it completely off the Net, completely out of people's
memory. ... I regret it. ... I hope America doesn't think I'm a threat to them and I hope they can
accept me and I'm just a normal human being who's been manipulated once and hopefully never
again."585 Her earnest sentiments echoed those of another resident of the camp: Shamima
Begum. Indeed, their stories continue to run parallel to one another. Responding almost
immediately to the broadcast of Hoda’s pleas, President Trump tweeted

Fig. 36. Tweet from President Donald Trump’s
account regarding Hoda Muthana.586
Elbein, “The Un-American.”
Ibid.
Ibid.
Enjoli Francis and James Longman, “Former ISIS bride who left US for Syria says she ‘interpreted everything
very wrong,” ABC News, Feburary 19, 2019, https://abcnews.go.com/International/isis-bride-left-us-syriainterpreted-wrong/story?id=61175508. Accessed March 26, 2021.
Donald Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, February 20, 2019. See also: Rebecca Morin, “Trump says he
directed Pompeo not to let ISIS bride back in U.S.,” Politico, February 20, 2019,
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In November 2019, a US Court revoked her citizenship.587 Two years later, in January 2021, the
Washington, D.C. Circuit court unanimously upheld the ruling, stating that although Hoda was
born in the United States, her father had not informed the government of his loss of a diplomatic
post prior to her birth, and thus she was not entitled to US citizenship.588 Despite the resources
available to Hoda, she remains in diplomatic limbo, as does Shamima. The US and UK are still
reluctant to repatriate these women who were legally minors when they left, insisting that they be
assessed as adults.
One question remains unanswered: if the state will take them back without significant
repercussions, will the families? Will the communities be willing to put in the labor necessary to
support and deradicalize these girls? The courts in the UK and the US argue that repatriating
women who joined IS is dangerous and that as women, they are more likely to successfully
carry-out attacks on-behalf of local terror cells.589 There is merit to this argument because
without proper support from families, communities, and the state, these women are still
vulnerable. They have gaps in their education and emotional and social development that must
be addressed as part of counterterrorism efforts.590
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Shamima and Hoda do not have control over any aspect of their identities now except for
their aesthetic devices, an occasional statement through their attorneys, and sporadic updates
from family members willing to speak to the media. Shamima’s transformation from a young
widow draped in black to a fashionable woman with hennaed hair and sunglasses reminds us of
how young she was when she ran away and how quicky she had to grow up. Hoda also dispensed
with the black niqaab and abaya (cloak) and returned to the modern hijab she favored as a
teenager in Alabama. Through aesthetics and signifiers deemed non-threatening to Western
observers, they are trying to reclaim their identity and their innocence that was lost when they
decided to join IS and to ensure the West, without words, that they are no longer a threat (and
perhaps never were).

3.6 CONCLUSION: THE MUHAJIRAT IN DIASPORA
In Raqqa, the capital of the Islamic State, Scheherazade’s final words to her father echo
through a 21st century phone call 700 miles from Baghdad: "I don't have a good feeling. I feel
scared. You know if something goes wrong, that's it. I'll never be able (to come home)."591 The
women who joined IS from the West fled their communities virtually and literally, becoming
part of an ultimately unsuccessful and unsustainable utopia abroad. These women left their
communities, frustrated with their lack of social, religious, and economic agency to join a young,
diverse group of coreligionists with a vision that became more of a dystopia than a utopia. Many
of these women are dead, while others are living in limbo with nebulous to non-existent
citizenship. Their childhood and adolescence were shaped by a competing cacophony of

Merritt Kennedy, “British Schoolgirl Who Ran Away To Join ISIS Feared Dead in Syria,” NPR, August 12, 2016,
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narratives born from terror and warmongering. As a result, they were disenfranchised through
war, Islamophobia, racism, the effects of an ongoing economic crisis, and a youth bifurcated by
large scale terror and exhaustive wars. The residual stress and uncertainty, the dramatic shift in
politics and social norms permeating every interaction and social institution, deeply affected
many of these women, leading them to leave the West to seek security and acceptance elsewhere.
In 2017 and into early 2018, IS ceded much of its territory to Iraqi and Syrian forces,
leaving IS fighters stranded, imprisoned, and executed. For foreign women, the situation was
particularly grave as their sense of security disappeared and they were quickly strangers in a
strange land and a land that did not want them permanently. Some of the women who joined IS
were killed by government forces, some have disappeared entirely, some languish in refugee
camps in limbo between states, and some may be in captivity with Iraqi and Syrian governments.
A handful of women have returned to their home countries with no consequences and their
citizenship still intact. Jurists in these countries have handed down light sentences, if any at all,
and some women have begun to educate other women of the dangers of extremism.592 Many of
the women returning to their countries of origin are returning with psychological issues like
PTSD and are also single mothers bearing children fathered by IS fighters, while others, it is
suspected, are returning on false premises of reconciliation, only to become embedded with a
new group of IS sympathizers. This again complicates the idea of citizenship in Western
countries for Muslim women creating a complicated and perverse diaspora from a non-state that
countries must contend with to maintain their own security. What rights do women returning
from IS have after fleeing the United States, Great Britain, and other Western nations, burning

Anne Speckhard and Ardian Shajkovci, “Beware the Women of ISIS: There are Many and They May Be More
Dangerous Than the Men,” The Daily Beast, September 12, 2017, https://www.thedailybeast.com/beware-thewomen-of-isis-there-are-many-and-they-may-be-more-dangerous-than-the-men. Accessed August 19, 2020.
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their passports, promoting terror, and undermining the security of the state? These were women
who are capable of duplicitous behavior, presenting one façade to their local community and
another through social media. They have been vehicles for IS once, at what point do they cease
to be a threat? By joining IS in search of a form of citizenship that appealed, embraced, and
enabled these women, they have further complicated the citizenships they left behind. Their
rights are limited by the state and, for women returning to families scandalized by their
daughters’ departures, curtailed by families and communities, too. As of this writing, it is too
early to tell how this group of women will renegotiate their citizenship, if they do at all, and how
states will cope with the emerging and returning threat of radicalized and traumatized women.
Scheherazade’s last words to her father demonstrate that she knew the risk of marrying
the Sultan, but she persisted, knowing that it could and would be an immense personal sacrifice
regardless of the outcome. She had faith that her actions were correct and that whatever the
outcome, it would not be in vain. The women of the Islamic State also understood this to varying
degrees, that the risk of fleeing to the caliphate carried the risk of death, but their desire to be
among others who understood them, their stories, their histories, their identities was too
powerful. Scheherazade was prepared to sacrifice herself for the benefit of other women in her
kingdom. The women of the Islamic State were prepared to make the same sacrifices for the
benefit of the umma and to restore the caliphate as a center of learning and culture like medieval
Baghdad where Muslims flourished and were protected. The future of the caliphate and the
women who sacrificed their families, citizenship, and lives, to support it, is tenuous. While some
women remain loyal to the Islamic State, others like Shamima Begum and Hoda Muthana
pivoted to seek a different kind of caliphate that requires faith, patience, and community rather
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than faith, violence, and isolation. Shamima and Hoda’s stories, yet to be fully told, will
undoubtedly be about their reconciliation with family, community, and, most importantly, Islam.
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V: CONCLUSION

The Midway Plaisance is now Midway Plaisance Drive and the land that once hosted the
“Sliding Scale of Humanity” is Midway Plaisance Park. The park is a blank strip of green grass,
scattered with a handful of trees and some benches. It separates the University of Chicago’s
campus from the Woodlawn neighborhood on Chicago’s East Side. The majority of Woodlawn’s
residents are African-American and the median household income is $13,000.593 The Midway
Plaisance in 1893 was a place to display and interact at a “safe” distance with races and cultures
considered inferior to the white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant majority in the United States. Over a
century later, the exhibits are gone, but the Midway Plaisance still forms a borderland between
race and class.594 The juxtaposition of the University of Chicago’s gothic, Anglo architecture
looming over dilapidated apartment buildings, bodegas, and the disenfranchised loitering on the
streets is a contemporary iteration of the Midway. Researchers, Chicagoans, and students from
the university visiting, observing, and maintaining a distance between us and them. There is no
memorializing of the Midway nor of the anonymous bodies exhibited and lost to time.
The process of integrating hijab into American culture continues to accelerate as more
Muslim entrepreneurs enter the marketplace to build Muslim-centered brands for an expanding
global market. In 2017, American Eagle, a brand marketed to American teenagers, introduced a
denim hijab that quickly sold-out. This denim hijab was a new take on the ultimate American
textile: denim. This sartorial statement was also a way to integrate teenage Muslim girls into the

World Hijab Day Homepage (https://worldhijabday.com/)
“We are Here,” The Chicago Blog, Blog Post, The University of Chicago Press, July 23, 2013.
https://pressblog.uchicago.edu/2013/07/23/we-are-here.html. This blog post offers an aerial view of the site of the
Midway bifurcating the Woodlawn. To the right is the University of Chicago’s campus and to the left is the
Woodlawn neighborhood of Chicago’s East side.
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fashions of American adolescence. In early 2018, Macy’s introduced a modest fashion line
called, “Urban Modesty,” to cater to Muslim women. The collection features stylish dresses and
tops made modest by longer hemlines and sleeves.595 In September 2020, Melanie Elturk, the
founder of HauteHijab announced plans to expand her hijab empire to the United Kingdom by
the second fiscal quarter of 2021 and to the Middle East by the end of the year.596 The market for
contemporary Muslim fashion is now estimated at $270 billion.597 American Muslim women are
a major driver of the growth of that market as a result of their experience creating an identity that
honors their Muslim identity and the necessity of integrating that identity into American culture.
In Los Angeles, the Women’s Mosque of America exists as another iteration of hijab, in
the form of a women’s-only mosque. The mosque expanded upon the work of the “Side
Entrance” project in the North America, which refers to the special entrance, separate from men,
where women enter, pray, and gather.598 Instead of attempting to continue the work of Amina
Wadud and Asra Nomani in integrating prayer, the founders of the Women’s Mosque of
America sought to create a women-only space for worship.599 The Women’s Mosque of
American reflects the position of women in the earliest days of Islam, segregated from men but
gathered around A’isha, the Prophet’s favorite wife and the companion with the most prolific
number of hadith to share with her intimate community of women.600 In this way, the Women’s
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Mosque of America introduced one of the earliest practices within Islam to the United States. In
2020, the Friday khutbah (sermon) and sharing of hadith was moved to Zoom creating yet
another dimension of hijab for the contemporary practice of Islam.
The final chapter of this dissertation centers on the women of the Islamic State (IS/ISIS)
and an important part of Muslim women’s identity formation in the West. IS is a result of the
destabilization of Iraq and Syria through American and British intervention.601 Recruitment of
women from the United States and Great Britain is supported by two decades of Islamophobia
and disenfranchisement of young Muslims living abroad, but there is no exact profile of young
Muslim women, either born or newly converted, who join IS.602 There may be parallels between
women who join gangs in that these groups offer a form of power, community, and protection.603
Those looking for community and an identity that is in active political and aesthetic opposition to
the status quo are increasingly drawn to Wahhabism, the ideological and political foundation of
IS.604 These are mostly adolescents and young adults who are in search of meaning and
community.605 Some of these participants were born or came of age in communities and
countries where they are estranged from both their countries of origin and the country their
families settled. Other young women are estranged from their families or peers and the
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messaging from IS recruiters resonates more strongly than the other forms of online grooming.
These variables combined in different ways form the profiles of the various girls who left their
homes to join IS.
The significance of IS as another venue of identity formation for Muslim women cannot
be ignored. It is uncomfortable to acknowledge and accept that the participation of women in
terror groups and as non-state actors.606 As Sjoberg and Gentry write, “portrayals of women
terrorists rarely if ever characterize them as having individual agency in general or with respect
to their violence specifically. This voiceless picture of women terrorists shows a lack of
knowledge and understanding of the ‘subject’ on the part of the media (and even on the part of
the academy).”607 In the context of IS recruitment, the participation of women is complicated by
the average age of the recruits and the process through which they are brought into IS via online
grooming.608 The age of the recruits must be considered: adolescents are not cognitively
developed enough to consider the long-term consequences of their risk-taking behavior yet for
many of the young women in IS, there appears to be a ruthless maturity that mitigates biology.609
They are almost universally groomed by online recruiters in the same way that sexual predators
groom young girls online but recruiters for IS frame their grooming in the context of inviting
young women to help reestablish the caliphate and to leave the City of Brass for a Golden Age
Damascus. This method of recruitment ages these adolescents because of the parallels with
rituals of adulthood especially in Jewish and Christian traditions.610 Islam, like Judaism and
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Christianity, grants them the status and authority of adults even when they are not considered
adults by secular society and this is how we must understand their involvement in IS.
Membership in IS is a rite of passage and a conscious decision made in the context of what these
young women believe is a return to the uncorrupted form of Islam and with it, a complete
identity.
Among the girls recruited by IS, many are dead, some are missing, and many are in
diplomatic limbo, like Shamima Begum. During the writing of this dissertation, I followed
Shamima’s case from the time of her flight as a 15-year-old runaway to Raqqa from the London
neighborhood of Bethnal Green in 2014. Shamima left London for Syria accompanied by two of
her school friends, Amira Abase and Kediza Sultan.611 Amira and Kediza were killed in Syria
and Shamima fled to a refugee camp in 2019.612 Shamima was interviewed by the BBC in
February 2019, still a teenager, her flat affect was indicative of someone who experienced
significant trauma but was perceived by many as dismissive and possessing the cadence of a
typical, bored teenager.613 She offhandedly recalled how she saw heads in barrels and appeared
unmoved but also stated, “I don’t want to be an IS poster girl.”614 Reports about Shamima’s
involvement in IS included her role in the Al-Khansaa Brigade which involved, among other
responsibilities, sewing fighters into suicide vests so they could not free themselves except
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through detonating the bomb.615 A protracted legal fight continues over Shamima’s citizenship
and her right to return to the U.K. The government argues that as a foreign fighter, she
relinquished her right to citizenship while supporters and counterterrorism researchers insist that
Shamima, barely twenty, could be rehabilitated and a valuable asset.616 In February 2021, the
British government upheld its decision to never let her return to reclaim her citizenship, so she
remains in limbo in a Syrian refugee camp.617 Despite her protestations, Shamima is the IS poster
girl but not in the way she perceives it. Shamima is the only one of the girls who joined IS whose
journey is still ongoing and is simultaneously heartbreaking and contemptible: a deeply damaged
child who is barely a woman.
The World’s Columbian Exposition lasted just over a year in 1893 and left a lasting
impression on Americans through its living Orientalist portrait on the Midway Plaisance. The
belly dancers of the Midway enabled American men and women to experience desire from a
distance. Later, New Age gurus and second wave feminists stripped belly dancing of any of its
Islamic elements and used it for empowerment and body positivity. The September 11th attacks
did nothing to deter belly dancing’s popularity, the violence embedded it deeper into
performative imperial feminism. After 9/11, a generation of Muslim women started to challenge
the narrative of this imperial feminism by negotiating space within imperial feminism and
framing it as dawah through World Hijab Day, entering the American consumer landscape by
creating a market for accessible modest Islamic clothing, and establishing a space set apart to
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exist as a community in the Women’s Mosque of America. Other women chose to join terror
organizations like al-Qaeda or the Islamic State to claim a Muslim identity that was a reaction to
secularism, disenfranchisement, and violence against their co-religionists and ethnic group by
Western nations. The process of identity formation is happening on multiple sites and at a faster
rate than previous generations because of the pace of globalization and the success of organizing
and political activism. Two decades after 9/11, a generation of young Muslim women is actively
deciding what it means to be Muslim, how to identify as Muslim, and how to negotiate a world
where that meaning is constantly challenged and renegotiated.
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